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ANNUAL REVIEW OF MARYLAND LAW: 
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, 1995-96 
OPINIONS 
The University oj Baltimore Law Review proudly introduces the 
Annual Review oj Maryland Law. The Review is designed to help 
practitioners by keeping them abreast of recent decisions of the Court 
of Appeals of Maiyland. The Review consists of short synopses of 
every case published by the Court of Appeals of Maryland during 
the previous year. Although this issue only covers opinions published 
between September 15, 1995 and May 17, 1996, beginning with 
Volume 27 the Review will cover the entire year. 
Organized by categories based on the Maryland Lawyer's Index 
on Published Opinions, each piece contains a short discussion of the 
facts and analysis of the law(s) affected by the holding. An index is 
included to facilitate the practitioner's search for changes in Maryland 
case law. 
Accompanying the Review is statistical data (Tables II through 
V) gathered to further aid Maryland practitioners in analyzing current 
trends of the court. This data, however, should not be interpreted 
as having any predictive value on the outcome of future cases. These 
tables follow the methodology used by the Harvard Law Review and 
the Revista Jurfdica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. See 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 305-06 (1986); 65 REv. lOR. V.P.R. 703-21 (1996). 
We are delighted to present our first Review and welcome 
constructive comments. 
THE EDITORS 
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TABLE I 
Case Name Pag. Subject Addi.ional Subjects 
Classified Impacted 
Under 
Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck 10 Bus 
MontgomeJY County v. Revere National Corp. II Bus Stat. Code. '" R.g 
Pav.1 En •• rpri .... Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co. 14 Bus 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Muyland National 8aDI< 16 Bus 
IA CoDStnlction Corp. v. Carney 18 Bus Prop 
Moleswonh v. Brandon 19 Bus S •••• Cod. '" R.g 
Enterprise Leasing Co. v. AIl ..... IDs. Co. 21 Bus Const I S.at. Cod •• '" R.g 
Sullins v. A11sWe Insurance Co. 13 Bus Evid 
Mackin '" Associates v. Hanis 15 Bus 
Uninsured Employen' Fund v. Lutter 27 Bus Ton 
Cottman v. Princess Anne ViU .. 29 Civ Pro 
Middl. S ..... Holding Co. v. Tbomas 30 Civ Pro 
Urban Si •• Venture" Ltd. v. Levering Associates Ltd. Pannenblp 31 Civ Pro Prop 
Bradley v. Hazard Tecbnology Co. 33 Civ Pro 
Gilchris. v. S .... 34 Civ Pro Cons. I Crim 
Fearnow v. Cbesapeake '" Potomac T.lephone Co. 37 Civ Pro S.at. Code. '" R.g 
In re Keehan lOS ProfR .. 
Anomey Grievance Commission v. Glenn 110 ProfR .. 
Attorney Gri.vance Commission v. Breschi 112 ProfR .. 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. WiUchet 114 Prof R .. 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kenney IU ProfR .. 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. James 116 ProfR .. 
"Bus" = Business Law: "Civ Pro" - Civil Procedure: "Crim" - Criminal Law: "Cons<" - Constitu.ional Law: "Evid" a Evidence Law: 
"Fam" - Family Law: "Prof Res" - Professional Responsibility: "Prop" - Property Law: "Law. Code. '" R.g" - S .... Law. Cod. '" 
Regulalions; -Ton- J:I Tort Law. 
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TABLE I (.-tnuaI) 
CascName Plae Subject Additional SubjectS 
Classified Impacted 
Under 
Poe v. Stale 39 Crim 
-
Aravonis v. 50_ County 42 Crim Censt 
Harley v. SlIlC 44 Crim Cens! 
SlIlC v. Brown 46 Crim 
-
BurreU v. SlIlC 48 Crim 
-
Gary v. SlIlC 50 Crim SW, Code, '" Res 
Stale v. Pun:ell 51 Crim 
-
Whittlesey v, SlIlC 53 Crim Cons! 
Grandison v, Stale 59 Crim Evid I Censt 
Ebb v, SlIlC 61 Crim 
-
Motor Vehicle Adminbtration v. KIIwacIti 63 Crim Evid I Stat, Code, '" Res 
Spitzinger v. Stale 65 Crim Const I Stat, Code, '" Reg 
Dennis v. SlIlC 67 Crim Const 
Jennings v. Stale 69 Crim Stat, Code, '" Reg 
SlIlC v. Brown 71 Crim 
-
Sbmd v. Stale 72 Crim 
-
Boyd v. SlIlC 74 Crim 
-
Gadson v. SlIlC 76 Crim Const 
Mangum v. SlIlC 77 Crim 
-
Baltimore Sun Co. v. SlIlC 79 Const Civ Pro 
SlIlC v. Jones 80 Const Crim 
Bishop v. Stale 82 Cons! Crim 
Ocpattmeot of Public Safety v. Bers 83 Const Stat, Code, '" Reg 
'Bus' a Businesa Law; "Civ Pro" - Civil Procedure; "Crim" - Crimillal Law; "Cons!" - Cons!itutional Law; "Evid" ~ Evidence Law; 
'Fan>" = Family Law; "Prof Rcs" - Professional Responsibility; "Prop" - Property Law; "Law, Code, '" Reg' = SlIlC Law, Code & 
Regulations: -Ton- - Ton Law. 
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TABLE I (contInIud) 
INDEX TO CASES REvIEWED AND SVBn!cr MAnmtS COVDED 
Case Name Page Subject Additional Subjects 
C1usified Impacted 
Under 
Armstead v. State 85 Evid Crim I Const I Sw, 
Code, &. Reg 
Aroiza v. Roskowinslci-Droneburg 87 Evid 
--
Sears, Roebuck &. Co. v. Ralph 89 Evid Tort I Civ Pro 
Goldstein v. Swe 92 Evid Crim 
Jackson v. State 93 Evid Crim 
Stewart v. State 95 Evid Crim 
Departmenl of Public Safety aDd Co=tional Services v. Cole 98 Evid CoDS! 
Fnnch v. Ankney 99 Evid Tort 
Klingenberg v. Klingenberg 101 Fam Civ Pro 
Coburn v. Coburn 102 Fam Civ Pro I Sw, Code, 
&. Reg 
BlaI<c: v. Blake 104 Fam Civ Pro 
Wills v. Jones 105 Fam Sw, Code, &. Reg 
Gordon v. Gordon 107 Faro 
-
Romm v. Au \18 Prop Sw, Code, &. Reg 
Magraw v. Dillow \19 Prop 
-
Schuman, Kane, FelIS &. Evemgam v. A1uisi 121 Prop Stat, Code, &. Reg 
Schlossberg v. Citizens Bank 122 Prop Bus I Civ Pro 
Bennett Heating &. Air Conditioning Inc. v. NationsBank 124 Prop Civ Pro I Bus 
Ro v. Heredia 126 Prop Civ Pro 
Prince George's County v. Vieira 127 Prop Const 
Wallander v. Bames 128 Prop 
-
"Bus" = Business Law; "Civ Pro" a Civil Procedure; "Crim" a Criminal Law; "Const" - Constitutional Law; "Evid" = Evidence Law; 
"Fatn" = Family Law; "Prof Res" - Professional Responsibility; "Prop" - Property Law; "Law, Code, &. Reg" - State Law, Code &. 
Regulations; "Tort" = Tort Law. 
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TABLE I (a>Ninuall 
INDEX TO CASES RIMEWED AND Stian!cT MATI'ERS COVERED 
Cm:Name Page Subject Additional Subjects 
CI:wified Impacted 
Under 
Fnuernal Order of PIlIic:e, Inc. Y. Baltimore County 130 Stat, Code, -
'" Reg 
Comptroller of Treaswy Y. Disclosure, Inc. 131 Stat, Code, -
'" Reg 
Roberts Y. LakIn 132 Stat, Code, -
'" Reg 
Board of Trustees of the Maryland State Retirement and Pension SystemS Y. 134 Stat, Code, -Hugh .. & Reg 
InsuraDcc CotntniJsioner Y. Equitable Life Assurance Soeie<y 13S Stat, Code, Ciy Pro I CODSt & Reg 
Carrion y. Linzey 137 Stat, Code, Ciy Pro I Ton 
& Reg 
Blondell y. Baltimore City PIlIic:e J)epattment 139 Stat, Code, -& Reg 
Hess Consuuction Co. y. Board of Educallon of PriIIc:e Oeorge's County 141 Stat, Code, Bus I Civ Pro 
& Reg 
Stev .... v. Rite-Aid Corp. 142 Stat, Code, Ton 
& Reg 
Hsupt y. State 144 Stat, Code, Civ Pro & Reg 
Alleco, Inc. Y. Harry & leanette Weinberg Foundation 14S Ton Ciy Pro I Prof Res 
Montgomery Ward v. W'tlson 147 Ton Civ Pro 
AC~,Inc.v.Godwm 149 Ton Civ Pro I Const 
Monis y. Osmose Wood Ptaerving lSI Ton Ciy Pro I Bus I Stat, 
Code, '" Reg 
"Bus" = Busmess Law; "Civ Pro" _ Civil Procedure; "Crim" - Criminal Law; "Const" a Constitutional Law; "Evid" - Evidence Law; 
"Fam" = Family Law; "Prof Res" • Professional Responsibility; "Prop" = Property Law; "Law, Code, & Reg" = State Law, Code & 
Regulalions; "Ton" - Ton Law. 
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TABLED 
INDMDUAL 0Vn'\Ir or JUDGES 
Judge N OC S CO CV 00 DV OCO DCV 
Roben C. MlUphy 70 12 56 0 0 I I 0 0 
JoIID C. Eldridge 79 10 64 0 0 I 4 0 0 
Lawrence F. RodoWiley 79 12 64 0 I 0 2 0 0 
Howanl S. CIwaDow 79 14 51 2 I I 0 0 0 
Robcn L. Karwacki 78 9 67 0 I I 0 0 0 
Roben M. Bell 80 7 60 0 2 7 3 I 0 
Irma S. Raker 80 12 59 2 0 3 4 0 0 
John F. McAuliffe 8 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(Specially Assigned) 
Marvin H. Smllh I 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(Specially Assigned) 
Roben F. FiJcber 2 0 0 0 0 I I 0 0 
(Specially Assigned) 
Theodore G. Bloom I 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 
(Specially Assigned) 
Total 
-
7S" 
-
4 
-
16 
-
I -
This table showa Ihe individual 0IIlpUl of eacb judge. "N" - number of ...... Judae participated in; "OC" - number of opinions of !he 
coun writteD by Ihejudge; "5" - number of limes a judge signtd to Ihe opinion oflhe coun; "CO" - number of concurring opinions written 
by Ihe judge; "CV" - number of times • judge signed to !he c:oncurrIns opinion of. colleasue; "00" - number of dissentins opinions 
written by !he judge; "DV" - number of times • judge signed to Ihe dissentin& opinion of • colleasue; "OCO" - number of 
concurring/dissenting opinions written by Ihe judge; "DCV" - number of limes. judge signed to !he concurring/dissenting opinion of a 
colleague. 
"Number does not indude twO per curiam opinions. 
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TABLE III 
INDMDUAL 0\11PUr OF JUDGES BY SUIUECr MATmR 
ludgc Bus Civ Pro Crim Canst Evid FIDI Prof Prop Tons Law, 
Res Code, 
&; Reg 
Robert C. Mwphy 3 I I 2 0 2 0 I I I 
lobn C. Eldridge I 2 I I 0 0 0 0 2 3 
La_ F. RocIowsky I I I 0 2 I I 3 I I 
Howard S. ChIWlOW 2 I 4 0 3 I I I 0 I 
Robert L. JWwacki I I 3 0 0 0 I I 0 2 
Robert M. BcD 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 I 
Irma S. Raker I 0 4 0 3 I 2 0 0 I 
lobn F. McAuliffe I 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(Specially Assigocd) 
This table shows the number of opiniODl of the coun writtell by cacb judge per ataI of the law. "Bus". BusiDcss Law; "Civ Pro" • Civil 
Procedure; "Crim" • CrimiDII Law; "Canst" • CanstII1lIiODal Law; "Evid" - EvIcIeucc Law; "Fam" - Family Law; "Prof Rcs" -
Professional RcsponsIbUity; "Prop" • Property Law; "Law, Code, &; Reg" • SCale Law, Code &; RcguIaliODl. 
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TABLE IV 
VOTING AuGNMENI'S 
Iud .. RM IE LIt HC RK RB IR 1M MS TO Rl' 
__ n C. Murphy ; - 12 12 12 12 12 1Z - - - -
-
11 12 11 12 11 11 - - - -
0-12 C 
-
0 0 I 0 0 0 
- - - -
0 
-
I 0 0 0 I I 
- - - -
CD 
-
0 0 0 0 0 0 
- - - -
lIP 
-
92 100 92 100 92 92 
- - - -
lobo C. Eldridae N 8 
-
10 10 10 10 10 I 
- -
.. 
S 8 
-
10 • 10 8 • I - - -0-10 C 0 
-
0 I 0 I I 0 
- - -
0 0 
-
0 0 0 1 0 0 
- - -
co 0 
-
0 0 0 0 0 0 
- - -
lIP 100 
-
100 90 100 80 90 100 
- - -
............ ROOowsky N 12 12 
-
12 12 12 12 
- - - -
S 12 12 
-
11 12 11 12 
- - - -
0-12 C 0 0 
-
I 0 I 0 
- - - -
0 0 0 
-
0 0 0 0 
- - - -
co 0 0 
-
0 0 0 0 
- - - -
lIP 100 100 
-
92 100 92 100 
- - - -
Howard S. CbasaDow N 12 13 13 
-
10 10 10 I I 
-
I 
S 11 12 10 
-
12 10 11 I I 
-
0 
0-14 C 0 0 I - I 0 I 0 0 - 0 
0 I I 2 
-
I 0 l 0 0 
-
I 
CO 0 0 0 
-
0 0 0 0 0 
-
0 
lIP 92 92 77 - 86 7t 7. 100 100 - 0 
...... L ......... ti N 8 • • 8 - • : I I I -S 8 • • 8 - I I I 0 -0-. C 0 0 0 0 
-
0 0 0 0 0 
-
0 0 0 0 0 
-
I I 0 0 I 
-
CO 0 0 0 0 
-
0 0 0 0 0 
-
SP 100 100 100 100 
-
8. 8. 100 100 0 -
RDbenM ...... N 6 7 7 , 
- 2 - - I 
S , 6 7 7 , 
-
, 2 
- -
0 
0-7 C 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0 0 
- -
0 
0 I I 0 0 0 
-
2 0 - - I 
CD 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0 0 
- -
0 
SP 83 86 100 100 100 
-
71 100 
- -
0 
lnDaS. Rake, N 10 12 :~ 12 12 12 - I - - -S 10 11 11 11 8 
-
I 
- - -
0-12 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0 
- - -
0 0 I 0 0 0 3 
-
0 
- - -
co 0 0 0 0 0 I 
-
0 
- - -
liP 100 92 100 100 100 67 
-
100 
- - -
JOM F. McAuliffe N 2 2 2 2 1 1 
- - - -
S 
-
1 2 I 2 2 I 
- - - -
0-2 C 
-
0 0 0 0 0 0 
- - - -
0 
-
0 0 I 0 0 I 
- - - -
CD 
-
0 0 0 0 0 0 
- - - -
liP 
-
100 100 SO 100 100 SO 
- - - -
lbis table shows die position asswncd by CKb judJc: widl rnpea 10 the opinion of Ibe coun written by IUs or ber coUcques. ·0·. aumber of opinions of Ibe coun writteD 
by each judac; ·W - rwmber of times. judie panicipaced in me decisions in whidl his or her coUcque wtOIC Ibe opiJUoD of the coun: ·S· - number of times • judIe sisDCd 
10 Ibc opinion of die eoun; ·C· _ DUmber of times me judie concurred with Ihe opinion of me court; -D- - number of times, jud,e dissented with the opinion of cbc COlIn; 
·CD- - rumber of times ajud,e CODCUrrcd and dissemcd with die opinion orebe coun; -tip· - percemaae of q:reemem betwcm die judJa (tiP-(SlN)-I00). JudlCS specia1ly 
usip:d: ~ Tbeodo" G. 8toom (1'9), Marvin H. Smith (MS). Raben F. F'tsebcr (RF), aDd John F. McAuliffe OM). 
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TABLE V 
Jud,C RM JE Ul. HC RK RB JR JM MS TO RF 
.... nC. Murpb)' S 
-
.. 65 64 64 -56 62 I I 0- 0 
CD 
-
0 I 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 
T 
-
64 66 .. 64 .56 63 I I 0 0 
N 
-
69 69 69 68 10 10 I I I 2 
SP 
-
93 96 93 94 80 go 100 100 0 0 
JobD C. Eldridac S .. - 10 71 70 65 68 7 0 0 0 
CD 0 
-
0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 
T .. - 10 71 10 68 71 1 0 0 0 
N 69 - 18 18 71 19 19 . 8 0 I 2 
SP '3 - go 91 '1 86 go 88 0 0 0 
Lawrence F. RodowUy S 65 0 
-
I 74 .. 69 8 I 0 0 
CD I 0 - 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
T 66 10 
-
11 16 64 71 8 I 0 0 
N 69 18 
-
18 71 19 19 8 I I I 
SP 96 90 
- '1 .. 81 go 100 100 0 0 
HowonI S. ClwaDow S 64 I I 
-
11 0; 68 I 0 0 CD 0 0 0 
-
0 I 0 0 0 0 
T .. 11 11 - 11 61 69 1 I 0 0 
N 69 18 18 
-
71 19 19 8 I 0 2 
SP 93 91 .1 
-
92 B> 81 88 100 0 0 
.-.. L. Kar .. "'" S 64 70 7. 71 - 63 69 7 I 0 0 
CD 0 0 2 0 
-
0 2 0 0 0 0 
T .. 70 76 71 - 63 11 0 I 0 0 
N 68 71 71 71 
-
18 78 1 I I I 
SP 94 91 .. 92 
-
81 '1 100 100 0 0 
R.obettM. Bdl S 56 65 64 65 63 
-
63 7 0 0 I 
CD 0 3 0 2 0 
-
2 0 0 I 0 
T 56 68 .. 61 63 
-
6S 1 0 I I 
N 10 19 19 19 18 
-
80 8 I I 2 
., 
SP 80 86 81 B> 81 
-
81 88 0 100 SO 
Inna S. Rakc:r S 62 68 69 68 69 63 
-
6 I 0 0 
CD I 3 2 I 2 2 
-
0 0 I 0 
T 63 71 11 69 71 65 
-
6 I I 0 
N 10 7' 79 19 18 80 - 8 I I 2 
SP go 90 go 81 .1 81 
-
15 100 100 0 
J_ F. McAuliff. S I 8 7 1 1 2 
-
0 0 -0 
(Sp<eiallyAuipd) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 
-
0 0 0 
T I 1 8 1 7 1 0 
-
0 0 0 
N I 8 8 8 7 8 8 
-
0 0 0 
!lOP 100 88 100 88 100 88 SO 
-
0 0 0 
This table mows me DUmber of times dw ODe juda'c YOtCd wUh anocbcI ill tun opinion dt:cWoos. -N" - number of decisions in wbicb bodl jud.ps participas:cd aDd dm die 
DUmber of oppommilies for qrecmcm; .$. _ DIUI'Ibcr of times !he rwo judI" siped me opin.ioa of cbe c:ourt; "CO"' - IIlDIlIcr of timCI Chc rwo judacs Iipcd Ibe lime 
ccmcurm, or disscmiDa opinion; .,... - 1he IDQl number of timts the two judges liIacd die same opinic:tII <T-S+CD): ·SP· - pneemaac of .,IUmeN berween tbe judJes 
(S'-(TIN)*IOO). Jud.cs specially usiJned were: Tbeodor. G. Bloom (I'B). MaI"¥U:I H. Smidt (MS), Robert F. Fcscber (RF). and Jolin F. MtAuliffe OM). 
this tabutuioD follows the mcdxxIoIoI)' used by rhe HQlWrd l.4w limn.', &~ 100 HAilv. L. REv. 30'.06 (1986). 
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I. BUSINESS & INSURANCE LAW 
A. One who is neither a party to an arbitration agreement nor a 
signatory of the agreement can not be bound by an arbitration 
award. An arbitrator does not have the authority to award attorney 
fees when the contract between the parties does not provide for 
recovery of attorney fees, regardless of whether a statutory claim 
provides that a court can award attorney fees. Curtis G. Testerman 
Co. v. Buck' 
1. Facts 
Curtis G. Testerman and Curtis G. Testerman Company (Com-
pany) appealed from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Cecil County affIrming an arbitration award in favor of 
Walter and Gabrielle Buck (the Bucks). The underlying dispute arose 
out of a construction contract between the Bucks and the Company. 
The contract was signed by the Bucks, as owners of the property 
involved, and by the Company as the contractor. Testerman signed 
the contract on behalf of the Company in his capacity as President. 2 
The Bucks brought an action to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
arbitration clause of the contract, after the Company allegedly failed 
to complete the construction on time. 3 
2. Analysis 
Two issues were raised on appeal. The flrst issue was whether one 
who is neither a party to an arbitration agreement nor a signatory of 
1. 340 Md. 569, 667 A.2d 649 (1995). 
2. The contract in question was executed in the name of "Curtis O. Testennan, Inc." 
instead of the actual name of the corporation, "Curtis O. Testerman Company," 
and signed by Testerman as "President." See id. at 575; 667 A.2d at 652. The 
Bucks argued that because of the mistake, Testerman entered into the contract on 
behalf of an unincorporated entity and was therefore personally liable. See id. at 
575-76, 667 A.2d at 652. The trial court found, and the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland agreed, that the use of "Inc." instead of "Gompany" was a misnomer 
and that the Bucks knew that they were dealing with an incorporated entity. See 
id. The court of appeals stated "[w]e cannot allow the Bucks to use a simple 
misnomer in the corporate name to hold Testerman personally liable." [d. The 
court then concluded that Testerman had signed the agreement as an agent on 
behalf of a disclosed principal and therefore could not be held personally liable. 
See ill. at 576-77, 667 A.2d at 653. 
3. The arbitration clause provided: 
"All claims or disputes between the Contractor and the Owner arising 
out or relating to the Contract, or the breach thereof, shall be decided 
by arbitration . . . . The award rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators 
shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with 
applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof." 
[d. at 573, 667 A.2d at 651 (quoting section 10.8 of the construction contract). 
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the agreement can be bound by an arbitration award. 4 The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland answered this question in the negative because 
Testerman did not sign the contract in his individual capacity and 
therefore, as a non-party and a non-signatory to the contract, he did 
not agree to arbitrate.' The trial court erred in compelling Testerman 
to submit to arbitration of his personal liability. 6 
The second issue raised on appeal was whether an arbitrator has 
the authority to award attorney fees when the contract between the 
parties does not provide for recovery of attorney fees.7 One of the 
claims involved the Maryland Consumer Protection Act which provides 
that a "court" can award attorney fees. 8 The court of appeals held 
that an arbitrator does not have authority to award attorney fees in 
such a situation, regardless of whether a statutory claim provides that 
a "court" can award attorney fees.9 
John B. Beckman 
B. A judicial order incorporating a settlement agreement is a final 
judgment when it has the effect of terminating the litigation in the 
trial court. Settlement agreement ending dispute over zoning 
regulations does not exceed the authority of Montgomery County, 
but instead is an exercise of executive discretion. Montgomery 
County v. Revere National Corp.1O 
1. Facts 
In 1968, Montgomery County (County) changed its zoning regu-
lations regarding the placement, height, and size of billboards within 
the County. The regulations provided that any existing billboards not 
conforming to the new requirements be removed within two years of 
the effective date of the regulations or four years from the date the 
billboards were erected, whichever occurred later. CI~gRollins 
4. See id. at 574, 667 A.2d at 651; see also supra note 3. 
5. See id. at 578-79, 667 A.2d at 653-54. 
6. See id. The trial judge ordered Testerman to participate in the arbitration with the 
Bucks and the Company. See id. It should be noted that Testerman could have 
waived his right to have his liability litigated in a judicial forum, but he did not. 
See id. at 583, 667 A.2d at 656. 
7. See id. at 574, 667 A.2d at 651. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. at 589-90, 667 A.2d at 659. The court of appeals concluded that an 
arbitrator is not a court within the meaning of the statute, making it an error for 
the trial court to confIrm the award of attorney fees by the arbitrator. See id. 
10. 341 Md. 366, 671 A.2d 1 (1996). 
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Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Rollins) did not comply with the new 
requirement, the County ordered Rollins to remove them. 
In 1974, Rollins subsequently med suit against the county II chal-
lenging the validity of the regulations.12 In 1986, while the litigation 
was still pending the County again changed its zoning regulations, this 
time to prohibit all billboards within the County. In 1990, Rollins's 
successor-in-interest, Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Reagan) en-
tered into an agreement with the County ending the sixteen years of 
litigation. The agreement, signed by the County, the County attorney, 
and Reagan officials and incorporated into a judgment of the Circuit 
Court of Maryland for Montgomery County, provided for the dismissal 
of all pending litigation and allowed Reagan to maintain and replace 
certain billboards for a period of ten years. 
In 1992, Revere National Corporation, Inc. (Revere), the successor-
in-interest to Reagan, sought the County's permission to construct a 
replacement billboard in accordance with the settlement agreement. The 
County denied the request stating that the settlement agreement was 
void ab initio because it conflicted with current zoning restrictions 
banning all billboards. Revere med suit to enforce the settlement 
agreement and the County moved to have the agreement voided, 
contending that the County had no power to make an agreement which 
conflicted with zoning regulations. The circuit court granted the County's 
motion to vacate the settlement agreement. 
Revere appealed and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
reversed in an unreported opinion. The court of special appeals held 
that the settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment of the 
circuit court constituted a final judgment terminating the litigation. 
The court further held that the County had not shown any valid basis 
to set aside the 1990 judgment incorporating the settlement agreement. 
The County appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
2. Analysis 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Montgomery 
County argued that the court of special appeals erred in holding that 
the 1990 order was a fmal judgmentY Revere argued that the 1990 
order was a fmal judgment and that the judgment could not be revised 
absent fraud, mistake, or irregularity.14 The court of appeals agreed 
11. Rollins filed suit against Montgomery County, the Montgomery County Ex-
erutive, and the Montgomery County Council. See id. at 370, 671 A.2d at 2-
3. All the defendants will be referred to collectively as "Montgomery County" 
or "the County." See id. 
12. See id. Rollins sought both injunctive and declaratory relief. See id. 
13. See id. at 376, 671 A.2d at 5. 
14. An order that is not a final judgment is subject to revision. 
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with Revere and held that the 1990 order constituted a final appealable 
judgment. 15 The court reasoned that an order which was entered on 
the docket pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-60p6 and had the effect of 
terminating the litigation in the trial court constituted a final judgment. 17 
Montgomery County also contended that, even if the 1990 order 
was a final judgment, it was subject to collateral attack because the 
County exceeded its legal authority when it entered into the settlement 
agreement. IS 
The court of appeals expressly declined to decide whether such a 
collateral attack can be made, concluding that the substance of the 
settlement agreement was not ultra vires l9 because the County's au-
thority to make zoning regulations is not legislative authority. 20 There-
fore, the County did not cede legislative authority over zoning matters 
that was specifically granted by state law and county charter. 21 Zoning 
enactments are not legislation within the meaning of Article XI-A of 
the Maryland Constitution or the Montgomery County Charter. 22 In-
stead the County Council, sitting as a District Council, is an admin-
istrative agency. 23 
Furthermore, the court of appeals concluded that when the exec-
utive branch of a county, in carrying out the laws and functions of 
government, enters into a contract, it is exercising its executive discre-
tion.24 Therefore, a requirement that the county adhere to that discretion 
and be bound to that contract does not constitute an unlawful inter-
ference with future executive discretion.25 Thus, the settlement agree-
ment was a valid exercise of executive discretion which ended a dispute 
between the County and Revere, and the County shall be bound by 
its agreement.26 
John B. Beckman 
IS. See Revere, 341 Md. at 379, 671 A.2d at 7. 
16. Rule 2-601 is the rule by which the trial courts enter an order disposing of the 
case. 
17. See Revere, 341 Md. at 379, 671 A.2d at 7. 
18. See id. at 379-80, 671 A.2d at 7. 
19. See id. at 382-83, 671 A.2d at 9. 
20. See id. at 386-87, 671 A.2d at 11. 
21. See id. at 387, 671 A.2d at 10. 
22. See id. at 383-84, 620 A.2d at 9-10. 
23. See id. at 384, 620 A.2d at 10. The Montgomery County Council, pursuant 
to the Regional District Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 28, § 8-101 (Supp. 1995), 
adopts zoning "ordinances" which are not subject to the approval or veto of 
the County Executive. See Revere, 341 Md. at 383, 671 A.2d at 9. 
24. See Revere, 341 Md. at 390, 620 A.2d at 12. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. Under Maryland law, counties and municipalities are normally bound 
by their contracts to the same extent as private entities. See id. at 384-85, 671 
A.2d at 10; Fraternal Order of Police v. Baltimore County, 340 Md. 157, 665 
A.2d 1029 (1995). 
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C. The doctrine oj detrimental reliance applies to the setting oj 
construction bidding. Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co.1:I 
1. Facts 
The National Institute of Health (NIH) solicited bids for a reno-
vation project on one of the buildings on its Bethesda, Maryland 
campus. A large part of the mechanical work involved heating, venti-
lation and air conditioning (HVAC). Appellant Pavel Enterprises, Inc. 
(pavel), a general contractor, submitted a bid for the NIH project. In 
preparation for its bid, Pavel solicited sub-bids from subcontractors 
for the HV AC component of the job. Among the subcontractors 
submitting sub-bids was the appellee, A.S. Johnson Co. (Johnson), 
which submitted a bid of $898,000 for the HV AC work. 
Based on Johnson's sub-bid, Pavel prepared and submitted a bid 
of $1,585,000 for the entire project to the NIH on August 5, 1993. 
Pavel's bid was accepted by NIH later that month. Pavel met with 
Johnson on August 26, 1993 to discuss Johnson's proposed role in the 
work. After the meeting, Pavel sent a letter by facsimile to all the 
mechanical subcontractors who had bid on the project and asked them 
to resubmit their bids minus the amount calculated for electric controls 
because Pavel was going to supply the electric controls. On August 30, 
1993, Pavel informed NIH that Johnson was to be the mechanical 
subcontractor on the project. On September I, 1993, Pavel formally 
accepted Johnson's bid. 
Upon receipt of the Pavel's acceptance on September I, 1993, 
Johnson informed Pavel that their bid contained an error that caused 
its price to be too low. Johnson claimed that they had discovered the 
error but did not inform Pavel because they believed that Pavel was 
not awarded the NIH contract. Johnson sought to withdraw its bid 
and Pavel refused to allow Johnson to withdraw. 
On September 28, 1993, NIH formally awarded the construction 
contract to Pavel. In order to complete the project, Pavel hired a 
substitute HV AC subcontractor who agreed to perform the work for 
$930,000. Pavel instituted this action to recover the $32,000 difference 
between Johnson's bid and the cost of the substitute subcontractor. 
The trial court found for Johnson because they determined that a 
contractual relationship was never formed between the parties. Pavel 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, and before the 
intermediate appellate court considered the case, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion. 
27. 342 Md. 143, 674 A.2d 521 (1996). 
1996] Annual Review of Maryland Law 15 
2. Analysis 
Judge Karwacki, writing for the court, outlined the mechanics of 
the construction bidding process and the legal system's attempts to 
regulate it.2M Among the legal difficulties in the construction bidding 
process is the problem of determining at what precise points on the 
bidding timeline the various parties become bound to each other. 29 
Under the facts of this case, the court of appeals analyzed (1) 
whether a traditional bilateral contract had been formed at the time 
Johnson withdrew its bid, and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence 
to establish Pavel's detrimental reliance on the bid. The court answered 
both questions in the negative and affirmed the decision of the trial 
court.30 
On the first issue, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court 
that Johnson's sub-bid was an offer to contract, fmding it sufficiently 
clear and defmite. 31 The next inquiry focused on whether Pavel made 
a timely acceptance and thus created a traditional bilateral contract. 32 
The trial court found that there was "no meeting of the minds" and 
the court of appeals - fmding nothing clearly erroneous - agreed.33 The 
trial judge reached this conclusion primarily because of the August 26 
letter to all potential mechanical subcontractors indicated that Pavel 
and Johnson did not have a definite meeting of the minds on a certain 
price for a certain quantity of goods.34 
Alternatively, the court of appeals held that the evidence permitted 
the trial judge to find that Johnson revoked its offer before Pavel's 
fmal acceptance. 35 The court detenitined that Pavel's acceptance of the 
offer was subject to a condition precedent, that is, Pavel's receipt of 
the award from NIH.36 Prior to the occurrence of the condition 
precedent, Johnson was free to withdraw its offer. 37 Therefore, the 
trial judge's fmding that a withdrawal preceded a valid acceptance was 
supported by sufficient evidence and not clearly erroneous.38 
The court of appeals addressed Pavel's alternate theory, holding 
that Pavel had not proven detrimental reliance. 39 However, the court 
of appeals expressly stated that the doctrine of detrimental reliance is 
28 .. See id. at 151-62, 674 A.2d at 525-30. 
29. See id. at 152, 674 A.2d at 526 .. 
30. See id. at 169, 674 A.2d at 534. 
31. See id. at 161, 674 A.2d at 530. 
32. See id. at 162-63, 674 A.2d at 530-31. 
33. [d. 
34. See id. at 162-63, 674 A.2d at 531. 
35. See id. at 163, 674 A.2d at 531. 
36. See id. 
37. See id.; see also 2 Wn.usTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:14 (1990). 
38. See Pavel, 342 Md. at 163-64, 674 A.2d at 531. . 
39. See id. at 167-68, 674 A.2d at 533-34. 
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applicable to the setting of construction bidding. 40 The court adopted 
Section 90(1) of the Second Restatement of Contracts, which they 
"recast" as a four part test.41 
Detrimental reliance arises when there exists (1) a clear and 
definite promise; (2) where the promisor has a reasonable 
expectation that the offer will induce action or forbearance 
on the part of the promisee; (3) which does induce actual and 
reasonable action or forbearance by the promisee; and (4) 
causes a detriment which can only be avoided by the enforce-
ment of the promise.42 
The court analyzed each element of the doctrine of detrimental reliance 
and held that the trial judge was not clearly erroneous in finding that 
recovery by Pavel was not justified under the theory of detrimental 
reliance. 43 
John B. Beckman 
D. Under Maryland common law, a drawer can bring an action to 
recover their losses against a depository bank for checks that the 
depository bank accepted with missing endorsements or in violation 
of restrictive agreements. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Maryland 
National Bank44 
1. Facts 
In 1982, Eugene Carbaugh, head of the accounts payable depart-
ment of the Prince George's County Board of Education (the Board), 
began an elaborate scheme to steal money from the Board. Carbaugh 
submitted fictitious bills to the Board, and after the checks were 
issued to pay for the bills, Carbaugh deposited the checks into bank 
accounts opened in his name at Maryland National Bank (MNB). By 
the time Carbaugh's scheme was discovered in 1993, he had stolen 
approximately $1.1 million. 
The Board recovered most of its losses from its insurance carrier, 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (Hartford). As subrogee and assignee of 
the Board's claims, Hartford brought an action in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland against MNB seeking to 
40. See id. 
41. RFsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979). 
42. Pavel, 342 Md. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532. 
43. See id. at 166-69, 674 A.2d at 533-34. 
44. 341 Md. 408, 671 A.2d 22 (1996). 
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hold MNB liable for the Board's loss. The district court found that 
MNB failed to follow commercially reasonable banking practices be-
cause MNB accepted checks with missing endorsements and in violation 
of restrictive endorsements. This case came to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland by method of certification from the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland. 
2. Analysis 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
called upon the Court of Appeals of Maryland to decide whether a 
drawer can bring suit against a depository bank when it accepts a 
check with no indorsement for deposit into an account other than that 
of the named payee or when the depository bank accepts a check in 
violation of a restrictive indorsement. 45 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that, under Mary-
land common law, 46 Hartford, as assignee of the Board, can bring an 
action to recover the Board's (the drawer's) losses against MNB (the 
depository bank) for those checks accepted with missing endorsements 
or in violation of restrictive agreements.47 
In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals of· Maryland 
expressly rejected Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First National 
Bank & Trust48 and Underpinning Foundation Constructors Inc. v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank,49 two leading cases from Massachusetts and 
New York. so These cases stand for the proposition that a drawer cannot 
sue the depository bank directly, but instead must sue the drawee bank, 
who can then sue the depository bank.51 The reasoning behind this is 
as follows: the drawee bank pays the depository bank with its own 
funds and subsequently debits the drawer's account. 52 Therefore, the 
funds that the depository bank receives are not drawer's funds - but 
45. See id. at 411, 671 A.2d at 23. 
46. Titles 3 and 4 of the Commercial Law Article of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland govern the rights and duties of drawers and depository banks. Titles 
3 and 4 are essentially equivalent to Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. "Where the Commercial Law Article does not expressly resolve an 
issue," however, "the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its 
provisions." Hartford Fire Insurance, 341 Md. at 413, 671 A.2d at 24. In this 
case Titles 3 and 4 do not directly define or limit the drawer's right of action; 
consequently, the court looked to Maryland common law. See id. at 413, 671 
A.2d at 24. 
47. See id. 
48. 184 N.E.2d 358 (Mass. 1962). 
49. 386 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1979). 
50. See Hartford Fire Ins., 341 Md. at 418-23, 427-28, 671 A.2d at 27-29, 31-32. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
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the drawee's.'3 Under this analysis, the only party that can sue the 
depository bank directly is the drawee bank. 54 The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland rejected this concept calling it a "legal fiction."55 
John B. Beckman 
E. A junior mechanic's lien is extinguished upon foreclosure of a 
senior mortgage to the same extent as any other junior lien would be 
extinguished upon foreclosure of a senior mortgage. IA Construction 
Corp. v. Camey6 
1. Facts 
Birchwood Manor. Inc. (BMI) assembled a tract of land in Harford 
County, Maryland for development through various conveyances. One 
of the conveyances to BMI was from the respondent Robert E. Carney. 
Jr. The deed, dated June 28. 1989, stated that the consideration was 
$135,000. Carney, acting as the mortgagee, took back a $35,000 
mortgage on the property that he had conveyed. 
The petitioner, IA Construction Corporation (IA) entered into 
construction contracts with BMI for work for which BMI failed to 
pay. On May 24, 1993, IA petitioned to establish a mechanic's lien on 
the mortgaged property in the amount of $27,269." 
On June 22, 1993, Carney instituted foreclosure on the mortgage 
and notified IA. Carney purchased the property for $26,000 at the 
mortgage foreclosure sale. IA then fIled an action in the Circuit Court 
of Maryland for Harford County to enforce the mechanic's lien. The 
circuit court granted Carney's motion for summary judgment conclud-
ing that a valid foreclosure had taken place which defeated the me-
chanic's lien claim for work performed prior to the foreclosure 
proceeding. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affIrmed and 
subsequently the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted lA's petition 
for certiorari. 
2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affIrmed the intermediate 
appellate court's decision, holding that a valid foreclosure had taken 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
55. [d. at 427-28, 671 A.2d at 31-32. 
56. 341 Md. 703, 672 A.2d 650 (1996). 
57. The mechanic's lien was ordered pursuant to Section 9-106(b)(3) of the Real 
Property Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which is part of the 
mechanic's lien law, MD. CODE ANN., REAL PRoP. §§ 9-101 to -114 (1996). 
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place which defeated the mechanic's lien claim for work performed 
prior to the foreclosure proceeding. 58 The court based its decision on 
Section 9-108 of the Real Property Article of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland.59 The court concluded that section 9-108 makes it. clear that 
ordinary rules and priorities in judicial sales apply when a mortgage is 
foreclosed that is senior to a mechanic's lien. 60 Therefore, upon a 
mortgage foreclosure sale, all liens and encumbrances on such property 
must be satisfied in accordance with their priority.61 The junior me-
chanic's lien is extinguished upon foreclosure of a senior mortgage to 
same extent as junior lien would be extinguished upon foreclosure of 
senior mortgage. 62 Section 9-108 also defeats an attempt by a junior 
lien (that was not satisfied out of the proceeds of the foreclosure) to 
encumber the land after legal title has been conveyed to the mortgage 
foreclosure purchaser.63 
Although lA, as the contractor, has a contract claim against BMI 
that survived the mortgage foreclosure, the mechanic's lien claim of 
IA is a remedy that is limited to a lien on the specific land and when 
the lien no longer exists, a claim for that lien no longer exists.64 
John B. Beckman 
F. A cause of action exists in Maryland for wrongful discharge for 
sex discrimination against an employer with less than fifteen 
employees. When there is direct evidence of discrimination, a jury 
instruction that where the same person hires and fires the employee 
there is an inference that the discharge was not due to the 
employee's sex is not applicable. Molesworth v. Brandon65 
1. Facts 
Dr. Linda Molesworth, a recent graduate from veterinary school, 
began working for Dr. Randall Brandon (Brandon) whose veterinary 
practice concentrated on thoroughbred horses. There were two other 
male members of the practice and Molesworth was the first female 
full-time veterinarian employed by Brandon. Molesworth's primary duty 
58. See Carney, 341 Md. at 716, 672 A.2d at 657. 
59. See id. at 714, 672 A.2d at 656. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. at 714-15, 672 A.2d at 656. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. at 715, 672 A.2d at 656. 
65. 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996). 
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was working at the Laurel racetrack administering shots to horses. 
During Molesworth's employment, which was from July 1, 1988 
to July 13, 1990, she was given two pay increases and numerous 
favorable evaluations. There were, however, several complaints from 
trainers at the racetrack stating that they did not want a female 
veterinarian at the racetrack. On July 13, 1990, just two weeks after 
her second pay increase, Molesworth met with Brandon and Palmer, 
who had a contract to acquire 48% of the stock in the incorporated 
practice, and Brandon informed her that her contract would not be 
renewed because of complaints from trainers. Molesworth asked if she 
was being fIred because she was a woman. Molesworth testifIed that 
Palmer replied "Yes, that's part of it."66 According to Molesworth, 
Brandon nodded in agreement. Palmer and Brandon both testifIed that 
they answered "no" to Molesworth's question. 
Molesworth fIled a wrongful discharge suit in the Circuit Court 
of Maryland for Anne Arundel County. The jury awarded Molesworth 
$39,198 in damages. 67 
2. Analysis 
The issues before the Court of Appeals of Maryland were: (1) 
whether a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of a 
female employee based on sex discrimination lies against an employer 
with less than fIfteen employees; and (2) whether the court must instruct 
a jury that where the same person hires and fIres the employee there 
is an inference that the discharge was not due to the employee's sex.68 
First, the court of appeals held that there is a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge for sex discrimination against an employer with less 
than fIfteen employees.69 Maryland recognizes a cause of action for an 
employer's wrongful discharge of an at will employee when the moti-
vation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public 
policy.70 A plaintiff must allege a particular statute with some specifIcity 
to show the conduct was violative of public policy.71 The court con-
cluded that section 14 of the Fair Employment Practices Act, Maryland 
Code, Article 49B (the Act) provides a suffIciently clear mandate of 
public policy against sex discrimination to support Molesworth's claim 
for wrongful discharge even though the Act exempts employers with 
less than fIfteen employees.72 The existence of this exception does not 
66. [d. at 626. 672 A.2d at 610. 
67. Sa? id. at 627. 672 A.2d at 611. 
68. Sa? id. at 624. 672 A.2d at 609-10. 
69. See id. at 637. 672 A.2d at 616. 
70. See id. at 629. 672 A.2d at 612. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. at 637. 672 A.2d at 616. 
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change the Act's declaration that sex discrimination is against public 
policy. 73 
Second, the court of appeals held that a jury instruction stating 
that when the same person hires and flres the employee there is an 
inference that the discharge was not due to the employee's sex is not 
applicable in a case, such as this one, with direct evidence of discrim-
ination.74 The court of appeals held that in this case there was direct 
evidence of discrimination, that is, testimony of Molesworth that the 
defendants admitted the discharge was because of her gender.7s Thus, 
the inference was not applicable.76 Therefore, the trial court properly 
denied the defendant's requested instruction. 77 
John B. Beckman 
G. Lessor oj motor vehicle must provide primary liability insurance 
up to the statutory minimum to cover operation oj a rental vehicle, 
regardless oj whether the driver is authorized by the rental agreement 
to operate rental vehicle. Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. 78 
1. Facts 
On August 8, 1991, Grace Sonde leased an automobile from 
Enterprise Leasing Company (Enterprise), a self-insured entity that is 
in the business of leasing automobiles to the public. Under the terms 
the rental agreement, the car could not be driven by anyone under the 
age of twenty-one without the owner's written permission or by anyone 
other than the renter without written consent of the owner. Sonde 
speciflcally declined to request permission for anyone else to drive the 
vehicle. Three days later, however, Sonde allowed her seventeen year-
old son, David Sonde (David), to operate the Enterprise rental vehicle. 
David was subsequently involved in an accident while driving the 
Enterprise vehicle, in which Stephany Witt, a passenger in the other 
car, was injured. 
At the time of the accident, Allstate Insurance Co. (Allstate) had 
an automobile insurance policy in effect that provided liability coverage 
73. Sre id. 
74. Sre id. at 638, 672 A.2d at 616. 
75. Sre id. at 638-39, 672 A.2d at 616-17. Although the jury instruction is not 
applicable, the defendant is not precluded from making the "same actoI:" 
argument to the jury. See id. at 645-46, 672 A.2d at 620. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. at 646, 672 A.2d at 620-21. 
78. 341 Md. 541, 671 A.2d 509 (1996). 
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for both Grace and David Sonde. After Witt flIed suit against Grace 
. and David Sonde, the Sondes submitted the claim to Allstate to provide 
coverage and to defend the suit. Allstate in tum submitted the claim 
to Enterprise, contending that Enterprise was required to provide 
primary insurance coverage up to the statutory minimum coverage 
required by Maryland law. After Enterprise denied responsibility for 
primary coverage, Allstate sought a declaratory judgment in the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County that Enterprise was obligated to 
provide primary coverage for the claim, which was granted in Allstate's 
favor. Prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, the State's highest court granted a writ of certiorari on its 
own motion and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
The sole issue presented to the Court of Appeals of Maryland was 
whether the lessor of a rental vehicle is relieved of financial responsi-
bility for third party claims resulting from the negligent operation of 
its rental vehicle, when the operation of the vehicle was in violation 
of the express terms of the rental agreement. 79 In reaching an answer 
to this question, the court focused on language contained in Section 
18-102(b) of the Maryland Transportation Article of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland, which requires security to be provided for rental 
vehicles to cover the "owner of the vehicle and each person driving or 
using the vehicle with the permission of the owner or lessee . . . 
[n]otwithstanding any provision of the rental agreement to the con-
trary."Bt> The court then concluded that the plain language of section 
18-102(b) indicates "that no term or condition of a private rental 
agreement may interfere with the coverage required" 81 under this 
section, and therefore, "Enterprise could not 'contract away its statu-
torily-imposed risk by inserting in its rental agreement restrictive clauses 
that narrow the statutory requirements."'82 
Further, section 18-106, which provides for the enforcement of 
provisions in rental contracts such as the one in the instant case,83 does 
not effect the lessor's obligation under section 18-102(b) to provide the 
required security.84 To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the 
79. See id. at 543, 671 A.2d at 510. 
80. MD. CODE ANN., 'fIlANSP. § 18-102(b) (1992 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). 
81. Enterprise Leasing, 341 Md. at 547, 671 A.2d at 513. 
82. Id. at 549, 671 A.2d at 513 (quoting Consolidated Enters., Inc. v. Schwindt, 
833 P.2d 706, 710 (Ariz. 1992». 
83. Section 18-106 provides, in pertinent part, "[iJf a person rents a motor vehicle 
under an agreement not to permit another person to drive the vehicle the 
person may not permit any other person to drive the rented motor vehicle." 
TRANSP. § 18-106{a). 
84. See Enterprise Leasing, 341 Md. at 547-48, 671 A.2d at 513. 
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"[n]otwithstanding any provision of the rental agreement to the con-
trary" language of section 18-102(b).85 Thus, the court held that section 
18-1 02(b) requires the lessor to cover damages to third parties under 
its required security where any operator, whether authorized or unau-
thorized to operate the vehicle under the terms of the rental agreement, 
drives or uses a rental vehicle.86 
Joseph R. Salko 
H. Conflicting interpretations of insurance policy language in 
judicial opinions is not determinative oj, but is a factor to be 
considered, in determining the existence of ambiguity. Sullins v. 
Allstate Insurance Co.ff1 
1. Facts 
In 1990, the Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) issued a Deluxe 
Homeowners Policy to Reverend D. Paul Sullins and Patricia H. Sullins 
(Sullinses). An endorsement to the .policy, added later that year, 
provided liability coverage to the Sullinses' rental properties, including 
the property located at 30 South Fulton Avenue in Baltimore, Mary-
land. The policy contained the following exclusion, the interpretation 
of which would later result in the litigation of this case: "We do not 
cover bodily injury or property damage which results in any manner 
from the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of: a) vapors, fumes, 
acids, toxic chemicals, toxic liquids or toxic gasses; b) waste materials 
or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants."88 
In 1993, suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by 
a tenant residing in the 30 South Fulton Avenue property against the 
Sullinses. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Sullinses were 
negligent in allowing lead paint to chip and flake from the interior of 
the premises, resulting in injuries to an infant child who ingested the 
lead paint. Allstate responded by filing suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that the facts as set forth 
in the plaintifPs complaint fell within the express exclusion in the 
policy, and thus had no duty to defend the Sullinses. The district court 
then certified the following question to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland: Whether an insurance company has a duty to defend and/ 
or indemnify its insured in an action alleging injury from exposure to 
85. Id. 
86. See id. at 548, 671 A.2d at 513. 
87. 340 Md. 503, 667 A.2d 617 (1995). 
88. Id. at 506-07, 667 A.2d at 618. 
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lead paint where the insurance policy contains an exclusion such as the 
one contained in the Allstate policy. The court of appeals held that 
Allstate had a duty to defend. 
2. Analysis 
In answering the certified question, the court of appeals examined 
the language of the Allstate policy, in addition to other jurisdictions' 
treatment of this issue. Starting with the general premise that an insurer 
has a duty to defend its insured if there is a potentiality that a claim 
may be covered by the policy,89 the court looked to the terms of the 
pollution exclusion in the Allstate policy to determine whether there 
existed an ambiguity, such that a reasonable person would interpret 
the exclusion to apply to lead paint.90 Utilizing Webster's Dictionary, 91 
the court found that several of the terms in the exclusion, including 
"contaminants," "pollutants" and "chemicals," were susceptible of 
two interpretations by a reasonably prudent person.92 Since no extrinsic 
evidence was proffered by Allstate to clarify the intentions of the 
parties involved, the court concluded that the policy must be construed 
against Allstate as the drafter. 93 Thus, the pollution exclusion clause 
did not remove Allstate's duty to defend the Sullinses in the underlying 
lead paint poisoning action.94 
The court then discussed other jurisdictions' treatment of the issue 
to determine what effect conflicting interpretations of policy language 
in judicial opinions had in deciding whether ambiguity exists. The court 
rejected the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Cohen v. 
Erie Indemnity CO.,9S which held that where several appellate courts, 
construing the same policy language, denied coverage and several others 
granted coverage, the conflict in judicial opinion "itself creates the 
inescapable conclusion that the provision in issue is susceptible to more 
89. See id. at 509, 667 A.2d at 619-20. See also Aetna v. Cochran, 337 Md. 98, 
651 A.2d 859 (1995) and Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 
347 A.2d 842 (1975) for a discussion of an insurer's duty to defend in Maryland. 
90. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 509-10, 667 A.2d at 620. 
91. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981). 
92. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 509-13, 667 A.2d at 620-22. 
93. See id. at 509-10, 667 A.2d at 620. The court noted that Maryland does not 
follow the rule of many jurisdictions that an insurance policy is to be construed 
most strongly against the insurer. See id. at 508, 667 A.2d at 619. Rather, 
where terms of a policy are ambiguous, extrinsic and parol evidence may be 
considered to ascertain the intentions of the parties. See id. However, if no 
extrinsic or parol evidence is introduced, or if the ambiguity remains after such 
evidence is examined, the policy will be construed against the insurer as the 
drafter of the document. See id. at 508-09, 667 A.2d at 619. 
94. See id. at 518, 667 A.2d at 624. 
95. 432 A.2d 596 (pa. Super. Ct. 1981). 
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than one interpretation.''96 Rather, the court followed language from 
the Court of Appeals of New York decision in Breed v. Insurance Co. 
of North America, 'TI which noted that "[s]urely we would be abdicating 
our judicial role were we to decide such cases by the purely mechanical 
process of searching the nation's courts to ascertain if there are 
conflicting decisions.''98 Thus, the court concluded that conflicting 
interpretations of policy language in judicial opinions is not conclusive 
in determining . the existence of ambiguity, but is a factor to be 
considered in the analysis. 99 
J~eph R. Salko 
I. A subsequent fall on ice while going to a physical therapist's 
office for treatment of a compensable injury suffered three years 
earlier is not a direct and natural result of the original injury. 
Mackin & Associates v. Harris 100 
1. Facts 
Dean Harris, a workers' compensation claimant, suffered a com-
pensable injury in 1989 while employed with Mackin & Associates 
(Mackin). Harris subsequently terminated his employment with Mackin 
and became self-employed. In 1993, while self-employed, Harris was 
injured when he slipped on a patch of ice and fell. Harris ~ought 
additional benefits for the subsequent slip and fall accident because, 
he said, the fall occurred while he was on his way to a physical therapy 
appointment to receive treatment for the earlier compensable injury. 
Harris contended that the second accident was a consequence of the 
first and should therefore be compensable as well. 
Mter a claim to the Workers' Compensation Commission was 
denied, Harris appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, 
and the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Mackin. 
Harris then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
and that court reversed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted 
Mackin's petition for certiorari to determine whether the injury he 
sustained in the second accident "naturally result[ed] from an accidental 
injury that arises out of and in the course of employment,"IOI such 
96. Id. at 599. 
97. 385 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 1978). 
98. Id. at 1283 (quoting Hastigan v. Casualty Corp. of Am., 124 N.E. 789 (N.Y. 
1919». 
99. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 518, 667 A.2d at 624. 
100. 342 Md. I, 672 A.2d 1110 (1996). 
101. Id. at 3, 672 A.2d at 1111. 
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that it would be compensable under the Maryland Workers' Compen-
sation Act (the Act). 
2. Analysis 
Harris argued on appeal that the 1993 accident naturally resulted 
from the 1989 accident because but for the 1989 accident he would 
not have been required to go to the therapist in 1993, and but for the 
requirement of that visit he would not have fallen on the ice at that 
time and place.I02 Initially, the court acknowledged that a subsequent 
injury caused by an earlier work-related accident may be compensable 
even though the subsequent injury occurred when the claimant was not 
pursuing the employer's business. 103 Moreover, the court stated, com-
plications flowing directly from treatment of a compensable injury are 
covered under the Act even if the complications result from negligent 
medical treatment.104 The court refused, however, to extend the concept 
of causation to "embrace every subsequent accident that may occur 
while going to and coming from a doctor or other health care provider 
or obtaining or taking medication for an original compensable in-
jury."IOS 
In holding that a subsequent fall on ice while going to a therapist's 
office for treatment of a compensable injury suffered three years earlier 
is not a direct and natural result of the original injury,l06 the court 
specifIcally rejected the "but for" test as solely determinative of 
causation. I07 The court noted that this expanded concept of causation 
would produce an unusual resulUa! That is, under the workers' com-
pensation laws a claimant would be denied coverage for an ordinary 
accident that occurred while the claimant was going to or coming from 
actual employment. 109 To permit recovery in the instant case would 
enable a claimant to be compensated if the same accident occurred 
while the claimant was going to or coming from a doctor visit for 
treatment of injuries suffered in an earlier compensable accident.llo 
Rather than expanding the concept of causation in this manner, the 
court reiterated the long settled rule of causation that a "claimant 
102. See id. 
103. See id. at 4, 672 A.2d at 1111 (citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Hill, 201 
Md. 630, 95 A.2d 84 (1953». 
104. Seeid. at 5, 672 A.2d at 1112 (citing Nazario v. Washington Adventist Hosp., 
. 45 Md. App. 243, 412 A.2d 1271 (1980». 
105. See id. at 7, 672 A.2d at 1113. 
106. See id. at 8, 672 A.2d at 1113. 
107. [d. The "but for" test asks: but for the first injury and the need for treatment 
for it, would the second accident have occurred? See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
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must establish 'a direct causal connection' between the original acci-
dental injury and the subsequent injury or condition. "III 
Joseph R. Salko 
J. Officers of close corporations who make conscious and deliberate 
decisions not to purchase workers' compensation insurance for 
themselves cannot claim the status of covered employees for the 
purpose of collecting benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Lutter l2 
1. Facts 
In 1991, William Lutter was injured in a work-related accident 
while working for Lutter Construction, Inc., a Maryland close 
corporationll3 wholly owned by Lutter and his wife. Lutter served as 
president of the corporation, and his wife was vice-president. When 
Lutter was injured in 1991, Lutter was the corporation's only employee. 
Significantly, the corporation did not have workers' compensation 
insurance at the time of Lutter's injury. Approximately six months 
prior to the accident, Lutter discovered that his insurance with Aetna 
included liability coverage but not workers' compensation coverage. 
However, Lutter decided not to purchase workers' compensation cov-
erage for the corporation upon the advice of his insurance agent who 
suggested that it was not necessary as long as he was the corporation's 
only employee and had health insurance. 
After spending nearly two months in the hospital following a 
serious job related injury, Lutter fIled a claim with the Workers' 
Compensation Commission (the Commission), seeking benefits from 
his close corporation pursuant to the Maryland Workers' Compensation 
Act (the Act).114 Because the corporation did not have workers' com-
pensation insurance, Lutter sought benefits from the Uninsured Em-
111. Id at 10-11, 672 A.2d at 1114. 
112. 342 Md. 334, 676 A.2d 51 (1996). 
113. "A close corporation is one in which the stock is subject to certain transfer 
restrictions, and which has elected close corporation status by a unanimous 
vote of its stockholders." Id. at 341 n.3, 676 A.2d at 54 n.3 (citing William 
G. Hall, Jr., The New Maryland Close Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REv. 
341, 341-42 (1967». Close corporations are typically characterized by a "limited 
number of stockholders who actively participate in the business," stockholders 
who have a close personal relationship, and no established market for the 
corporate stock. Id. (citing William G. Hall, Jr., The New Maryland Close 
Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REv. 341, 341-42 (1967». 
114. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 9-101 to -1108 (1991 & Supp. 1996). 
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ployers' Fund,115 which was established by the State to provide workers' 
compensation benefits for injured workers whose employers fail to 
purchase workers' compensation insurance for them. The Commission 
denied Lutter's claim for benefits on the ground that Lutter was not 
a "covered employee" within the meaning of the Act. After the Circuit 
Court for Prince George's County affirmed the ruling of the Commis-
sion, Lutter appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
which reversed the circuit court, rmding that Lutter was a "covered 
employee" under the Act and therefore entitled to benefits from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari to determine whether "officers of Maryland close 
corporations, who decide not to purchase workers' compensation in-
surance for themselves but fail to notify the State of their decision and 
are subsequently injured working for the corporation, may collect 
workers' compensation benefits from the state-operated Uninsured 
Employers' Fund. "116 The court of appeals reversed the intermediate 
appellate court. 117 
2. Analysis 
In determining whether Lutter was eligible to collect benefits from 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the court examined section 9-206 of 
the Act. Section 9-206(a) provides that "an officer of a corporation 
... is a covered employee if the officer ... provides a service for the 
corporation . . . for monetary compensation." 118 Because Lutter was 
performing construction work for the corporation at the time of his 
injury, it would appear that he would be a covered employee within 
the meaning of section 9-206(a).119 However, the Act also provides that 
an officer of a close corporation may elect to be exempt from cover-
age,l20 which becomes effective when the corporation submits a written 
notice of the election to the Commission and the insurer of the 
corporation.121 Thus, the court determined that the real question was 
whether Lutter effectively exempted himself from coverage under sec-
tion 9-206(b) by deciding, in his capacity as corporate president, not 
to purchase workers' compensation insurance for himself.l22 
115. Id. § 9·1002. 
116. Lutter, 342 Md. at 336-37, 676 A.2d at 52 (holding that Lutter did not qualify 
for benefits under the Act). 
117. In a lengthy dissent, acknowledging the law as written would produce an unsatis-
factory result, Judge Karwacki criticizes the majority for ignoring the express 
language of the statute and leaving the law regarding workers' compensation 
confused and vague. Id. at 350-61, 676 A.2d at 58-64 (Karwacki, J., dissenting). 
118. LAB. & EMPL. § 9-206(a). 
119. See Lutter, 342 Md. at 341, 676 A.2d at 54. 
120. See LAB. & EMPL. § 9·206(b)(l). 
121. See id. § 9-206(c)(2). 
122. See Lutter, 342 Md. at 341, 676 A.2d at 54. 
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In determining that Lutter elected to be exempt from Maryland's 
workers' compensation system by working as an employee of his close 
corporation without workers' compensation insurance,l23 the court found 
that the requirement in section 9-206(c) that the Commission be notified 
in writing of a corporate officer's election to be exempt exists for the 
benefIt of the state not for the benefit of the corporate officer. 124 
Because the notice provision exists solely for the benefit of the state, 
the state has the right to waive the notice requirement,l25 and thus, 
Lutter's failure to notify the Commission of his decision not to obtain 
workers' compensation insurance did not provide him with coverage. 126 
The court reasoned that Lutter, as president of the corporation, could 
not use his own failure to notify the Commission as the basis for his 
eligibility for benefits.l27 Therefore, the court held that Lutter elected 
to be exempt from workers' compensation coverage by making a 
conscious and deliberate decision not to purchase workers' compensa-
tion insurance and thus could not claim the status of a covered employee 
for the purposes of collecting benefits from the Uninsured Employer's 
Fund. l28 In so holding, the court avoided the absurd result of enabling 
officers of close corporations to obtain free workers' compensation 
coverage from the Uninsured Employer's Fund by not buying insurance 
for themselves and not notifying the Commission of their decision. 
Jmeph R. Salko 
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. A lessor is required to order a transcript for purpose of an 
appeal to circuit court when the amount in controversy is more than 
$2500 based on the value of tenant's right to possession. Cottman v. 
Princess Anne VilIas l29 
1. Facts 
Beginning in October of 1987, Princess Anne Villas (lessor) and 
Tyzanna Cottman entered into a series of yearly lease agreements. 130 
123. See id. at 343-44, 676 A.2d at 55-56. 
124. See id. at 342-43, 676 A.2d at 55. 
125. See id. at 343, 676 A.2d at 55 (citing Blaustein v. Aiello, 229 Md. 131, 138, 
182 A.2d 353, 357 (1962». 
126. See id. at 343, 676 A.2d at 55. 
127. See iii. at 345, 676 A.2d at 56. The court noted that Lutter, by "occupying the 
dual roles of employer/employee ... was 'required to discharge the responsibilities 
of each or suffer the consequence of failing either one.'" [d. (citing Molony v. 
Shalom Et Benedictus, 46 Md. App. 96, 103, 415 A.2d 648, 651 (1980». 
128. See id. at 345-46, 676 A.2d at 56. 
129. 340 Md. 295, 666 A.2d 1233 (1995). 
130. The rent was paid partially by a federal subsidy and partially by Cottman. See 
id. at 297, 666 A.2d at 1234. 
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Because Cottman was delinquent on several rent payments, Princess 
Anne Villas notified Cottman that it would not renew the lease. 
Cottman held over and Princess Anne Villas flied a complaint in the 
district court seeking possession for breach of lease. The district court 
found for Cottman. Princess Anne Villas appealed to the circuit court. 
Cottman moved to dismiss for failure to transmit the record required 
by Maryland Rule 7-109, when the amount in controversy exceeds 
$2500. The circuit court denied Cottman's motion to dismiss finding 
the amount in controversy to be $167. 
2. Analysis 
Disagreeing with the circuit court's determination of the amount 
in controversy, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that the 
correct way to calculate the amount in controversy in an action for 
possession was to determine the value of the tenants right to posses-
sion. J3J This is done by determining "whether the fair market rent 
'over [Cottman's] remaining life span, or at least over a period of 
years' was greater than $2500."132 The court found the aggregate 
amount to exceed $2500, therefore it reversed the circuit court judgment 
because the appeal to the circuit court should have been on the record, 
and the failure of Princess Anne Villas to transmit the record was 
sufficient grounds to dismiss the appeal.133 
Christopher J. Marchand 
B. When the appellate court remands a tort case for a new trial on 
punitive damages, the question whether a claim for punitive damages 
should be submitted to a jury depends on the evidence adduced at 
the new trial and not upon the evidence from the prior trial. Middle 
States Holding Co. Inc. v. Thomas- 34 
1. Facts 
In April 1990, Everett Thomas and the predecessor of Middle 
States Holding Company, Inc. (Middle States) enter~d into a contract 
131. See id. at 298, 666 A.2d at 1234 (citing Purvis v. Forrest Street Apartments, 
286 Md. 398, 408 A.2d 388 (1979». 
132. [d. at 299, 666 A.2d at 1235 (quoting Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Comm'n 
306 Md. 515, 527, 510 A.2d 540, 546 (1986». This method is used to determine 
the value of possession because a tenant in federally subsidized housing has a 
continuing right to possession for an indefinite time period. See Carroll, 306 
Md. at 525, 510 A.2d at 545. "A tenant in federally subsidized ho~sing can 
only be evicted for 'material noncompliance' with the lease or other good 
cause." Cottman, 340 Md. at 298, 666 A.2d at 1234. Therefore, Cottman had 
a right to possession until good cause for eviction could be established. See 
id. at 299, 666 A.2d at 1235. 
133. See id. at 299, 666 A.2d at 1235. 
134. 340 Md. 699, 668 A.2d 5 (1995). 
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for the raising of hogs on a farm leased by Thomas. In December 
1990, difficulties arose between the parties, and Thomas instituted a 
suit against Middle States. Seeking compensatory and punitive damages 
Thomas brought counts alleging trespass, breach of contract, and 
conversion. Thomas also brought a count under the federal Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 13S which was dismissed. The 
court, upon a motion fIled by Middle States, dismissed the trespass 
count and Thomas's request for punitive damages. The jury awarded 
Thomas $9411.60 on the contract count and $12,853.00 on the con-
version count. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
held that the trial court erred in dismissing the claim for punitive 
damages with respect to the trespass and conversion counts because 
the complaint sufficiently alleged "actual malice." 136 The court of 
special appeals held that '''[i]n the event that a new trial is held on 
Count II (trespass) or Count III· (conversion), the issue of punitive 
damages must be submitted to the jury."'137 Middle States appealed to 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland arguing that the court of special 
appeals could not require the issue of punitive damages to be submitted 
to the jury upon new trial because the evidence at the new trial may 
not be sufficient to submit the issue to the jury. 
2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with Middle States 
that the determination of whether the issue of punitive damages will 
be submitted to a jury is determined by the evidence adduced at the 
new trial.138 The court stated "[s]imply because an appellate court 
believes that the evidence at the prior trial was sufficient to generate 
a jury issue on punitive damages does not mean the evidence at the 
trial to be held in the future will be sufficient." 139 Therefore, the 
court of special appeals cannot require the issue of punitive damages 
to be submitted to the jury in the event a new trial is ordered. 140 
Christopher J. Marchand 
C. A defendant in an encroachment case who seeks to avoid 
injunctive relief through the doctrine of comparative hardship must 
prove innocent mistake by a preponderance of the evidence. Urban 
Site Venture II Ltd. v. Levering Associates Ltd. Partnershipl41 
135. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). 
136. Maryland law does not permit punitive damages in claims for breach of 
contract. See id. at 702, 668 A.2d at 7 (citing Alexander v. Evander, 336 Md. 
635, 645 n.8, 650 A.2d 260, 265 n.8 (1994». 
137. Id. at 702-03, 668 A.2d at 7. 
138. See id. at 703, 668 A.2d at 7 (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 
420, 472, 601 A.2d 633, 659 (1992». 
139. Id. at 704, 668 A.2d at 8. 
140. See id. 
141. 340 Md. 223, 665 A.2d 1062 (1995). 
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1. Facts 
Urban Site Venture II Limited Partnership and LaSalle Partners 
(Urban Site) planned and began construction on a parking garage 
adjacent to property owned by Levering Associates Limited Partner-
ship (Levering). Urban Site had already built three stories of the 
garage when Levering filed suit alleging an encroachment. Levering 
sought an injunction ordering removal of the encroachment and 
damages. At trial, the garage was found to encroach a total of 1.3 
square feet on Levering's property. The trial court, using a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, found the encroachment to be the 
result of an innocent mistake. Levering was awarded damages of 
$302 and the injunction was denied. Levering appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland which reversed the circuit court's 
ruling and granted the injunction. The court of special appeals found 
that Urban Site failed to provide compelling evidence necessary to 
establish innocent mistake under the doctrine of comparative hard-
ship. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
judgment of the court of special appeals and affirmed the trial 
court's decision. 
2. Analysis 
The doctrine of comparative hardship blocks a permanent in-
junction if the court determines the benefit of the injunction is 
minimal compared to the inconvenience and damage to the defen-
dant. 142 To prevail, the party seeking to avoid the issuance of a 
permanent injunction bears the burden of proving that its mistake 
was innocent.143 First the court must find that the defendant's mistake 
was innocent. l44 In determining the innocence of the mistake, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland used a heightened level of 
scrutiny due to "the sanctity of private property.' '145 The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland rejected the heightened standard used by the 
court of special appeals because a preponderance of evidence standard 
has been consistently applied by the court in previous cases involving 
142. See id. at 231, 665 A.2d at 1065 (citing Eastern v. Dundalk Holding Co., 199 
Md. 303, 305, 86 A.2d 404 (1952) (citing Hasselbring v. Koepke, 248 N.W. 
89), 873 (1933))). 
143. See id. at 228, 665 A.2d at 1064 (citing Griffin v. Red Run Lodge, 610 F.2d 
1198 (4th Cir. 1979». 
144. See id. at 232, 665 A.2d at 1066. An innocent mistake is one made in good 
faith. See id. at 234, 665 A.2d at 1067. In this case, the court found that 
Urban Site was acting in good faith because it relied on an expert's survey 
and stopped work to recheck the survey as soon as it was made aware of 
Levering's objections. See id. 
145. [d. at 229, 665 A.2d at 1064-65. 
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private property ownership. 146 Therefore, a defendant in an encroach-
ment case who seeks to avoid injunctive relief through the doctrine 
of comparative hardship must prove innocent mistake by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.147 
Christopher J. Marchand 
D. A motion for new trial on grounds that the transcript is 
unavailable for appellate review can only be granted when the lost 
portion is relevant to appellate issues and can not be reconstructed 
through diligent efforts. Bradley v. Hazard Technology CO.I48 
1. Facts 
On April 19, 1993, Hazard Technology Company (Hazard) filed 
suit against Bradley, a terminated employee, to recover money it had 
paid Bradley prior to termination. The district court entered a judg-
ment against Hazard. A timely notice of appeal was flled, however, 
because of a faulty audio tape a full transcript of the district court 
trial was not available.149 Before Hazard filed an appeal memorandum 
as required by Maryland Rule 7-1l3(d)(2), it moved to have the case 
remanded for new trial on the grounds that since a full transcript 
was not available it could not "adequately prepare for or prosecute 
its appeal." ISO The court granted the motion for a new trial. Bradley 
filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the circuit oourt erred by 
granting a new trial .without first requiring Hazard to submit a 
memorandum explaining the basis for appeal, and then determining 
whether a sufficient record could be reconstructed. 
2. Analysis 
Maryland Rule 7-1l3(d)(3) requires the appealing party to file 
an appeal memorandum to present specific allegations of error, pose 
146. See id. at 229, 665 A.2d at 1065. 
147. See id. 
148. 340 Md. 202, 665 A.2d 1050 (1995). 
149. In civil cases, appeals from district court are on the record if'the amount in 
controversy exceeds $2500. See id. at 204 n.l, 665 A.2d at 1052 n.l (citing 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-401(f) (Supp. 1995». Maryland 
Rules require the recording of the entire trial on the merits excluding opening 
statements a~d closing arguments. See id. at 204 n.2, 665 A.2d at 1052 n.2 
(citing MD. R. 1224(d)(2)(a». 
150. [d. at 205, 665 A.2d at 1052. 
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any questions for appellate review, and provide an argument in 
support of its position. J5J The Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that the circuit court erred when it granted Hazard's motion for a 
new trial on the basis that a full transcript was not available. ls2 The 
court stated that it had consistently held that the unavailability of a 
complete transcript is not in itself sufficient to warrant a new trial. IS3 
The appellant has the burden to assert error and prove that the 
omissions from the record "are not merely inconsequential, but are 
in some manner relevant on appeal. "154 The appellant must, if 
possible, reconstruct the record for review. ISS A new trial may be 
warranted, however, "[i]f an appellant can demonstrate to the circuit 
court that error may have occurred at trial, and that a record 
sufficient to allow for a fair consideration [of the issues] cannot be 
reconstructed.' 'IS6 
Christopher J. Marchand 
E. The Batson rule applies to the exclusion of white jurors based 
on race. A defendant'S objection to the discharge of the first jury 
pool is not waived by the acceptance, by defendant'S counsel, of a 
jury chosen from a second jury pool. Gilchrist v. StateIS7 
1. Facts 
During jury selection at the trial of Gary Gilchrist, defense 
counsel exercised seven peremptory challenges all of which were 
directed at white members of the venire. After the seventh peremptory 
challenge, the State objected "arguing that the defense was attempting 
to remove all white prospective jurors in violation of the principles 
set forth in Batson v. Kentucky."IS8 The court proceeded to ask the 
defendant to give reason for striking all seven jurors. In the ensuing 
exchange, the court told Gilchrist: "[W]hen you have stricken seven 
jurors, potential jurors, ... and they are all white and they all have 
different profiles, you're going to have to come up with a satisfactory 
151. See id. at 206, 665 A.2d at 1053. 
152. See id. at 207, 665 A.2d at 1053. 
153. See id. at 208, 665 A.2d at 1053 (citations omitted). 
154. [d. at 208, 665 A.2d at 1054 (quoting Smith v. State, 291 Md. 125, 136, 433 
A.2d 1143, 1149 (1981». 
155. See id. at 211-12, 665 A.2d at 1055. 
156. [d. at 213, 665 A.2d at 1055. The court stated that "only in 'rare cases' is a 
retrial justified because of a missing or incomplete transcript." [d. 
157. 340 Md. 606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995). 
158. [d. at 612, 667 A.2d at 878-79. 
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explanation that persuades me that your reason for striking him was 
not racial .... " IS9 The court found that the explanation given by 
defendant for striking four of the seven potential jurors was unsat-
isfactory}60 The court excused the jury pool and defense counsel 
objected. The selection process proceeded to a second jury pool, and 
defense counsel found the second jury to be acceptable. Gilchrist 
was subsequently convicted on all charges. On appeal, Gilchrist 
argued that Batson was inapplicable to peremptory challenges against 
white jurors, and that even if Batson applied, the trhil court erred 
in its determination that "the prosecution had made a prima facia 
showing of discrimination. "161 The State argued that the defense 
counsel objection was not preserved because defense counsel waived 
the objection to the first jury by accepting the second jury. Gilchrist 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which af-
firmed Gilchrist's conviction. l62 The court of appeals granted certi-
orari and affirmed. 
2. Analysisl63 
First, the court addressed the State's waiver argument as a 
threshold issue. The court stated that it had consistently held that 
an objection to the exclusion of a juror is waived if the objecting 
counsel finds the jury to be acceptable at the conclusion of the 
selection process. l64 The court, however, distinguished the situation 
in this case from earlier cases. The court noted that previous cases 
159. Id at 615, 667 A.2d at 880. 
160. Among reasons found unsatisfactory by the court were the clothing and manner 
of a juror, the education level attained by a juror and his studious appearance, 
the address of a juror, and the inability of the defense counsel to recall the 
reason he struck a specific juror. See iii. at 615-16, 667 A.2d at 880. 
161. Id. at 616, 667 A.2d at 881. 
162. 97 Md. App. 55, 627 A.2d 44 (1993). 
163. Judge Chasanow, joined by Judge Bell, wrote separately "to clarify that a 
prima jacie case of discrimination under Batson merely shifts the burden to 
the striking party to offer a race and gender-neutral reason for the challenge; 
it does not create a rebuttable presumption that, in effect, shifts the ultimate 
burden of proof." [d. at 606, 667 A.2d at 892 (Chasanow, J., concurring). 
According to Judge Chasanow, the majority made the same mistake the eighth 
circuit made in Purkett v. Elem, 25 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 1994), overruled by 115 
S. Ct. 1769 (1995). The Supreme Court overruled Purkelt because the eighth 
circuit collapsed steps two and three of the Batson analysis. See Gi/christ, 340 
Md. at 631-34, 667 A.2d at 888-89 (Chasanow, J., concurring) (discussing 
Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1769). Judge Chasanow also wrote that the issue of 
waiver was moot because the defendant was entitled to, and did assemble, a 
properly selected jury. See id. at 630, 667 A.2d at 887 (Chasanow, J., 
concurring). 
164. See id. at 617, 667 A.2d at 881 (citations omitted). 
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did not involve two separate jury pools, an objectionable first seated 
jury from the first pool, and a subsequently acceptable jury selected 
entirely from the second pool.I65 In previous cases, the objection was 
waived because the included or excluded juror was from the same 
jury pool as the jury that actually heard the case. The court held 
that the objection to the dismissal of the first panel of jurors is not 
waived even though the objecting counsel found the second jury 
panel acceptable. 166 
Next the court addressed whether Batson is applicable to the 
exclusion of white jurors.167 The court stated that "[t]he majority of 
courts throughout the country which have considered Batson's ap-
plicability to excluded white jurors have determined that the same 
reasoning underlying the court's decision in Batson applies with equal 
force to race-based peremptory challenges exercised against white 
prospective jurors." 168 The court held that, under both Article 24 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Equal Protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, peremptory challenges cannot be 
exercised against white persons solely because of their race. 169 
Gilchrist's last claim was that the process by which the Batson 
challenge was utilized by the trial court was flawed. 170 Gilchrist argued 
that the prosecution never made a prima facia showing that the 
peremptory challenge was exercised in a racially discriminatory man-
ner .171 In Batson, the Supreme Court articulated a three-step process 
to assess whether peremptory challenges were being exercised in a 
racially discriminatory manner. 172 First, the complaining party must 
make a prima facia showing that the other party has exercised its 
peremptory challenges on a discriminatory basis.173 Second, once a 
prima facia case js established, the burden shifts to the other party 
165. See id. at 618, 667 A.2d at 881. 
166. See id. at 618, 667 A.2d at 882. The court's rationale was that when a jury is 
found to be acceptable after an objection has been made to include or exclude 
a prospective juror from the same pool that the final jury was selected, "[t)he 
parties' final position, [finding the jury acceptable), is directly inconsistent with 
his or her earlier complaint." [d. However, the same inconsistency is not 
present when the objection is aimed at an entirely different pool of jurors than 
that which the objecting counsel found acceptable. See id. 
167. See id. at 621, 667 A.2d at 883. 
168. [d. (citations omitted). 
169. See id. at 624-25, 667 A.2d at 885. The court made clear that "[b)lacks are 
not the only cognizable [racial) group to which Batson applies .... " [d. 
170. See id. at 625, 667 A.2d at 885. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. (discussing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-97 (1986) and citing 
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 
30, 46, 665 A.2d 223, 231 (1995». 
173. See id. 
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to offer race-neutral explanations for excluding the jurors.174 "Finally, 
the trial court must 'determine [] whether the opponent of the strike 
has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination."'17s The 
trial judge is accorded great deference in the determination of whether 
a prima facia showing has been made.176 Moreover, the issue of· 
whether a prima facia showing has been made becomes moot once 
the court has ruled on the ultimate issue of discrimination. 177 The 
court further stated that it would only overturn a judge's decision if 
it was clearly erroneous.l78 The court held that the defendant's reasons 
for exercising the peremptory challenges were insufficient and the 
judge's ruling was not clearly erroneous. 179 
Christopher J. Marchand 
F. Police officer did not properly preserve for appellate review 
issues of the trial court's faulty jury instructions when he objected 
to sending the issues to the jury; arguments raised for the first 
time in an appellate brief were properly refused,· the court correctly 
refused jury instructions that were unnecessary or inapplicable to 
the instant case. Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone 
Co. ISO 
1. Facts 
In 1983, Leon C. Fearnow was a police officer with the Hag-
erstown Police Department. The Chief of the department placed a 
wire tap on Fearnow's telephone with the assistance of other police 
officers and Donald K. Wood, an employee of the Chesapeake & 
Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland (C&P). Fearnow sued 
Wood and C&P for assisting with the illegal interception of his 
workplace telephone conversations in violation of the Maryland Wire-
tapping and Electronic Surveillance Act (Wiretap Act). 181 Upon a 
summary judgment in favor of C&P and a reversal of a judgment 
in favor of Wood, the court of appeals granted certiorari to review 
174. See id. 
175. Id at 625-26, 667 A.2d at 885 (citations omitted). 
176. See id. (citing Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 533, 616 A.2d 356, 361 (1992». 
177. See id. at 628, 667 A.2d at 886 (citations omitted). 
178. See id. at 627, 667 A.2d at 886 (citing Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 84, 542 
A.2d 1267, 1283 (1988». 
179. Id. at 628, 667 A.2d at 886-87. 
180. 342 Md. 363, 676 A.2d 65 (1996). 
181. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 to -414 (1995 & Supp. 1996) 
(hereinafter the Wiretap Act). 
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Maryland's rules on the preservation of issues for appeal, as well as 
to examine certain provisions of the Wiretap Act. 182 
2. Analysis 
This case illustrated that when a party's reasons at trial for an 
objection to jury instructions are "starkly different" from the reasons 
outlined in the appellate brief, the party will not properly preserve 
the issue for appellate review. 183 For example, in the trial court, 
Fearnow objected to jury instructions that police officers are pre-
sumed to act lawfully in the line of duty. 184 Fearnow asserted that 
the presumption was confusing and not applicable.18s However, on 
appeal Fearnow contended that section 1O-402(c)(i)(ii) of the Wiretap 
Act nullified the presumption because the statute imposed a duty on 
Wood to inquire whether the police had a court order to tap the 
telephone line. 186 Since Fearnow failed to mention section l0-402(c)(i)(ii) 
during his trial court objection, he was barred from asserting the 
issue before the appellate court.187 
On remand, Fearnow also erred regarding his objection to an 
instruction on the privacy of parties on a telephone. 188 Fearnow 
objected to sending the issue of privacy to the jury because he stated 
that the jury was "bound byu the previous determination by the 
court of special appeals that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.l89 However, this objection was not sufficient to alert the 
trial judge to the errors in his instructions. 190 Essentially, privacy was 
not a consideration under the statute because the statute only speaks 
to the willfulness and knowledge of the person tapping the telephone 
line. 191 Thus, the court held that Fearnow did not properly preserve 
this issue· for appeal because the trial judge did not have sufficient 
notice of any possible errors in his instructions. l92 Consequently, the 
182. See Fearnow, 342 Md. at 368, 676 A.2d at 67. C & P prevailed on summary 
judgment because the court held that, even if Wood acted in violation of the 
Wiretap Act, he did so outside the scope of his employment. See id. at 372, 
676 A.2d at 69. 
183. See id. at 381, 676 A.2d at 74; see also MD. R. 2-520(e). 
184. See Fearnow, 342 Md. at 382, 676 A.2d at 74. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. at 378, 676 A.2d at 72-73. 
189. See id. 
190. See id. at 379, 676 A.2d at 73. 
191. See id.; see also Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 283 Md. 284, 388 A.2d 54 (1978) 
(holding that an objection in compliance with former Maryland Rule 554 
(precursor to Maryland Rule 2-520) is properly preserved for appellate review). 
192. See Fearnow, 342 Md. at 379, 676 A.2d at 73. 
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court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment in favor of C&P 
and ruled in favor of defendant Wood.J93 
Dan Curry 
III. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. The doctrine of transferred intent applies when a defendant 
shoots and wounds an intended victim and with the same bullet 
hits and kills an unintended victim. Poe v. Statel94 
1. Facts 
James Allen Poe (Mr. Poe) went to the home of his estranged 
wife, Karen Poe (Ms. Poe), to visit their children. A dispute ensued 
over Mr. Poe's plans to take the children to Florida with his 
girlfriend. As Ms. Poe entered her home declaring that she was going 
to call the police, Mr. Poe retrieved a shotgun from his car, shouted 
'''Take this, bitch,'" and fired at least one shot into the house. The 
bullet hit and wounded Ms. Poe, continued through her and fatally 
wounded Kimberly Rice, the six-year-old daughter of Ms. Poe's 
boyfriend. 
As part of his instructions to the jury, the trial judge explained 
the doctrine of transferred intent. The judge explained that if the 
jury determined that the defendant intended to kill Ms. Poe and if 
Ms. Poe had died they would have found Mr. Poe guilty of first 
degree murder, the intent could transfer and they could find Mr. 
Poe guilty of first degree murder of Rice. The jury convicted Mr. 
Poe of both attempted murder of Ms. Poe and first-degree murder 
of Rice. During the sentencing phase, the trial judge stated that he 
was "old-fashioned" and made reference to his belief in the Bible. 
He stated, 
I guess I'm a dinosaur . . . . I still believe in good old-
fashioned law and order, the Bible, and a lot of things that 
people say I shouldn't believe anymore .... I'm not going 
to change. Maybe one day they will say you should not sit 
here anymore because you are too much of a dinosaur. You 
193. See id. at 388, 676 A.2d at 77. 
194. 341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501 (1996). 
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are too conservative in criminal law. You believe too much 
in the Bible and law and order .195 
After finding no mitigating factors, the trial judge sentenced Mr. 
Poe to life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Rice 
and a consecutive 30-year sentence for the attempted murder of Ms. 
Poe. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the con-
victions. 
Mr. Poe appealed his conviction on two grounds. First, Mr. Poe 
claimed that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent. Second, Mr. Poe argued that the trial judge's comments 
about his own religious beliefs required reversal of Mr. Poe's sen-
tence. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari and 
affirmed both the conviction and sentence. Judge Irma Raker, joined 
by Judges Rodowski and Karwacki, filed a concurring opinion. l96 
2. Analysis 
a. Transferred Intent 
In an opinion by Judge Chasanow, the court of appeals first 
addressed the issue of whether transferred intent applies to the death 
of an unintended bystander notwithstanding the fact that the intended 
victim is injured by the same bullet.'97 Based on prior case law, 
transferred intent would have applied had the defendant missed Ms. 
Poe entirely, hitting Rice instead. 198 The defendant argued, however, 
that since the bullet he fired hit and wounded Ms. Poe, his intent 
was "'used up'" upon the completion of the crime of attempted 
195. Id. at 533, 671 A.2d at 505-06. 
196. In a concurring opinion, Judge Irma Raker, joined by Judges Rodowski and 
Karwacki, wrote separately to clarify that she did not believe that the court 
was making the dicta from Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 625 A.2d 984 (1993), 
binding. See Poe, 341 Md. at 534, 671 A.2d at 506 (Raker, J., concurring) 
(discussing Ford, 330 Md. at 708-18, 625 A.2d at 996-1(01). Judge Raker also 
rejected the dicta in the majority opinion which narrowed the doctrine of 
transferred intent, making it inapplicable to "attempted murder where there is 
no death." Id. at 535, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, J., concurring). Instead, Judge 
Raker wrote, the rule should be that "transferred intent should not apply to 
attempted murder if no one is injured." Id. (Raker, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). According to Judge Raker, this interpretation of the rule was necessary 
and important in order not to substantially interfere with the prosecution of 
criminals for "harm inflicted on innocent bystanders." Id. at 539, 671 A.2d 
at 509 (Raker, J., concurring). 
197. See id. at 527-28, 671 A.2d at 503. 
198. See id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504 (citing Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 390-
92, 330 A.2d 176, 180-81 (1974». 
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murder of Ms. Poe. l99 Although acknowledging that the crime of 
attempted murder was complete, the court nonetheless rejected Mr. 
Poe's argument that his intent was "used up" because his intent was 
to kill Ms. Poe, not to attempt to kill Ms. Poe. 200 
Next, the court addressed Mr. Poe's reliance on Ford v. State. WI 
In dicta, the Ford court stated that transferred intent did not apply 
to attempted murder. 202 Thus, if a defendant non-fatally injures both 
an intended victim and an unintended victim, the defendant can only 
be charged with the attempted murder of the intended victim.203 
Refusing to extend and apply the Ford dicta, the court distinguished 
Mr. Poe's case because, in Poe, the unintended victim died.204 
The court then analogized the doctrine of transferred intent with 
the felony murder doctrine.20s The court said that the two were 
similar in that they both were legal fictions designed to assign liability 
for the murder of unintended victims.206 Since there is no crime of 
attempted felony murder, the court concluded there is no transferred 
intent of attempted murder.207 Thus, in dicta, the court seemed to 
narrow the application of the doctrine of transferred intent, stating 
that it "does not apply to attempted murder when there is no 
death." 208 Because an unintended victim did die in the instant case 
the doctrine of transferred intent was applicable.209 In fashioning the 
test to determine whether the doctrine of transferred intent applies, 
the court stated that the relevant question to ask is: "[W]hat could 
the defendant have been convicted of had he accomplished his 
intended act?" 210 
b. Judge's Statement of Religious Beliefs During Sentencing 
The second major issue addressed by the court was the effect of 
the judge's statement concerning his religious beliefs during sentenc-
199. Id at 528, 671 A.2d at 503. 
200. See id. at 528-29, 671 A.2d at 503. 
201. See id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 503-04 (discussing Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 625 
A.2d 984 (1993». 
202. See id. at 529-30, 671 A.2d at 504 (discussing Ford, 330 Md. at 714, 625 A.2d 
at 999). 
203. See id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504 (discussing Ford, 330 Md. at 714, 625 A.2d 
at 999). 
204. See id. 
205. See id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 504. 
206. See id. 
207. See id. 
208. Id. 
209. See id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504. 
210. Id. at 530-31, 671 A.2d at 504 (citing Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 390-92, 
330 A.2d 176, 180-81 (1974». 
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ing.211 Mr. Poe contended that his sentence was improperly given 
because the judge made a statement that he believed "too much in the 
Bible and law and order" during sentencing. 212 The court rejected this 
contention, maintaining that despite the trial judge's reference to his 
religious beliefs, the trial judge nonetheless properly weighed the factors 
including any possible mitigating factors.213 Furthermore, the court of 
appeals noted that a trial judge has broad discretion in sentencing.214 
The court then distinguished this case from United States v. 
Bakker,21S in which the Fourth Circuit held that the judge had im-
properly brought his own personal religious beliefs into the sentencing 
of the defendant. 216 The Court of Appeals of Maryland asserted that 
the statements made by the trial judge in Poe were not as extreme as 
those made by the sentencing judge in Bakker.217 In Bakker, the 
sentencing judge stated that the defendant "'had no thought whatever 
about his victims and those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed 
as being saps from money-grubbing preachers or priests."'218 The 
Fourth Circuit suspected that the sentence somehow "reflected the fact 
that the court's own sense of religious propriety had somehow been 
betrayed.''219 In the instant case, the court of appeals reasoned that 
the statements made by the trial judge did not appear to reflect any 
sense of religious betrayal. 220 While upholding the sentence, however, 
the court of appeals was careful not to express approval of the trial 
judge's reference to his religious beliefs.221 
Jennifer R. Terrasa 
B. The Maryland civil forfeiture statute is subject to 
Constitutional prohibition against excessive fines; court must 
consider instrumentality of property and weigh proportionality of 
the punishment to the seriousness of offense. Aravanis v. Somerset 
Countym 
1. Facts 
Appellant, Aravanis, appealed from a judgment rendered in the 
Circuit Court of Maryland for Somerset County against his real 
211. See id. at 531, 671 A.2d at 505. 
212. [d. at 533, 671 A.2d at 506 (emphasis added). 
213. See id. at 531, 671 A.2d at 505. 
214. See id. (citing Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 642 (1981». 
215. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991). 
216. See Poe, 341 Md. at 533, 671 A.2d at 506 (discussing Bakker, 925 F.2d at 
740). 
217. See id. (discussing Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740-41). 
218. [d. (quoting Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740). 
219. [d. (discussing Bakker, 925 F.2d at 741). 
220. See id. at 533-34, 671 A.2d at 506. 
221. See id. at 534, 671 A.2d at 506. 
222. 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). 
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property. Aravanis had pled guilty to one count of possession of a 
controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in sufficient quantity to indi-
cate intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense pursuant to Section 
286 of the Crimes and Punishment Article of the Maryland Annotated 
Code.223 A 1991 search of the property conducted pursuant to a 
search and seizure warrant yielded marijuana and drug paraphernalia. 
Upon the guilty plea, Aravanis was sentenced to five years impris-
onment, of which three and one-half years were suspended. Somerset 
County (the County) subsequently initiated forfeiture proceedings 
against the real property pursuant to state law, presenting as evidence, 
inter alia, the search and seizure warrant as well as the marijuana 
and drug paraphernalia found on the property. In granting an order 
of forfeiture, the trial court rejected Aravanis' pro se defense that 
the in rem forfeiture was excessive under both the Eighth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution as well as Article 25 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights. Prior to consideration by the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari on its own motion. Upon hearing the appeal, the court of 
appeals vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded for a 
determination of whether the forfeiture violated Article 25 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
The significant legal issues in the present case are: (1) whether 
under Maryland law a civil forfeiture statute is punitive in nature; 
(2) whether the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration 
of Rights prohibitions against excessive fines are applicable to a civil 
forfeiture statute; and (3) what factors Maryland courts must consider 
in determining whether or not a forfeiture constitutes an excessive 
fine. 
2. Analysis 
Maryland's civil forfeiture statute permits forfeiture proceedings 
against property involved in the unlawful manufacture, possession 
or distribution of CDS.224 The court of appeals held that because the 
state statute at issue "requires 'direct payment to a sovereign as 
punishment for some offense"'22s it was punitive226 and subject to 
222. 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). 
223. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286 (1992). 
224. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1992). 
225. Aravanis, 339 Md. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893. 
226. The court of appeals followed the reasoning promulgated in Austin v. United 
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (looking to the historical interpretation of forfeitures 
as punitive and the intent of Congress to punish only those involved in drug 
trafficking). See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 651-57, 664 A.2d at 892-94. 
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the Excessive Fines Clause of Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights. 227 
The court of appeals further held that, in Maryland, courts must 
consider the "instrumentality" of the property subject to forfeiture 
and whether the "'fine' is out of all reasonable proportion" to the 
offense committed.228 In "paint[ing] with a rather broad brush," the 
Aravanis court declined to adopt a specific analysis for determining 
whether or not a forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine. 229 The court 
of appeals, however, did discuss with approval the factors considered 
by other courts which have recently decided this issue.23o In remanding 
the case back to the circuit court, the court of appeals left open the 
issue of how much weight to accord specific factors or which factors 
to apply. The court instead relied on the trial court's discretion to 
fashion a test commensurate with the circumstances of the individual 
case. 
Douglas I. Wood 
c. Prosecution's peremptory strikes withstand Batson challenge if 
prosecutor provides sufficient race-neutral reasons for the strikes. 
Harley v. StateD I 
1. Facts 
Peter Donald Harley was charged in the Circuit Court of Mary-
land for Prince George's County with murder and other offenses 
arising out of an attempted sale and purchase of illegal drugs. During 
227. Article 25 is considered in pari materia to the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 656, 664 A.2d at 893-94. The 
court declined, however, to reach the issue of whether the forfeiture violated 
the United States Constitution. See id. Rather, the court determined the issue 
solely on the applicability of article 25. See id. at 656-57, 664 A.2d at 893-94. 
228. [d. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
229. [d. at 665-66, 664 A.2d at 898. 
230. See id.; see a/so, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 
1994) (describing three-part test for determining excessiveness of in rem for-
feiture under the Eighth Amendment based on: (1) nexus between offense, 
property, and extent of property's role in offense; (2) role and culpability of 
owner; (3) possibility of readily separating offending property from remainder); 
United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994) 
(prescribing three-factor proportionality test focusing on: (1) inherent gravity 
of offense compared with harshness of penalty; (2) whether property was 
integral part of commission of offense; (3) whether criminal activity involving 
use of property was temporally and/or spatially extensive). 
231. 341 Md. 395, 671 A.2d 15 (1996). 
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voir dire, the State first made peremptory challenges against four 
black jury pool members. Following the fourth challenge, Harley, 
who is black, raised a Batson232 objection to the striking of the last 
two black jurors. The assistant state's attorney replied that these two 
jurors were struck not because of their race, but because they were 
under thirty and unmarried. The judge deemed this reason sufficient 
and jury selection proceeded. 
With the panel requiring the selection of one more juror the 
prosecutor struck a fifty-six year old black woman. The defense again 
raised the Batson objection. In response, the prosecutor replied that 
the State wanted to place a police officer on the jury, who happened 
to be positioned next in the jury selection pool. The court denied 
the challenge, and selection proceeded. The State next struck a 
twenty-four year old black woman. In response to the Batson chal-
lenge raised by the defense, the State claimed that the woman had 
been struck because she was under thirty and unmarried. The court 
denied the defense motion, stating for the record that eight out of 
the eleven jurors selected were black. Of the twelve regular and two 
alternate jurors selected, nine of the regular jurors and both of the 
alternates were black. The jury convicted Harley of first-degree felony 
murder, second-degree murder, and related offenses. On petition to 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Harley argued that the jury 
selection violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.233 
2. Analysis 
A trial judge's rulings on a Batson challenge are factual findings 
and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. 234 In ruling on 
a Batson challenge, the trial judge must consider (1) whether the 
stated reason for the challenge "is a pretext for purposeful discrim-
ination" and (2) whether the reason itself denies equal protection.23$ 
This being the case, the rulings will stand unless the trial judge could 
not have reasonably found that the reasons proffered were non-
pretextual and did not violate equal protection. 236 
The Harley court concluded that since Harley did not argue 
either at trial or on appeal that age and marital status were imper-
232. The Batson challenge is derived from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 
(1986). See Harley v. State, 341 Md. 395, 396, 671 A.2d 15, IS (1996). Batson 
challenges require the prosecution to provide a race-neutral reason for exercise 
of peremptory challenges in light of the defendant's allegations that the 
challenges are actually racially motivated. See id. 
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
234. See Harley, 341 Md. at 402, 671 A.2d at 18-19. 
235. [d. (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995». 
236. See id. at 402, 671 A.2d at 18-19. 
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missibly discriminatory reasons to strike a juror, no equal protection 
rights were violated by the strikes.237 The court of appeals also noted 
that neither the court nor defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's 
policy of striking jurors based on age and marital status, and that 
this policy was applied without regard for race.238 The court of 
appeals also found plausible the striking of a juror to attempt to 
empanel a police officer further down the jury list. 239 Finding that 
the trial judge's rulings were not clearly erroneous, the court of 
appeals affirmed Harley's conviction.240 
Douglas I. Wood 
D. Speedy trial period begins anew when charges are refiled after 
a nol pros241 unless nol pros was entered for purpose of 
circumventing speedy trial period. State v. Brown242 
1. Facts 
Otis Alexander Brown was charged by criminal information filed 
in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County on May 12, 1993 with 
second degree rape, child abuse, and other offenses arising from 
allegations that Brown had raped his step-granddaughter. Defense 
counsel entered an appearance on May 21, 1993, setting the ISO-day 
period for trial to commence no later than November 17, 1993.243 
The trial was initially scheduled for August 3, 1993, then postponed 
on the defendant's request until October 5, 1993. The prosecutor nol 
prossed the case on October 5, 1993, stating that undergarments 
worn by the victim at the time of the offense had been sent to the 
Maryland State Police Crime Lab for DNA testing, and that the 
results of the DNA testing, necessary for both the trial preparation 
237. See id. at 403 n.2, 671 A.2d at 19 n.2. The challenging party must allege and 
demonstrate that the strike violates the equal protection rights of the juror, 
not the accused. See id. 
238. [d. at 403, 671 A.2d at 19. The court noted that the prosecutor also struck a 
21-year-old, single, white juror. See id. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. at 404, 671 A.2d at 19. 
241. Nolle prosequi is a "[v)oluntary withdrawal by prosecuting attorney of present 
proceedings on a criminal charge ... commonly called 'nol pros.'" BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). 
242. 341 Md. 609, 672 A.2d 602 (1996). 
243. Maryland law requires that a criminal case in the circuit court generally begin 
within 180 days of the appearance of defense counselor the first appearance 
of the defendant before the circuit court. See MD. R. 4-271; MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 591 (1996). 
1996] Annual Review of Maryland Law 47 
of the State as well as compliance with a discovery motion filed by 
defense counsel, had not been received. 
The State refiled the same charges by criminal indictment on 
January 11, 1994, after the DNA test results had been obtained. 
Brown filed a motion to dismiss in February of 1994, alleging that 
the State had violated the 180-day trial commencement requirement 
of the Maryland law,244 the speedy trial requirement of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Ar-
ticle 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
At the motion hearing, Brown acknowledged the "need" for 
the DNA test results, but claimed that the State should have sought 
a further postponement of the trial rather than filing the nol pros. 
In addition, Brown argued that because the State had not sought a 
postponement past the 180-day commencement period in accordance 
with the applicable code and rule section~S dismissal was required. 
The circuit court denied the dismissal motion, stating that there had 
been no violation of the code and rule provisions and no violation 
of the constitutional speedy trial requirement. Brown was subse-
quently convicted of child abuse and sentenced to four years impris-
onment. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed Brown's 
conviction, holding that the nol pros had the effect of circumventing 
the 180-day rule in violation of section 591 and Maryland Rule 4-
271. The Court of Appeals of Maryland then granted the State's 
petition for a writ of certiorari. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals noted that courts generally follow one of 
three approaches in applying statutory time limits for the commence-
ment of criminal trials in cases where the prosecutor first nol prossed 
the case and then later refiled the same 'charges: (1) the speedy trial 
time period is unaffected by the filing of the nol pros, and the same 
time period applies after the refiling of the same charges; (2) the 
trial commencement period is suspended between the filing of the 
nol pros and the filing of the new charges, but is not restarted anew 
with the new filing; or (3) the refiling of the same charges after a 
nol pros begins the time period anew except in cases where the nol 
pros was entered for the purpose of circumventing the time require-
ment.246 Under the third scenario, if the purpose of the nol pros and 
244. See supra note 243. 
245. The trial date may be postponed beyond 180 days by a party's motion or on 
the court's own initiative for "good cause shown." Brown, 341 Md. at 611 
n.l, 672 A.2d at 603 n.l. 
246. See id. at 616,672 A.2d at 606. 
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refiling was to frustrate the speedy trial requirement, the trial com-
mencement period is held not to have begun anew with the new 
filing but to have started under the original filing.247 The court of 
appeals stated that this latter approach is followed by Maryland. 248 
In Brown, the court of appeals found that the nol pros was not 
filed to evade the time statute because it was possible that the DNA 
evidence might have been obtained in time to start the trial within 
the ISO-day period. 249 Alternatively, the court found the delay in 
obtaining the DNA test results provided good cause for postponing 
the trial.2so As such, the entry of nol pros was within the discretion 
of the prosecutor and did not warrant reversal of the conviction.2s1 
Douglas l. Wood 
E. Defendant's right to a fair trial is not denied by the 
prosecutor's decision to nol pros lesser included offense when the 
evidence presented at trial virtually compelled the jury to convict 
the defendant of the greater offense. Burrell v. State2S2 
1. Facts 
Mack Tyrone Burrell was charged with robbery with a deadly 
weapon, robbery, theft of $300 or over, theft under $300, use of a 
247. See ide at 616-17, 672 A.2d at 606-07. 
24S. See ide at 616, 672 A.2d 606. In Maryland, the speedy trial period has been 
held not to begin anew if the nol pros and new filing "clearly circumvented" 
the ISO-day rule and had the "necessary effect" of attempting to avoid 
dismissal. See ide at 617, 672 A.2d at 606. The entry of a nol pros and 
subsequent refiling have the "necessary effect" of attempting to frustrate the 
speedy trial requirement when the only alternative to the nol pros is dismissal 
for failure to meet the statutory time period or when such actions have the 
"necessary effect" of violating the rule. See ide 
If the prosecutor is able to show "good cause" for the nol pros and refiling, 
the ISO-day clock will begin anew. See ide at 619, 671 A.2d at 607 (discussing 
State v. Glenn, 299 Md. 464, 474 A.2d 509 (19S4». In Glenn, the prosecutor 
nol prossed the case and refiled because of a legitimate belief that the charging 
documents contained errors and because the defense attorney would not agree 
to amendment of those documents. See ide 
Additionally, the Glenn court noted that nol prossing the case on the last 
possible day for trial is a clear indication that the nol pros is intended to 
circumvent the speedy trial statute. See ide Nol prossing the case at the time 
the good-faith reason for nol prossing is known, preferably some time before 
the time requirement runs, reduces the appearance that the nol pros was filed 
to evade the time requirement. See ide 
249. See ide at 620, 672 A.2d at 60S. 
250. See ide 
251. See ide at 621, 672 A.2d at 60S. 
252. 340 Md. 426, 667 A.2d 161 (1995). 
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handgun in the commission of a felony, and use of a handgun in 
the commission of a crime of violence in connection with the armed 
robbery of a Baltimore County gas station. At trial, after the 
conclusion of the evidence but before the jury was charged, the State 
moved to enter a nol prog2S3 to the robbery and theft under $300 
charges. Burrell was then convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon, 
theft of $300 or over, and the handgun charges. 
On appeal, Burrell argued, inter alia, that his common-law right 
to a fair trial was infringed by the State's entering the nol pros on 
the two lesser charges because it infringed upon the jury's discretion 
to convict him only of the lesser offense. 
2. Analysis 
Generally, the State has sole discretion to enter a nol pros.2S4 
However, this power must yield to the accused's right to a fair 
trial.2SS The court, therefore, may limit the prosecutor's power to nol 
pros a case if it will result in an unfair trial.2s6 Unfairness arises 
when a lesser charge, of which the accused is plainly guilty, is nol 
prossed over the defendant's objection. 2S7 In such cases, the jury is 
likely to convict the accused of the more serious offense, even though 
some element of the more serious offense remains in doubt, rather 
than allow the defendant to escape all punishment.2s8 As the Burrell 
court stated, when the defendant is "plainly guilty" of some offense, 
253. See supra note 241. 
254. See Burrell, 340 Md. at 430, 667 A.2d at 162. 
255. See id. at 430, 667 A.2d at 163. A paramount consideration is the right of an 
accused to a fair trial. See id. (citing Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 451, 
404 A.2d 244, 254 (1979». 
256. See id. 
257. See id. at 431-32, 667 A.2d at 163. 
258. See id. The court of appeals cites the case of Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 553 
A.2d 233 (1989), in which a defendant confessed to robbery and murder and 
was shown to be intoxicated at the time the offenses occurred. See Burrell, 
340 Md. at 430-31, 667 A.2d at 163. Over Hook's objection, the prosecutor 
nol prossed a charge of second-degree murder, and the jury was instructed to 
either convict or acquit the defendant of first-degree murder based on felony-
murder or to convict or acquit the defendant of first-degree murder based on 
premeditated murder. See id. The jury was not instructed that intoxication 
could preclude a finding of felony murder and mitigate the charge of premed-
itated murder to second-degree murder because the second-degree murder charge 
was withdrawn before the jury was charged. See id. The court of appeals 
reversed Hook's first-degree murder conviction on the grounds that the failure 
to instruct the jury on grounds for second-degree murder resulted in unfair 
prejudice. See id. The rationale for the reversal is that the jury could have 
reasonably convicted Hook for second-degree murder because of the evidence 
of intoxication. See id. 
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it is prejudicial for the State to nol pros the lesser included offense, 
over the defendant's objection, because it removes from the jury the 
option of convicting the defendant of the lesser offense. 259 
The Burrell court stated, however, that if the jury could not 
find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense without also finding 
the defendant guilty of the greater offense, the prosecutor is not 
precluded from nol prossing the lesser offense.260 The court of appeals 
held that the latter situation best described the case at bar and 
affirmed the conviction. 261 
Douglas l. Wood 
F. Sentence of life imprisonment for conviction of conspiracy to 
commit first-degree murder is within permissible statutory range. 
Gary v. State262 
1. Facts 
Petitioner Morris K. Gary was convicted of conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder arising from his involvement in a gang-related 
"drive-by" shooting. Gary was sentenced by the trial judge to life 
imprisonment. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in an 
unreported opinion, affirmed the trial court. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland accepted Gary's writ of certiorari and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
In Maryland, the trial judge has great discretion in sentencing,263 
and sentences are only reviewable on appeal on three grounds: (1) 
259. See id. at 432, 667 A.2d at 163-64 (emphasis added). 
260. See id. at 433-34, 667 A.2d at 164. The state is precluded from nol prossing 
a lesser included offense only when the jury could reasonably convict the 
defendant of the lesser offense only. See id. 
261. See id. at 436, 667 A.2d at 165-66. Burrell's argument was that he was guilty 
of simple robbery only and not robbery with a deadly weapon because he did 
not know of or intend to use a gun in the robbery, and that therefore the jury 
was prejudiced because it did not have the option to convict him of simple 
robbery. See id. at 435, 667 A.2d at 165. The court of appeals rejected this 
argument, noting that there was uncontradicted evidence presented at trial that 
a deadly weapon was used in the robbery. See id. at 436, 667 A.2d at 165-66. 
This being the case, the jury could not have rationally found Burrell guilty of 
simple robbery rather than robbery with a deadly weapon. See id. 
262. 341 Md. 513, 671 A.2d 495 (1996). 
263. See id. at 516, 671 A.2d at 496. 
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that the sentence violates constitutional requirements, i.e., cruel and 
unusual punishment; (2) that the sentencing judge was motivated by 
impermissible considerations, i.e., ill will or prejudice; or (3) that 
the sentence is not within statutory limits.264 Gary attacked his 
sentence claiming his sentence was illegal. 
The Gary court stated that the sentence imposed was not unlaw-
ful by statute, because the punishment imposed for conviction of 
conspiracy of a crime is limited to the maximum punishment for the 
crime that the conspiracy intended to commit. 26S Maryland statutory 
law provides that conspiracy to commit murder is a premeditating 
factor raising the offense to one of the first degree,266 and that the 
permissible punishments for first degree murder are death, life im-
prisonment, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.267 
The court of appeals also rejected Gary's argument that since 
the court of special appeals had previously held that the death penalty 
statute did not allow the imposition of the death penalty for con-
spiracy to commit a capital offense, the statute did not authorize the 
imposition of life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit murder.268 
The court of appeals noted that the death penalty was one of "unique 
nature" and that simply because the death penalty was not authorized 
for conspiracy did not necessarily imply that life imprisonment was 
not authorized. 269 
Douglas I. Wood 
G. Defendant who received probation before judgment for drunk 
driving was held ineligible for probation before judgment for 
subsequent drunk driving offense committed within five years of 
conviction or sentencing for prior offense. State v. Purcell270 
264. See id. at 516, 671 A.2d at 496. The Gary court stated that only the latter 
issue was raised on appeal. See id. at 517, 671 A.2d at 497. 
265. See id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 38 (1996) ("The punishment of 
. every person convicted of the crime of conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum 
punishment provided for the offense he or she conspired to commit. "). 
266. See id. at 517 n.2, 671 A.2d at 497 n.2. 
267. See id. The court of appeals also noted that it had previously endorsed sentences 
of life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit murder by allowing such 
sentences to stand. See id. at 518, 671 A.2d at 497. 
268. See id. at 519-20, 671 A.2d at 498. 
269. See id. at 520, 671 A.2d at 498. The Gary court noted that the death penalty 
varied from imprisonment "not in degree but in kind." [d. (quoting Woods 
v. State, 315 Md. 591, 605, 556 A.2d 236, 243 (1989». It is this difference in 
the type of punishment that places it in a unique classification. See id. at 520, 
671 A.2d at 498. 
270. 342 Md. 214, 674 A.2d 936 (1996). 
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1. Facts 
John Paul Purcell was arrested after failing field sobriety tests 
during a traffic stop on May 19, 1994. He pled guilty in the Circuit 
. Court of Maryland for Montgomery County on November 28, 1994 
to driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Section 21-
902(b) of the Transportation Article of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland. At the hearing, Purcell admitted that he had received 
probation before judgment (PBJ) on March 14, 1990 for a previous 
drunk driving offense occurring on November 2, 1989. 
Purcell's attorney argued that since more than five years had 
passed between the November 28, 1994 hearing and Purcell's previous 
offense on November 2, 1989, Purcell was eligible to receive PBJ 
for the second offense. 271 The State claimed, however, that the 
relevant period for measuring eligibility for PBJ was that between 
the occurrence of the two offenses, rendering Purcell ineligible for a 
second PBJ. 
The circuit court decided that the relevant period was that 
between the dates of conviction or granting of probation for each 
offense making March 14, 1995 the earliest date on which Purcell 
could receive PBJ for the second offense. In light of Purcell's refusal 
to withdraw his guilty plea, the court decided to postpone sentencing 
until after March 15, 1995 stating that sentencing was to be deferred 
until more than five years had elapsed. 
At the sentencing hearing on May 10, 1995, the court stated 
that the disposition date for the second offense, not the date of the 
guilty plea, was determinative for sentencing. Thus, the court con-
cluded that five years had elapsed and granted PBJ for the second 
offense. Before Maryland's intermediate appellate court considered 
the state's appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certi-
orari on this case of first impression. 
2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first noted that the trial 
court was correct in its determination that in regard to the prior 
offense, the date of conviction or granting of PBJ started the five 
271. Courts generally have discretion to grant PBJ. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 
641(a)(1)(i) (1992). However, section 641(a)(2) states that: 
[A] court may not stay the entering of judgment and place a person 
on probation for a violation of any provision of § 21-902 of the 
Transportation Article if the person has been convicted under, or has 
been placed on probation under this section after being charged with 
a violation of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article within the 
preceding 5 years. 
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year period in which the defendant would be ineligible for a subse-
quent PBJ.272 The Purcell court rejected, however, Purcell's argument 
that the trial court had discretion to delay sentencing in order to 
grant a subsequent PBJ.273 The court of appeals found that in 
delaying sentencing the trial court had abused its discretion.274 
If a defendant is found guilty of a drunk driving offense within 
five years of the date of being found guilty for a previous drunk 
driving offense, the defendant is ineligible for PBJ.27' Because less 
than five years had passed between Purcell's grant of PBJ for the 
first offense and his guilty plea on the second offense, the grant of 
PBJ was reversed. 276 
Douglas l. Wood 
H. Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not carryover from 
one charge to another if the charges are unrelated; bad acts 
evidence may be admitted within the narrow exception in United 
States v. Byrd; hearsay evidence may be admitted in death penalty 
sentencing hearings; double jeopardy prohibition does not bar 
murder prosecution of defendant arising out of same event for 
which defendant was convicted of robbery. Whittlesey v. State277 
272. See Purcell, 342 Md. at 223, 674 A.2d at 941. 
273. See id. at 228, 674 A.2d at 943. 
274. See id. Purcell, citing the "rule of lenity" - that statutes are strictly construed 
in favor of the accused - argued that the current version of the statute was 
intended to give judges discretion to delay sentencing until after the five year 
period. See id. at 228-29, 674 A.2d at 943-44. The court of appeals rejected 
this argument, stating that the intention of the legislature in passing an 
amendment was to limit judicial discretion, rather than expand it, in the 
granting of PBJ. See id. at 228, 674 A.2d at 943. As such, the date the 
defendant's guilt is determined, not the date of disposition, should be deter-
minative of whether PBJ can be granted for the second offense, as this 
construction is consistent with the legislature's purpose of restricting judicial 
discretion. See id. The court of appeals went on to say that an interpretation 
which allowed the trial court to "exercis[e] the very discretion that [the 
legislature] seeks to remove" was an unacceptable frustration of legislative 
intent. Id. at 229, 674 A.2d at 944. 
275. See id. at 227, 674 A.2d at 943. The court rejected the contention that the 
date of the later offense is relevant, because if both offenses had occurred 
before adjudication of the first offense, the defendant could receive PBJ for 
the second offense because the defendant would not have committed an offense 
since receiving the first PBJ. See id. The court noted that the situation occurred 
in the case of State v. McGrath, 77 Md. App. 310, 550 A.2d 402 (1988), and 
that the Maryland General Assembly amended section 641(a)(2) in 1991 ex-
pressly to overrule McGrath. Purcell, 342 Md. at 228, 674 A.2d at 943. 
276. See id. at 229, 674 A.2d at 944. 
277. 340 Md. 30, 665 A.2d 223 (1995) (hereinafter Whittlesey II). 
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1. Facts 
In 1982, James Rowan Griffen disappeared. Michael Whittlesey 
was the focus of police suspicion from the outset of their investiga-
tion. During the investigation, a police informant tape recorded 
several incriminating conversations made by Whittlesey. Because the 
authorities were unable to locate Griffin's body, Whittlesey was tried 
and convicted of robbery when he was found in possession of 
Griffen's personal effects. 
In 1990, Griffin's remains were discovered and Whittlesey was 
indicted for the first-degree murder of Griffin. Whittlesey filed a 
motion to dismiss asserting that the murder prosecution violated the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution because 
it was based on the same conduct278 as his robbery conviction. 279 The 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to 
dismiss holding that the exception carved out in Diaz v. United 
StateSM applied in the instant case. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land remanded and Whittlesey was tried and found guilty of both 
premeditated murder and felony murder. The same jury then sen-
tenced him to death. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, Whittlesey raised eleven issues 
for review. Four related to the validity of his conviction281 and seven 
278. At the time of Whittlesey's appeal, the same conduct test enunciated in Grady 
v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), was the law of the case. See Whittlesey II, 
340 Md. at 44, 665 A.2d at 230. Grady was later overruled by United States 
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). See Whittlesey II, 340 Md. at 44, 665 A.2d at 
230. 
279. [d.; see also Whittlesey v. State, 325 Md. 502, 606 A.2d 225 (1992) (hereinafter 
Whittlesey l) (holding that an exception enunciated in Diaz v. United States, 
223 U.S. 442 (1912), permits a subsequent prosecution on a greater charge 
after conviction of a lesser charge where "a reasonable prosecutor, having full 
knowledge of the facts which were known and in the exercise of due diligence 
should have been known to the police and the prosecutor at the time, would 
not be satisfied that he or she would be able to establish the suspect's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
280. 223 U.S. 442 (1912). 
281. Of the four challenges, only two represent issues of first impression. Thus, 
only two are discussed below. The remaining issues include a Batson claim and 
a jury instruction challenge. 
The first challenge raised by Whittlesey was a Batson challenge; however, 
the court of appeals held that Whittlesey failed to make a prima facie showing 
of purposeful discrimination. See Whittlesey II, 340 Md. at 46-47, 665 A.2d 
at 231. Thus, the trial court's ruling on the Batson challenge was affirmed. 
Whittlesey also excepted to the trial judge's jury instruction on first-degree 
murder. See id. at 65, 665 A.2d at 240. The court held that the instruction 
adequately conveyed the difference between first- and second-degree murder 
and thus was not in error. See id. The court emphasized that it would have 
been preferable to "include language to the effect that the defendant thought 
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related to the penalty phase of his trial. Maryland's high court 
affirmed his conviction, but vacated his death sentence and remanded 
for a new sentencing proceeding. 
2. Analysis 
a. Objections Raised to Conviction 
Whittlesey moved to exclude the tape recorded conversations 
between himself and the informant on Sixth Amendment grounds.282 
Specifically, Whittlesey asserted that his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had attached and, therefore, the tapes were inadmissable.283 
The court dismissed his first theory - that right to counsel had 
attached - because he was the focus of a police investigation.284 
Additionally, the court rejected his assertion that the right to counsel 
had attached upon the filing of a false statements charge. 28s 
Whittlesey also asserted that the trial court erroneously admitted 
evidence of prior bad acts despite the court of appeals's adherence 
to the general rule that such evidence be excluded.286 The court 
about the killing, and that there was enough time before the killing, though it 
may have only been brief, for the defendant to consider the decision, whether 
to kill and enough time to weigh the reasons for and against the choice." Id. 
282. See id. at 48, 665 A.2d at 232. 
283. See id. The three factors that must be present to exclude evidence under the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel are: (1) the statement was made out of the 
presence of counsel; (2) the statement was made in response to interrogation 
by an agent of the state; and (3) the right to counsel had attached with respect 
to the charge being tried. See id. The court conceded that the first two factors 
had been satisfied and only attachment was at issue. See id. 
284. See id. The court noted that focus alone cannot trigger the attachment of the 
right to counsel. See id. 
285. See id. at 50, 665 A.2d at 232. The Maryland high court noted that, although 
the Supreme Court has frequently held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is offense-specific, two exceptions to this general rule may have operated 
to allow attachment. See id. at 50, 665 A.2d at 323-33; see also Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Instead 
of relying on these exceptions, however, the court of appeals relied on Bruno 
v. State, 93 Md. App. 501, 613 A.2d 440 (1992), afl'd, 332 Md. 673, 632 
A.2d 1192 (1993). Declining to decide whether the Sixth Amendment ever 
requires carry-over from one offense to another, the court instead focused on 
whether the two charges were closely related to each other. See Whittlesey II, 
340 Md. at 52-53, 665 A.2d at 234-35. The court determined that the two 
charges were not closely related based on several factors: (1) different situs 
between the murder and the false statements; (2) distinct conduct - "com-
mitting a crime is separate from an attempt to avoid responsibility for it"; 
and (3) that the "proof for the two crimes does not necessarily require identical 
evidence." Id. at 56, 665 A.2d at 236. 
286. See id. at 57-58, 665 A.2d at 236-37. 
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acknowledged that the evidence in question was "bad acts evidence"287 
and was inadmissable under the general rule.28s The court declined 
to exclude the evidence, however, and adopted the limited exception 
to the admissability of "bad acts evidence" delineated in United 
States v. Byrd. 289 According to the Byrd exception, "evidence of 
prior bad acts may be admitted without satisfying the clear-and-
convincing threshold if the 'probative value [of the proffered evi-
dence] ... does not depend on whether the misconduct it reports 
actually took place. "'290 Applying this exception to the disputed 
evidence, the court found that the evidence was not offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted, but rather, went to Whittlesey's 
state of mind and specifically, his consciousness of guilt. 291 The court 
also found that the evidence was highly relevant and had little, if 
any, prejudicial impact.292 Thus, the court held that the evidence was 
properly admitted. 293 
b. Objections Raised Regarding the Sentencing Phase 
Whittlesey raised seven objectiong294 to the sentencing phase of 
his trial. 29s Finding merit in one of these challenges, the court vacated 
287. Id at 58. 665 A.2d at 237. 
288. See id. Bad acts evidence can only be admitted if the Harris-Faulkner test is 
satisfied. That is: (1) the evidence "is relevant to the offense charged on some 
basis other than mere propensity to commit crime"; (2) there is clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the alleged act; and (3) 
the probative value of the evidence must substantially outweigh its potential 
for unfair prejudice. Id. at 59. 665 A.2d at 237 (citations omitted). 
289. Id. (discussing United States v. Byrd. 771 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1985) (relaxing 
the clear and convincing prong and allowing admission of prior bad acts under 
a limited exception». 
290. Whittlesey II. 340 Md. at 60. 665 A.2d at 238 (quoting Byrd. 771 F.3d at 
223). The court stressed. however. that the other two prongs of the Harris-
Faulkner test must be satisfied. See id. at 44. 665 A.2d at 230. 
291. See id. at 61-62. 64. 665 A.2d at 238. 239-40. 
292. See id. 
293. See id. at 62. 66. 665 A.2d at 238. 240. 
294. Three of these objections, if meritorious. would have precluded the imposition 
of the death penalty: 
(1) The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution 
and Maryland's common-law double jeopardy doctrine prohibit the 
use of the robbery for which appellant was already convicted as the 
predicate felony underlying the charge of felony murder or as the 
aggravator in the sentencing phase[;] (2) [t]he Maryland death penalty 
statute [MD. ANN. CODE art. 27. § 413 (1996)] violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in two respects[:] First. 
by permitting the use of the same act as a predicate felony for felony 
murder purposes and as an aggravating circumstance in the sentencing 
phase. the statute fails to narrow sufficiently the class of murders for 
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the death penalty and remanded for resentencing. 296 Specifically, the 
court held that hearsay evidence, proffered as mitigating factors by 
Whittlesey, was improperly excluded.297 Sentencing hearings, carried 
out pursuant to Maryland's death penalty statute,298 are not strictly 
confined by the rules of evidence.299 The court stated that "in 
determining the admissibility of evidence at a sentencing proceeding, 
the court should not merely apply the evidentiary standards that 
would govern at trial. Instead, the court must exercise its 'broad 
authority to admit evidence it deems probative and relevant to 
sentencing. '" 300 The court found that the record reflected the trial 
judge's concession that some of the proffered hearsay testimony was 
relevant.301 The trial judge failed to determine if the evidence was 
reliable, however, because he believed it to be per se inadmissible.302 
Thus, the court remanded for resentencing, directing the trial judge 
to exercise discretion and to admit any reliable and relevant mitigating 
evidence, including hearsay evidence, if the State again seeks the 
death penalty.303 
which capital punishment is imposed and (s]econd, the allocation of 
the burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances precludes the 
sentencer from considering a full range of mitigating factors, and the 
standard of proof prescribed for the final weighing process inade-
quately guarantees the reliability of the outcome[; and] (3) [t]he State 
violated § 412(b) of Article 27 by serving notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty on appellant's counsel, rather than directly upon ap-
pellant. 
Whittlesey II, 340 Md. at 38, 665 A.2d at 227. Whittlesey's final four objections 
would require only a new sentencing hearing, at which the State would be free 
to again seek the death penalty: 
[(1)] The trial court erred in excluding, on grounds of hearsay, certain 
mitigating evidence offered by appellant[; (2)] [t]he trial court's refusal 
to propound appellant's requested voir dire questions concerning the 
attitudes of prospective jurors toward the death penalty impaired 
appellant's efforts to select an impartial jury, in violation of his rights 
under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, as 
construed in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and Morgan 
v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992)[; (3)] Appellant's right to due process 
was violated when he was required to appear before the sentencing 
jury in leg shackles[; and (4)] [t]he trial court erred in permitting the 
State to introduce a videotape as victim impact evidence. 
Id. (parallel citations omitted). 
295. See id. at 38, 665 A.2d at 227. 
296. See id. at 66, 665 A.2d at 240. 
297. See id. at 71, 665 A.2d at 243. 
298. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(c)(1) (1996). 
299. See Whittlesey II, 340 Md. at 70-71, 665 A.2d at 242-44. 
300. Id. at 71, 665 A.2d at 243 (quoting Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 366, 509 
A.2d 120, 131 (1991». 
301. See id. 
302. See id. 
303. See id. at 71, 665 A.2d at 243. 
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Next, the court of appeals addressed Whittlesey's Double Jeop-
ardy claim. The court stated that this claim consisted of four separate 
elements: (1) the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the murder trial; 
(2) the common law barred the murder trial; (3) the Double Jeopardy 
Clause barred the sentencing; and (4) the common law barred the 
sentencing. 304 
The Whittlesey II court first rejected the appellant's claim of a 
constitutional bar to the murder trial, stating that this issue had 
previously been addressed in Whittlsey 1.30S The court next examined 
Whittlesey's assertion that the common law prohibition against dou-
ble jeopardy barred the murder prosecution. 306 The Whittlesey II 
court stated that the double jeopardy rule does not prohibit the 
prosecution of a defendant for intentional homicide, despite the fact 
that the defendant was previously convicted of other crimes arising 
from the same incident.301 
The Whittlesey II court next rejected the appellant's claim that 
the use of the robbery as an element of the prosecution during the 
capital sentencing hearing was violative of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, noting that this claim essentially raised the same issue as the 
contention of a constitutional bar to the murder trial. 3(11 Whittlesey's 
theory was that a sentencing hearing was the constitutional equivalent 
of a trial.309 The court rejected this approach as well, stating that 
304. See ide at 74, 665 A.2d at 244. 
305. See ide The court of appeals noted that Whittlesey raised the issue that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause barred separate prosecutions of robbery and murder 
in a motion to dismiss prior to trial. See ide The motion was denied, and the 
court of appeals affirmed that denial, stating that, because the case fell within 
an exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause held in Diaz V. United States, 223 
U.S. 442 (1912), the denial was proper. See Whittlesey II, 340 Md. at 74, 665 
A.2d at 244. 
306. See ide at 75, 665 A.2d at 245. The common law double jeopardy claim was 
limited to the felony murder claim. See ide 
307. See ide at 75, 665 A.2d at 245. The Whittlesey II court noted that Judge Bell's 
dissent appeared premised on the theory that an underlying felony conviction 
constituted a prior prosecution for first degree murder. See ide at 75 n.15, 665 
A.2d at 245 n.15. While the majority appeared to concede that the felony 
murder conviction was improper, it stated that the first-degree murder convic-
tion was still proper based on the premeditated murder conviction. See id; cf. 
State V. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 716, 393 A.2d 1372, 1376 (1978) (holding that 
first degree murder charge and conviction based on events occurring during 
commission of a felony is not same offense as felony itself, provided inde-
pendent proof of wilfulness, premeditation, and deliberation exist). 
308. See Whittlesey II, 340 Md. at 76-77, 665 A.2d at 246. Whittlesey argued that 
because robbery was an element in the State's case at the death penalty hearing, 
he was unconstitutionally retried after conviction. See ide at 77, 665 A.2d at 
246. The Whittlesey II court rejected this claim on the same grounds as the 
constitutional double jeopardy claim concerning the murder trial. See ide 
309. See ide at 78, 665 A.2d at 246. Whittlesey cited Bullington V. Missouri, 451 
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sentencing hearings are not always equivalent to trials, and that the 
defendant merely has the right not to be convicted of a penalty of 
which he has already been acquitted. 310 
The court rejected Whittlesey's allegation that Maryland's death 
penalty is unconstitutional, noting that this issue had been previously 
addressed on numerous occasions.3I1 The court also found no merit 
in Whittlesey's assertion that the prosecution's service of the Notice 
of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty on his attorney, rather than to 
him, personally, violated statutory requirements. 312 
The court declined to address the remaining issues raised by 
Whittlesey. The court did, however, address them in dicta. First, the 
court urged the trial court to follow the procedures established in 
Bowers v. Statel l3 and Hunt v. State314 prior to employing extraor-
dinary security measures like shackling.3JS Additionally, it counseled 
the trial judge to articulate, on the record, the reasons for any 
extraordinary security measures implemented. 316 Finally, the court did 
not find that victim impact evidence introduced at the sentencing 
hearing was an abuse of discretion.3J7 
Laurel Anne Albin 
I. Eighth Amendment is not violated by duplication 0/ an element 
0/ an underlying murder offense at death-penalty sentencing 
proceeding; aggravating circumstance of participating in murder-
for-hire constitutionally narrows the class of defendants eligible for 
the death penalty. Grandison v. Slate318 
1. Facts 
Anthony Grandison received two sentences of death stemming 
from his murder-for-hire conviction. At the time, a narcotics case 
U.S. 430 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant who was 
sentenced to life imprisonment in a separate death penalty hearing following a 
murder trial could not be sentenced to death after being convicted in a new 
trial. See Whittlesey II, 340 Md. at 78-79, 665 A.2d at 246-47. 
310. See id. at 81, 665 A.2d at 248. The Whittlesey II court noted that in Bullington 
the defendant had already been "acquitted" of the death penalty by the 
sentencing jury during the first hearing. See id. at 78-79, 665 A.2d at 247. As 
such, Bullington was inapplicable to the present case. See id. at 82, 665 A.2d 
at 248. 
311. See id. at 83, 665 A.2d at 249. 
312. See id. 
313. 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072 (1986). 
314. 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990). 
315. See Whittlesey II, 340 Md. at 85, 665 A.2d at 250. 
316. See id. 
317. See id. 
318. 341 Md. 175, 670 A.2d 398 (1995). 
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was pending against Grandison in federal district court. Grandison 
allegedly hired a hit man, Vernon Lee Evans, Jr., for $9000 to kill 
David Piechowicz and his wife, Cheryl, who were witnesses scheduled 
to testify against him in the federal trial. Evans shot and killed David 
Piechowicz as well as Susan Kennedy, Cheryl's sister, whom Evans 
mistook for Cheryl. Grandison was subsequently charged in circuit 
court with and found guilty of, inter alia, two counts of first degree 
murder and conspiracy to commit those murders .. The jury then 
sentenced Grandison to death for each of the two murder convictions. 
The court of appeals, on writ of certiorari, later awarded a new 
capital sentencing proceeding after Grandison successfully argued 
that the first sentencing proceeding violated his constitutional rights. 
As a result of the resentencing proceeding, Grandison was again 
given two death sentences. 
On appeal, Grandison argued that application of the death 
penalty violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution as well as Article 25 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
2. Analysis 
Grandison's appeal raised the contention that the "murder for 
hire" aggravating circumstance found in the Annotated Code of 
Maryland does not sufficiently "narrow" the class of defendants 
eligible to receive a death sentence. 319 The court of appeals noted 
that the narrowing requirement of the Eighth Amendment dictates 
that the State justify the imposition of a more severe sentence (Le. 
death) on the defendant than the punishment accorded to others 
found guilty of murder .320 The Grandison court stated that the 
gravamen of Grandison's appeal was that the duplicate use of the 
finding that he hired Evans to commit the murders for both the trial 
and the sentencing proceeding was insufficient to accomplish the 
required narrowing. 321 In his appeal, Grandison stated that "he was 
319. See id. at 196, 670 A.2d at 408. 
320. See id. at 197-98, 670 A.2d at 409. The Supreme Court stated that in order 
to meet the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, any capital-sentencing 
arrangement must narrow the class of death-eligible offenses at either the trial 
stage or the sentencing stage. See id. at 197-98, 670 A.2d at 408-09; see also 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988). 
321. See Grandison, 341 Md. at 175, 670 A.2d at 408. Grandison contended that 
the Maryland capital-sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the aggra-
vating circumstance utilized at the sentencing did not narrow the class of 
murders eligible for a death sentence. See id. Under the Maryland statutory 
scheme, "only those convicted as principals in the second degree of first degree 
murder who engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and 
the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuner-
ation or the promise of remuneration." Id. at 198, 670 A.2d at 409; see also 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(7) (1996). 
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only eligible for the death penalty because the State alleged that he 
hired Vernon Evans to commit murder." 322 . 
The Grandison court rejected the appellant's contention, how-
ever, stating that the Eighth Amendment was not violated because 
the aggravating circumstance of involvement in murder-for-hire suf-
ficiently narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants at the trial 
stage.3D In affirming the conviction on this and other grounds, the 
court of appeals stated that the aggravating circumstance met the 
narrowing requirement of the Eighth Amendment. 324 
Douglas I. Wood 
J. Precluding cross-examination of witnesses about pending, 
unrelated, criminal or violation of probation charges is not an 
abuse of discretion when ,evidence is of little probative value and 
witnesses expected no leniency in exchange for their testimony. Ebb 
v. State325 
1. Facts 
Jeffrey Damon Ebb was tried and convicted on two counts of 
first degree murder and related charges arising out of an attempted 
robbery. At trial, Ebb filed a motion requesting that the State disclose 
whether any witnesses had been offered leniency in their pending, 
unrelated criminal cases or violation of probation charges in exchange 
for their testimony. The State denied having made any promises or 
inducements. Notwithstanding the State's denial, Ebb proposed to 
cross-examine three State witnesses regarding their pending charges 
in order to impeach their credibility. In response, the judge held a 
hearing outside the jurors' presence to determine whether Ebb's 
proposed cross-examinations were appropriate. After the hearing, the 
judge ruled that Ebb could not cross-examine two of the three, 
witnesses regarding their pending charges, finding those witnesses 
were neither promised nor expected leniency for their testimony. 
On appeal, Ebb argued that his right to confront the State's 
witnesses was unconstitutionally curtailed, asserting that a defendant 
322. [d. at 197, 670 A.2d at 408. 
323. See id. at 198, 670 A.2d at 409. The court of appeals noted that the Supreme 
Court had held that the narrowing may occur at either the trial stage or the 
sentencing stage of the proceeding. See id. In addition, the Court held that 
the duplication of an element of the underlying offense at the sentencing stage 
was not unconstitutional. See id. 
324. See id. 
325. 341 Md. 578, 671 A.2d 974 (1996), cert. denied, No. 95-8968, 1996 WL 271708 
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1996). 
62 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
has an unqualified right to question a witness before the jury about 
that witness's expectation of leniency in pending charges. In an 
unreported opinion,326 the court of special appeals reaffirmed that a 
judge has discretion to limit cross-examination, holding that the 
judge in Ebb's trial properly exercised his discretion with a balanced 
handling of the issue. The court of appeals granted certiorari. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals held that a trial judge has discretion to 
preclude questioning a witness about unrelated, pending criminal or 
violation of probation charges when such evidence is of little pro-
bative value and potentially prejudicial and confusing to the jury. 327 
The court noted that, generally, pending charges are inadmissible to 
impeach a witness.328 However, when such evidence is offered to 
establish bias, prejudice, or motive of the witness, an exception 
exists. 329 Relying on Watkins v. State,330 the court stated that a judge 
confronted with this issue should engage in a balancing test, weighing 
the probative value of the unrelated, pending charges against the 
potential for the prejudicial or confusing effect which such question-
ing may have on the jury. 331 
In. the case sub judice, the court found that the judge had 
properly considered the relevant factors, both in substance and 
procedure, and had not abused his discretion by precluding such 
inquiry.332 The court was particularly impressed with the fact that 
the two witnesses had testified outside the presence of the jury that 
326. Ebb v. State, 101 Md. App. 721 (1994). 
327. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 590, 671 A.2d at 980. 
328. See id. at 588, 671 A.2d at 979. 
329. See id. 
330. 328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d 379 (1992). In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bell reiterated 
his disagreement with the holding in Watkins. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 600, 671 
A.2d at 985 (Bell, J., dissenting). Judge Bell argued that the probative value 
of placing evidence of pending charges against a witness before the jury 
outweighs the potential for confusion and is essential in order for the jury to 
make accurate credibility assessments regarding a witness's testimony. See id. 
at 601, 671 A.2d at 985 (Bell, J., dissenting). Specifically, he contended that 
the jury would comprehend that the two State's witnesses in Ebb's trial might 
be willing to testify without explicit agreements for leniency, nonetheless hoping 
for later favorable treatment. See id. (Bell, J., dissenting). Thus, there was no 
danger that the jury would be confused or diverted in Ebb's case. See id. 
(Bell, J., dissenting). 
331. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 591, 671 A.2d at 980. 
332. See id. The court noted that it would not have been an abuse of discretion if 
the judge had allowed the cross-examinations to proceed. See id. at 590 n.3, 
671 A.2d at 980 n.3. 
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they expected no benefit and that "there was no basis to infer an 
expectation of any benefit" from their testimony.333 
Gregory T. Lawrence 
K. Under Maryland's implied consent statute, an administrative 
law judge may base a decision to suspend a driver's license on an 
advice oj rights form signed by officer and motorist, 
notwithstanding motorist's contrary testimony. Motor Vehicle 
Administration v. Karwackf34 
1. Facts 
Lee Daniel Karwacki was stopped and detained for driving 
through a red light. During the detention, Karwacki refused to submit 
to an alcohol concentration test requested by the detaining officer. 
Both ,Karwacki and the officer signed an Advice of Rights form 
which stated in preprinted text: "Your refusal [to submit to testing] 
shall result in an administrative suspension of your Maryland driver's 
license .... The suspension . . . shall be . . . one year for a second 
offense. . . . [Signing this form certifies that] I have read or have 
been read [the foregoing]." 
Under the Maryland implied consent statute,m a detaining officer 
must advise the detainee that mandatory sanctions are imposed for 
refusal to submit to testing. Moreover, the statute provides that 
"[t]he sworn statement of the police officer . . . shall be prima facie 
evidence of a test refusal." 336 Karwacki, having previously been 
sanctioned for refusal to submit to testing, testified before an ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ) that the officer failed to advise him of 
the increased sanctions for a second offense.337 Based on the officer's 
sworn statement on the Advice of Rights form, but without the 
officer testifying,338 the ALJ decided against Karwacki and ordered 
a one year suspension of his driver's license. On appeal, the Circuit 
Court of Maryland for Baltimore City reversed the ALJ's decision, 
333. Id. 
334. 340 Md. 271, 666 A.2d 511 (1995). 
335. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-205.1 (Supp. 1996). 
336. Id. § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii). 
337. A person may request a "show cause" hearing, at which mandatory sanctions 
must be imposed if the ALI determines, inter alia, that "[t]he police officer 
requested a test after the person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions 
that shall be imposed." Id. § 16-205. 1 (f)(8)(i)(3). 
338. Neither Karwacki nor the Motor Vehicle Administration subpoenaed the officer. 
See Karwacki, 340 Md. at 276-77, 666 A.2d at 513-14. 
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finding it was unsupported by competent, material, and substantial 
evidence. The circuit court based its ruling on the absence of testi-
mony to rebut Karwacki's testimony. The court of appeals granted 
certiorari prior to consideration of the intermediate appellate court 
and reversed the circuit court. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals held that the officer's sworn statement 
provided adequate support for the ALJ's conclusion that the officer 
advised Karwacki of the consequences of a test refusal, notwithstand-
ing Karwacki's testimony to the contrary.339 Generally, hearsay evi-
dence, if reliable, is admissible in administrative hearings and may 
support an administrative decision. 34O In this case, the implied consent 
statute provides that the sworn statements of an officer amount to 
prima facie evidence that a detainee refused testing.341 Moreover, the 
court noted that it has previously held that the Advice of Rights 
form adequately conveys those rights granted by the statute.342 Thus, 
faced with conflicting evidence, the ALJ was within his authority to 
find that the documentary evidence was more credible than Kar-
wacki's testimony.343 Further, because credibility determinations are 
afforded great deference upon review, the court concluded that the 
ALJ's decision could not be overturned simply because the officer 
was not present at the hearing. 344 
339. See id. at 285, 666 A.2d at 518. 
340. See id. 
341. See supra text accompanying note 336. Notably, the majority never explicitly 
held that the officer's sworn statement established prima facie evidence that 
the officer advised Karwacki of the consequences of refusing to take the test. 
See Karwaki, 340 Md. at 273-89, 666 A.2d at 512-20. The court stated that 
the ALJ was forced to either accept Karwacki's testimony, "in which case the 
prima facie evidence of the officer's sworn statement would be rebutted, or he 
must reject it and leave the prima facie evidence intact." [d. Therefore, the 
court impliedly held that an officer's sworn statement establishes prima facie 
evidence that a detainee was advised of the consequences of a test refusal. See 
id. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520. 
342. See id. at 282, 666 A.2d at 516. 
343. See id. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520. The court noted that by not subpoenaing the 
officer, Karwacki had presented the ALJ with an all or nothing choice of 
either accepting his testimony or the officer's sworn statement. See id. Under 
these circumstances, the ALJ was not obligated to believe Karwacki. See id. 
344. See id. at 284, 666 A.2d at 517 (quoting Anderson v. Department of Public 
Safety, 330 Md. 187, 217, 623 A.2d 198, 212 (1993»; see also supra note 343. 
In Anderson, 330 Md. at 217,623 A.2d at 212,the court of appeals addressed 
the deference afforded to credibility findings of an agency representative on 
further agency review, not judicial review. 
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In addressing the circuit court opinion, the court of appeals 
made the distinction between stipulated evidence and sworn state-
ments. 345 The court reaffirmed that a fact-finder must have some 
basis on which to assess the credibility of conflicting stipulated 
evidence.346 A sworn statement, however, is distinct from stipulated 
evidence; rather, it is documentary evidence. 347 Moreover, the implied 
consent statute148 provides that the sworn statements of an officer 
amount to prima facie evidence that a detainee refused testing. Thus, 
without rebuttal, a sworn statement is sufficient to support an ALJ's 
decision. 349 
Gregory T. Lawrence 
L. Because the offense of felony theft does not merge into 
robbery, maximum penalty for felony theft was not lowered to 
that of robbery when defendant was prosecuted for both offenses 
involving same property and convicted only of felony theft. 
Spitzinger v. State 350 
1. Facts 
Steven Spitzinger was indicted and tried for, inter alia, robbery 
and felony theft involving the same property. He was convicted only 
of felony theft and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment. At the 
time of trial, felony theft and robbery carried statutory maximum 
penalties of fifteen and ten years imprisonment, respectively. 351 
On appeal, Spitzinger contended that because he was acquitted 
of robbery, the maximum penalty he could incur for felony theft 
345. See Karwacki, 340 Md. at 286-87, 666 A.2d at 518-19. 
346. See id. at 286-87, 666 A.2d at 518. 
347. See id. at 287, 666 A.2d at 518-19. 
348. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Fischer contended that the majority extended 
the prima facie effect of an officer's sworn statement beyond what the informed 
consent statute provided. See Karwacki, 340 Md. at 292-94, 666 A.2d at 521-
22 (Fischer, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Fischer noted that the explicit 
language of the statute only establishes prima facie evidence of the detainee's 
refusal to submit to testing and does not establish that the officer complied 
with the advice of rights requirement. See id. (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
349. See id. at 287, 289, 666 A.2d at 518-19, 521. 
350. 340 Md. 114, 665 A.2d 685 (1995). 
351. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (1996) (theft of property valued at $300 
or greater, felony theft; fifteen years maximum sentence); § 486 (simple robbery, 
robbery; ten years maximum sentence). In 1996, section 486 was amended to 
increase the maximum sentence for robbery from ten to fifteen years. 
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was thereby lowered from fifteen to ten years, the maximum for 
robbery.3S2 He asserted that the offense of felony theft merges into 
robbery or, in the alternative, the penalty for felony theft merges 
into the penalty robbery. In a per curiam opinion, the court of 
special appeals affirmed the trial court's sentence of twelve years. 
The court of appeals granted certiorari and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals first held that felony theft is not a lesser 
included offense of robbery.m Thus the offense of felony theft does 
not merge into robbery. 354 The court declared that legislative intent, 
not the Blockburger required evidence test, controls when construing 
criminal offenses and their punishments.355 Therefore, because the 
felony theft and robbery statutes each contain an important element 
not common to the other, the court found it "patently obvious" 
that these offenses were not intended to be merged and that neither 
is a lesser included offense of the other. 356 Moreover, the court noted 
that even under the Blockburger test these offenses do not merge.357 
Next, the court addressed the merger of penalties. The court 
found that there are circumstances under which two statutory offenses 
do not merge, but their penalties should merge. 358 One such instance 
is under the rule of lenity, whereby ambiguity is to be resolved in 
352. Spitzinger's appeal was premised on the rule adopted in Simms v. State, 288 
Md. 712, 421 A.2d 957 (1980). In Simms, the court of appeals held that when 
a lesser included offense is merged into a greater offense, the penalties imposed 
for a conviction only of the lesser included offense is thereby limited to the 
maximum penalty allowable for the greater offense. Id. at 724, 421 A.2d at 
964. 
353. See Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 121-22, 665 A.2d at 688. 
354. See id. 
355. See id. at 119, 665 A.2d at 687. The Blockburger test provides that where the 
same conduct constitutes a violation of two separate statutory provisions, the 
test to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, i.e., whether the 
offenses merge, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact 
which the other does not; if no such additional proof is required, the offenses 
merge into one. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), 
quoted in Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 119 n.l, 665 A.2d at 687 n.l. However, the 
Spitzinger court also emphasized that the legislature may provide for multiple 
pWlishments or cumulative sentences even if that might constitute the same 
offense under the Blockburger test. See Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 119, 665 A.2d 
at 687. 
356. See id. at 121-22, 665 A.2d at 688. The court noted that "[r]obbery requires 
a taking of property of any value whatsoever which is accomplished by violence 
or putting in fear. Felony theft requires taking of property valued at $300 or 
greater." Id. at 121, 665 A.2d at 688 (citations omitted). 
357. See id. 
358. See id. at 125, 665 A.2d at 690. 
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favor of the defendant. 359 The court found that because it was unclear 
whether the legislature intended to authorize cumulative or successive 
punishment for felony theft and robbery, the rule of lenity requires 
that these penalties merge. 36O Nonetheless, the court held that when 
penalties merge, as distinguished from merger of offenses, the lesser 
penalty merges into the greater .361 Again, the court found legislative 
intent dictated the result. 362 By prescribing variable maximum pen-
alties for theft offenses, the legislature constructed a sentencing 
hierarchy based on a graduation of severity.363 This construction, the 
court reasoned, should not be invalidated simply because the State 
elects to also charge a defendant with a related offense. 364 Therefore, 
Spitzinger's acquittal for robbery had no effect on the maximum 
penalty which could be imposed for his felony theft conviction. 365 
Gregory T. Lawrence 
M. Detention of passenger during a traffic stop was not 
warranted when officer testified that his intention in commanding 
the passenger to stay in vehicle was to ensure officer'S own safety. 
Dennis v. State66 
NOTE: This case has been VACATED AND REMANDED by a 
recent United States Supreme Court decision, Whren v. United 
States. 
1. Facts 
Bruce Lamont Dennis was a passenger in an vehicle driven 
through a red light. An officer saw the traffic violation and pursued 
359. See id. at 124-25, 665 A.2d at 690. 
360. See id. at 124, 665 A.2d at 690. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Raker contended 
that felony theft should merge into robbery for sentencing purposes where the 
two convictions arise from the same conduct. See id. at 130, 665 A.2d at 693 
(Raker, J., dissenting). She asserted that merger of felony theft into robbery 
is consistent with the historical practice at common law. See id. at 139, 665 
A.2d at 697 (Raker, J., dissenting). Because Judge Raker believed that the 
legislature did not intend to abrogate this common-law merger rule, she asserted 
that the majority's holding was in error. See id. at 135, 142, 665 A.2d 695, 
698 (Raker, J., dissenting). 
361. See id. at 126, 665 A.2d at 690-91 (quoting Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 
322, 593 A.2d 671, 676 (1991». 
362. See id. at 126-27, 665 A.2d at 691. 
363. See id. at 127, 665 A.2d at 691. 
364. See id. at 126-27, 665 A.2d at 691. 
365. See id. at 130, 665 A.2d at 692. 
366. 342 Md. 196,674 A.2d 928, vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 40 (1996). 
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the vehicle with his emergency lights on. The driver attempted to 
elude the police. Eventually, the driver turned into a driveway, 
stopped, and both the driver and Dennis opened their car doors and 
began walking away from the vehicle. An officer commanded Dennis 
to get back in the car, but Dennis ignored the command and 
continued to walk away. The officer pursued him, a struggle ensued 
and Dennis struck the officer. Finally, the officer subdued Dennis 
and placed him back in the vehicle. 
Dennis was charged with and convicted of disorderly conduct 
and battery. At trial, the officer testified that his reason for detaining 
. Dennis was to ensure the officer's own safety. On appeal, the court 
of special appeals affirmed the convictions in an unreported opinion. 
The court of appeals granted certiorari and reversed. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals was presented with the issue of whether, 
during a stop for a traffic violation, an officer may command a 
passenger to stay in the vehicle when the detaining officer testified 
that his intention in doing such was to ensure the officer's own 
safety.367 In a unanimous opinion overturning the court of special 
appeals, the court of appeals held that an officer's detention of an 
automobile passenger must be based on a reasonable suspicion that 
the passenger himself engaged in criminal activity and that the officer 
must intend to conduct further investigation based on that sus pi-
cion.368 In this case, because the officer testified that the detention 
of the passenger was only to ensure the officer's own safety, his 
command to the passenger to stay in the vehicle was unwarranted.369 
367. See id. at 198, 674 A.2d at 929. 
368. See id. at 211-12, 674 A.2d at 935. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court noted 
that there is another possible ground under which an officer might detain a 
passenger. See id. at 203, 674 A.2d at 931 (citing Barnhard v. State, 325 Md. 
602, 602 A.2d 701 (1992». In Barnhard, the court reiterated that there are 
circumstances under which an officer may briefly "freeze" a putative crime 
scene in order to make decisions about how to further proceed. See Barnhard, 
325 Md. at 615, 602 A.2d at 708 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Dennis 
court rejected these grounds as a basis for Dennis's detention because no 
testimony was offered that the police believed Dennis was an "important 
witness" to the criminal activities of the driver or that Dennis was a suspect 
in the case. See Dennis, 342 Md. at 204, 674 A.2d at 931-32. 
369. See id. at 211-12, 674 A.2d at 935. Because the court held that the detention 
was unwarranted, the disorderly conduct and battery charges, arising from 
Dennis's defiance, were thus in error. See id. at 201, 674 A.2d at 930-31 
(citing, e.g., Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 193, 167 A.2d 341, 344 (1961), for 
the proposition that an officer's command must be reasonable to sustain a 
disorderly conduct conviction and noting a person's right to resist an unlawful 
arrest). 
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Notably, the court pointed out that the record "may well have" 
contained sufficient evidence to warrant the officer's reasonable 
suspicion that the passenger aided and abetted the driver.37o Thus, 
the court reasoned, that had the officer intended to make an inves-
tigatory stop, a different result may have been appropriate. 371 
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment 
and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further consid-
eration in light of its opinion in Whren v. United States.372 
WHREN V. UNITED STATES373 
In Whren,374 the Court unanimously held that "subjective inten-
tions play no role in [an] ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amend-
ment analysis." 375 The petitioners in Whren were a passenger and a 
driver whose convictions on drug charges were supported by evidence 
seized during a traffic stop. They contended that the test for reason-
ableness of a traffic stop should be whether a reasonable officer 
would have made the stop for the reasons given by the detaining 
officer .376 In rejecting this contention, the Court held that the decision 
to stop a vehicle is reasonable where an officer has probable cause 
to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, notwithstanding. any 
ulterior motives an officer may possess. 377 
Gregory T. Lawrence 
N. A sentencing judge may consider a defendant's lack of 
remorse concerning crimes lor which the defendant has been 
convicted. Jennings v. State378 
1. Facts 
Arnold Jerome Jennings, Jr., convicted of three counts of armed 
robbery and the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, 
370. See id. at 208-09, 674 A.2d at 934. 
371. See id. at 209, 674 A.2d at 934. 
372. Maryland v. Dennis, 117 S. Ct. 40 (1996) (citing Whren v. United States, 116 
S. Ct. 1769 (1996». 
373. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). 
374. [d. 
375. [d. at 1174. 
376. See id. at 1773. 
377. See id. at 1774. 
378. 339 Md. 675, 664 A.2d 903 (1995). 
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addressed the court prior to his sentencing. Advised by the judge 
that Jennings's statements were of great import, Jennings pleaded: 
"Your Honor, jury found me guilty. You have got to sentence me. 
But when you do, can you make it as least as possible?· I'd like to 
be there with my kid."379 The judge gave Jennings a sentence of 
sixty-five years and stated that he would not suspend any portion of 
it due to Jennings's lack of remorse.380 On appeal to the court of 
special appeals, Jennings contended that the trial court impermissibly 
considered his refusal to admit guilt at sentencing when imposing the 
sentence. The intermediate court rejected Jennings's contention and 
affirmed. The court of appeals granted certiorari and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
In Maryland, the main objectives of sentencing are punishment, 
rehabilitation, and deterrence.3S1 Essentially, a sentencing court has 
"virtually boundless discretion" in the types of information it may 
consider while pursuing these sentencing objectives. 382 
Despite the discretion given to a sentencing judge, restrictions 
exist to protect the fundamental rights of the offender. 383 For in-
stance, the judge may not consider that the defendant pled not guilty 
and demanded a trial. 384 Here, however, the court determined that 
the judge considered the defendant's lack of remorse and not that 
the defendant chose to plead not guilty and thus go to trial. 38s This 
is a permissible consideration when deciding not to mitigate a sentence 
if it pertains to the defendant's refusal to show remorse or accept 
responsibility for his criminal behavior. 386 
Laura L. Chester 
379. [d. at 678, 664 A.2d at 905. 
380. See id. at 679, 664 A.2d at 905. The maximum sentence the defendant could 
have received was 80 years. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(B)(b) (1992). 
381. See Jennings, 339 Md. at 682, 664 A.2d at 907 (citing State v. Dopkowski, 
325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992». 
382. See id. at 683, 664 A.2d at 907. 
383. See id. at 683, 664 A.2d at 907 (citing Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 820, 490 
A.2d 1289, 1294 (1985» (holding that judge may not impose a sentence that 
is cruel and unusual, violative of the constitution, exceeds statutory limitations, 
or that is motivated by prejudice, ill-will, or other impermissible considerations). 
384. See id. at 684, 664 A.2d at 908 (citing Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 542-
43, 336 A.2d 113, 116-17 (1975». 
385. See id. at 687, 664 A.2d at 909. 
386. See id. at 688, 664 A.2d at 910. 
1996] Annual Review of Maryland Law 71 
O. It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit discharge 
of counsel after meaningful trial proceedings have commenced; 
however, denial of the discharge is erroneous if the court has not 
conducted an inquiry that meets constitutional standards to 
determine the reason for the dismissal. State v. Brown387 
1. Facts 
Respondent Shawn L. Brown was indicted in the Circuit Court 
of Maryland for Wicomico County on two counts of possession of 
a controlled dangerous substance and on two counts of distribution 
of a controlled dangerous substance. A few days prior to trial, 
Brown's counsel said that he would be prepared for the trial to 
proceed as scheduled. However, at the beginning of the trial, Brown's 
counsel requested a continuance stating he had not had enough time 
to prepare for the trial. The continuance was denied. 
While the State was examining its first witness, Brown's counsel 
advised the court that his client wished to discharge him. When the 
judge inquired as to why the client wished to discharge his counsel, 
his counsel stated that the client's father had advised him to do so. 
Brown made no comment during the inquiry. The judge did not 
allow the respondent to discharge his counsel. Brown appealed the 
trial court's decision to the court of special appeals. The court 
reversed and remanded, holding that the defendant should have been 
allowed to explain his reasons for requesting the discharge of his 
counsel. The court of appeals accepted certiorari and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
The Maryland Rules proscribe procedures a trial judge must 
follow when a defendant requests permission to discharge his counsel, 
whether he chooses to proceed with substitute counselor to proceed 
pro se. 388 However, these procedures do not apply after meaningful 
trial proceedings have commenced.389 Once a trial has begun, the 
defendant must be able to establish that the prejudice to his legitimate 
interests outweighs the potential disruption of the proceedings already 
387. 342 Md. 404, 676 A.2d 513 (1996). 
388. See id. at 409, 676 A.2d at 516; see also Md. R. 4-215. 
389. See id. at 423, 676 A.2d at 522 (citing Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 
886, 895 (5th Cir. 1977». After meaningful trial proceedings have commenced, 
the right to proceed pro se or to obtain substitute counsel must be limited in 
order to prevent undue interruptions with the administration of justice. See id. 
at 414, 676 A.2d at 518 (citing Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 605, 536 A.2d 
1149, 1159 (1988». 
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in progress. 390 "[D]isagreements short of a total breakdown in com-
munication between attorney and client generally do not warrant 
mid-trial substitution of counsel."391 
In the case at bar, however, the court of appeals determined the 
trial judge abused his discretion by not letting defendant state his 
reasons for wanting to discharge his counsel. 392 The trial judge bears 
the responsibility to determine the reason for the defendant's re-
quest,393 and his inquiry must meet constitutional standards. 394 Mary-
land's high court further suggested that trial judges consider the 
following factors when contemplating the discharge of counsel after 
trial has commenced: (1) reason for discharge; (2) quality of counsel's 
representation prior to request; (3) any disruptive effect the discharge 
would have; (4) timing of request; (5) the stage and complexity of 
trial; and (6) prior requests by defendant to discharge counsel. 39S 
Laura L. Chester 
P. An attorney's opening statement that a rape victim consented 
to sexual intercourse by trading sex for drugs is considered sexual 
conduct under the Rape Shield Statute and will not be admissible 
absent other evidence to substantiate the statement. Shand v. 
State396 
1. Facts 
Leroy Anthony Shand, Floyd Jackson Bailey, and Kevin Chris-
topher Allen were convicted of first-degree rape and other related 
charges. The three youths, along with two other youths, entered the 
victim's apartment397 to collect money that her brother owed Shand 
390. See id. at 421, 676 A.2d at 522 (quoting United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 
491 (2nd Cir. 1968». The court was concerned that this was a tactic to delay 
the proceedings or to confuse the jury, either of which increases the risk of a 
mistrial. See id. at 427, 676 A.2d at 525. 
391. [d. at 416, 676 A.2d at 519 (citing Commonwealth v. Miskel, 308 N.E.2d 547, 
552 (Mass. 1974». The First and Ninth Circuits also consider the timeliness of 
the motion. [d. at 422, 676 A.2d at 522 (citing United States v. Gallop, 838 
F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1988». 
392. See id. at 431, 676 A.2d at 526. 
393. See id. 
394. See id. at 428, 676 A.2d at 525. 
395. See id. 
396. 341 Md. 661, 672 A.2d 630 (1996). 
397. See id. at 668, 672 A.2d at 633. Lamiah Hall was tried with the other three 
defendants and acquitted. See id. The fifth person was never apprehended by 
the police. See id. at 668 n.4, 672 A.2d at 633 n.4. 
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for drugs. When he was unable to pay his debt, the youths pushed 
the victim's brother out of the apartment and proceeded to rape the 
victim. The defendants alleged that the victim had consented to 
sexual intercourse in exchange for drugs. The State filed a motion 
in limine to exclude evidence relating to this defense alleging that it 
was in violation of the Rape Shield Statute. The court called the 
victim to the stand during an in camera hearing in which she denied . 
she had ever agreed to trade sex for drugs with the defendants. The 
court ruled that this line of questioning was prohibited by the Rape 
Shield Statute, and that the defense could not make any statements 
regarding the alleged trade during its opening statement. Further, the 
court ruled that it would determine the relevancy of other evidence 
relating to the alleged trade as it developed during the course of the 
trial. 398 
Shand, Bailey, and Allen appealed their conviction arguing that 
the trial court committed reversible error when it granted the state's 
motion in limine. The court of special appeals rejected this assertion 
and affirmed the convictions. The court of appeals granted certiorari 
and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
The Rape Shield Statute399 was enacted to prohibit reputation 
and opinion evidence concerning the victim's chastity in prosecutions 
for rape or sexual offenses in the first degree. 400 Evidence of specific 
instances of the rape victim's prior sexual conduct will only be 
admissible if two criteria are met: (1) there must be an in camera 
hearing to determine that the evidence is relevant, and that the 
prejudicial value does not outweigh the probative value, and (2) the 
evidence must be within one of four exc~ptions.401 
398. See id. at 674, 672 A.2d at 636. No other evidence was offered during the 
trial to establish there had been a trade. See id. The defendants wanted to 
establish that a trade of sex for drugs occurred so they could show the victim 
had an ulterior motive for claiming the defendants raped her. See Johnson v. 
State, 332 Md. 456, 632 A.2d 152 (1993) (holding that evidence concerning a 
trade of sex for drugs was admissible when the victim conceded to trading sex 
for drugs in the recent past and the evidence tended to show that the victim 
alleged rape when the defendant did not provide drugs as his part of the 
bargain). 
399. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461(A) (1992). 
400. See Shand, 341 Md. at 663, 672 A.2d at 631. 
401. See id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461(A) (1992). The four exceptions 
are: 
(1) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant; 
or (2) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the 
source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or trauma; or (3) 
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The court determined that evidence relating to a trade of sex 
for drugs is sexual conduct,402 and thus, the opening statement 
referring to the alleged trade was restricted by the rape shield 
statute. 403 The opening statement would have only been relevant, and 
therefore admissible, had there been other evidence to substantiate 
the alleged trade occurred on that night.404 The court also dismissed 
the defendant's argument that the evidence was relevant to show that 
the victim had traded sex for drugs in the past. 40S According to the 
court, an allegation that a trade of sex for drugs occurred prior to 
the night in question, but not on the night in question, would only 
go to establish that the victim was sexually promiscuous. Thus, the 
court held that the trial court properly excluded the evidence because 
the prejudice to the victim clearly outweighed the probative value of 
the evidence.406 
Laura L. Chester 
Q. It is not mandatory, thus not an abuse of discretion, for a 
judge to refuse to ask voir dire questions concerning physical 
impairments of venire members. Boyd v. Statem 
1. Facts 
Zade Boyd was convicted of attempted armed robbery and other 
related offenses in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City. 
In an unrelated trial, Trevor Brooks was convicted of second degree 
murder and handgun offenses in the Circuit Court of Maryland for 
Baltimore City. Both defendants' attorneys asked the trial judge to 
Evidence of which supports a claim that the victim has an ulterior 
motive in accusing the defendant of the crime; or (4) Evidence offered 
for the purpose of impeachment when the prosecutor puts the victim's 
prior sexual conduct in issue. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461(A) (1992). The allegation that the victim had 
traded drugs for sex would have fallen into the third exception establishing 
that the victim had an ulterior motive to allege the defendant had raped her. 
See Shand, 341 Md. at 673, 672 A.2d at 636. 
402. See Shand, 341 Md. at 675,672 A.2d at 637. The court determined the General 
Assembly did not limit sexual contact to only apply to forms of physical sexual 
contact. See id. 
403. See id. at 673, 672 A.2d at 636. 
404. See id. 
405. See id. at 669, 672 A.2d at 634. 
406. See id. at 673, 672 A.2d at 636. 
407. 341 Md. 431, 671 A.2d 33 (1996). 
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ask voir dire regarding any physical impairment or ailment a juror 
had that would hinder his performance as a juror. In both cases the 
request was denied. 
2. Analysis 
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a trial by an 
impartial jury.408 Voir dire was developed to guarantee juror impar-
tiality.409 Although a judge has broad discretion to determine the 
scope and form of questions asked during voir dire,410 there are 
specific mandatory questions which must be asked because of their 
likelihood to reveal grounds for disqualification. 411 The grounds for 
disqualification of a prospective juror are that the juror does not 
meet the minimum statutory qualificationsm or that he or she pos-
sesses a state of mind which would unduly influence a determination 
of guilt. 413 Defendants have a right to have certain questions asked 
of the potential jurors when they are likely to reveal a specific cause 
for disqualification.414 In turn, if the question is not reasonably likely 
to reveal cause for disqualification, "it will not be an abuse of 
discretion for the judge to refuse to ask it."41s 
An inquiry into the potential juror's physical and mental abilities 
occurs before the individual becomes a member of the jury pool, 
rendering any further questions during voir dire unnecessary. 416 In 
Maryland, jurors are screened on at least three levels: (1) they must 
complete a juror qualification form; (2) they must appear before the 
judge or commissioner at the courthouse; and (3) the trial judge 
must observe each juror during the voir dire. 417 In both of the cases 
before the court of appeals there was a fourth level of screening for 
disqualifications in which the judges asked a catchall question as to 
any reason why the jurors should not serve.418 
Identification of someone with a physical disability does not 
automatically lead to that juror's disqualification. Instead, if a judge 
408. Id. at 435, 671 A.2d at 35 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MD. DECLARATION 
OF RIGHTS art. XXI). 
409. See id. (citing Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 279, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995». 
410. See id. at 436, 671 A.2d at 35 (citing Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34, 633 
A.2d 867, 870-71 (1993». 
411. See id. at 436, 671 A.2d at 36 (citing Davis, 333 Md. at 35-36, 633 A.2d at 
871). 
412. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-207 (1995). 
413. See Boyd, 341 Md. at 436, 671 A.2d at 35-36 (citing Davis, 333 Md. at 35-
36, 633 A.2d at 871). 
414. See id. at 436, 671 A.2d at 36 (citing HiI/, 339 Md. at 280, 661 A.2d at 1166). 
415. Id. at 439, 671 A.2d at 37. 
416. See id. at 441, 671 A.2d at 38. 
417. See id. 
418. See id. at 444-45, 671 A.2d at 40. 
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determines a juror suffers from a physical impairment, the judge 
will likely attempt to accommodate the juror rather than excuse 
him.419 Therefore. it is not mandatory, thus not an abuse of discre-
tion, for a judge to refuse to ask voir dire questions concerning 
physical impairments of venire members.420 
Laura L. Chester 
R. Absent a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity has occurred, it is not reasonable to detain a potential 
visitor of a prison if the visitor has expressed a desire to leave 
rather than be submitted to the detention. Gadson v. Stattt21 
1. Facts 
Petitioner Tyrone Jerome Gadson (Gadson) planned to visit an 
inmate at the house of correction in Jessup. He drove approximately 
one quarter of a mile and passed three signs warning visitors that 
they were subject to be searched. After Gadson reached the guard 
booth he was told that a canine sniff of his vehicle would be 
performed. Gadson indicated that he would prefer to leave as opposed 
to being subjected to the search. The trooper instructed Gadson to 
turn off his vehicle and proceeded to have a canine search his vehicle. 
As a result of the canine search, drugs and drug paraphernalia were 
found in Gadson's possession. 
2. Analysis 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights prohibit the deten-
tion of a person absent an articulable reason that the person has 
been engaged in criminal activity.422 There is no dispute that the 
detaining of Gadson by the trooper was a seizure. 423 Therefore the 
question to be determined by the court was whether the seizure was 
reasonable.424 The reasonableness of a seizure is determined by weigh-
419. See id. at 440, 671 A.2d at 37. 
420. See id. at 447, 671 A.2d at 41. 
421. 341 Md. I, 668 A.2d 22 (1995). 
422. See id. at 9, 668 A.2d at 26. The State did not contend that the officer had 
any basis for a suspicion that there were drugs in the vehicle. See id. at 16, 
668 A.2d at 30. 
423. See id. at 9, 668 A.2d at 26 (citing Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 493, 479 A.2d 
903, 907 (1984». 
424. See id. (citing Little, 300 Md. at 493, 479 A.2d at 907). 
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ing the governmental interest against the intrusion of the individual's 
Fourth Amendment rights. 4~ The governmental interest being served 
in the case sub judice was keeping drugs out of its correctional 
facilities.426 However, that objective was met when Gadson attempted 
to leave the facility. 427 Because the seizure was not necessary to serve 
the State's articulated interest, it was unreasonable.428 
Laura L. Chester 
S. Circumstantial evidence may be used in handgun-offense 
prosecution to establish whether a firearm is operable; the state is 
not required to investigate into operability of a confiscated firearm. 
Mangum v. Stattt29 
1. Facts 
Petitioner, Steven Mangum, was arrested by Baltimore County 
Police for possession of a sawed-off shotgun. He was charged in 
district court with one count of unlawfully carrying a handgun and 
one count of unlawful possession of a short-barrel shotgun. 430 
At trial, Mangum motioned for acquittal, arguing that the State 
had failed to prove that the weapon was operable, which the State 
conceded was an element of the offense, because the weapon, now 
in the possession of the State, was never test-fired. The State con-
tested Mangum's motion, contending that circumstantial evidence 
was sufficient to support a finding that the weapon was operable. 
Mangum was convicted of both counts, and the conviction was 
affirmed by both the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland and the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals rejected Mangum's contention that if the 
State obtains custody of the handgun at issue in a handgun-possession 
425. See id. at 10, 668 A.2d at 27 (citing Little, 300 Md. at 494, 479 A.2d at 907). 
426. See id. at 12, 668 A.2d at 28. 
427. See id. at 20-21, 668 A.2d at 32. 
428. See id. at 21, 668 A.2d at 32. 
429. 342 Md. 392, 676 A.2d 80 (1996). 
430. See id. at 395-96, 676 A.2d at 81-82. Under Maryland's handgun-possession 
law, a short-barreled shotgun is considered a handgun. See MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 36B,F (1992). 
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case, the State must conduct a test-firing of the weapon to support 
a finding of operability. 431 The court stated that Mangum's argument 
did not recognize the settled legal principle that circumstantial evi-
dence is considered to be equally probative as direct evidence.432 The 
court of appeals noted that other jurisdictions have considered cir-
cumstantial evidence sufficient to determine the operability of a 
firearm,433 and that "neither policy nor logic supports a special 
evidentiary distinction" for determining whether a firearm is opera-
ble.434 Holding that there was adequate circumstantial evidence to 
support a finding that the shotgun was operable,435 the court of 
appeals found that the trial court correctly determined that the 
firearm was operable.436 
Mangum also asserted that the State violated his due process 
rights by not test-firing the gun because the weapon was under the 
exclusive control of the State. 437 The court of appeals summarily 
rejected this argument, stating that Mangum had the right to order 
a test-firing of the weapon under discovery procedures or a request 
to produce,438 and that, because no request was made, the argument 
was groundless. 439 
The holding of this case closes a possible loophole in the 
handgun-offense law which would require the state to test-fire all 
recovered handguns used as evidence in handgun-possession cases. 
Any defendant charged with handgun offenses who wishes to argue 
that the handgun is inoperable must request that the gun be test-
fired. Thus, a defendant cannot argue that the weapon does not 
431. Set! Mangum, 342 Md. at 396-98, 676 A,2d at 82; see also Howell v. State, 
278 Md. 389, 364 A.2d 797 (1976) (holding that "handgun" must be a firearm 
to be within statute, and that weapon must be operable in order to be a 
"firearm"). The Annotated Code of Maryland prohibits the "unlawful wearing, 
carrying, or transporting of handguns." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b) 
(1996). 
432. See Mangum, 342 Md. at 398, 676 A.2d at 82-83 (quoting Hebron v. State, 
331 Md. 219, 226, 627 A.2d 1029, 1032 (1993) (stating that there is no difference 
between direct and circumstantial evidence». 
433. See id. at 400, 676 A.2d at 84. 
434. Id. at 398, 676 A.2d at 83. 
435. See id. at 400-01, 676 A.2d at 84. The court noted the State's evidence of 
shotgun shells in the possession of Mangum, Mangum's testimony of prior 
involvement in shooting a shotgun, and testimony of fearing for his life allowed 
the trial court to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon was operable. 
See id. 
436. See id. at 401, 676 A.2d at 84. 
437. See id. 
438. See id. at 401-02, 676 A.2d at 84-85. Maryland's evidentiary rule requires that 
defendant be allowed to inspect documents and tangible items of the State's 
evidence in a criminal trial. MD. R. 4-263(b)(5). 
439. See id. at 402, 676 A.2d at 85. 
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meet the statutory definition of a handgun merely because it was not 
test-fired. 
Douglas I. Wood 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. A court order conditioning media access to juvenile 
proceedings upon newspaper publication of court order is 
unconstitutional. Baltimore Sun Co. v. StattfAO 
1. Facts 
During the course of a closed juvenile proceeding,441 The Balti-
more Sun (The Sun) and other members of the media filed a motion 
for access to the proceedings and to some related documents. The 
juvenile court granted the motion on the condition that· the media 
not use the juvenile's full name, but instead refer to him as "Maur-
ice" or "Maurice M." Nine days later, The Sun published an article 
containing a photograph of the juvenile with a caption identifying 
him as "Maurice Bouknight." Although "Maurice Bouknight" was 
not the juvenile's legal name, Bouknight was the juvenile's mother 
last name and thus, "a name of identification."442 The Sun obtained 
the juvenile's photograph from the Baltimore City Police Department. 
The court conducted a hearing to determine whether The Sun 
had violated the conditions of its order. The court held that the 
order specifically limited all references to the child to "Maurice" or 
"Maurice M." and that The Sun had attempted to "get around" 
the order by identifying the child by his mother's last name. The 
court then proposed to amend the order to emphasize that the media 
could only refer to the juvenile as "Maurice" or "Maurice M." and 
to provide that no photographs or visual representation of the child 
could be displayed by the media. The court also asserted that it 
would deny the media further access to the proceedings unless The 
Sun published the amended order in all its editions the following 
day. The Sun refused to publish the order, and the court barred the 
media from the proceedings. Upon petition by the media for recon-
440. 340 Md. 437, 667 A.2d 166 (1995). 
441. See In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 550 A.2d 1135 (1988), rev'd sub nom. 
Maurice M. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). 
442. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 444-45, 667 A.2d at 170 (quoting the juvenile court 
findings). 
80 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
sideration, the court allowed access to all members of the media 
except The Sun, under the conditions of its amended order. 
The Sun filed an appeal with the court of special appeals 
requesting a reversal of the order denying access to the proceedings. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to inter-
mediate appellate review and reversed. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals held that the juvenile court's order con-
ditioning media access to the proceedings upon The Sun's publication 
of the amended order was unconstitutional.443 The court noted that 
under Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo444 a state's 
statute mandating the press to publish specific materials constitutes 
an impermissible exercise of control over editorial judgment and 
prerogative.44s This, the court continued, equally applied to the 
juvenile court's order requiring the media to use specific terms to 
refer to the child. 446 
The court of appeals also held that the juvenile court's order 
banning further publication of the child's picture was unconstitu-
tional.447 The court noted that although the state has an interest in 
protecting the juvenile's anonymity, this interest must yield to the 
constitutional right to print information lawfully obtained outside 
the proceedings. 448 The court concluded that the juvenile court's 
discretion to impose conditions on the media in return for access to 
the proceedings "can only extend as far as confidential information 
obtained from the juvenile proceedings. "449 
Gabriel A. Terrasa 
B. Suspension of an individual's driver's license pursuant to 
Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland and subsequent conviction for driving while 
intoxicated do not constitute double jeopardy within the meaning 
of the United States Constitution or Maryland common law. State 
v. JoneS-so 
443. See id. at 453, 667 A.2d at 174. 
444. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
445. See Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 453, 667 A.2d at 174. 
446. See id. at 455, 667 A.2d at 175. 
447. See id. at 460, 667 A.2d at 177. 
448. See id. See generally Eric B. Easton, Closing the Barn Door After the Genie 
Is Out of the Bag: Recognizing a "Futility Principle" in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 6 (1995) ("[T]he First Amendment 
imposes a presumption against the suppression of speech when suppression 
would be futile. Suppression is futile when the speech is available to the same 
audience through some other medium or at some other place. "). 
449. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 458, 667 A.2d at 176. 
450. 340 Md. 235, 666 A.2d 128 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1265 (1996). 
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1. Facts 
Ernest Jones, Jr. was arrested and charged with driving while 
intoxicated (OWl). An administrative law judge suspended Jones's 
driver's license for thirty days pursuant to Section 16-205.1 of the 
Transportation Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland.451 The 
district court found Jones guilty of driving while intoxicated. Jones 
appealed his conviction to the circuit court claiming that after having 
his license suspended, a OWl conviction constituted double jeopardy. 
The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case. The court of appeals 
granted certiorari prior to intermediate appellate review and reversed. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals held that suspension of an individual's 
driver's license pursuant to section 16-205.1 and subsequent conviction 
for driving while intoxicated did not constitute double jeopardy within 
the meaning of the United States Constitution or Maryland common 
law. 452 
Following United States Supreme Court precedent,453 the court of 
appeals devised a three-step analytical model to determine whether the 
statutory sanction was remedial or punitive. 454 First, the court "exam-
ine[ d) prior uses of license suspension to determine whether they have 
been generally understood as punitive or non-punitive. "455 Second, the 
court scrutinized the language, structure, and legislative history of 
section 16-205.1 to determine whether the statute itself "evidence[d] a 
purpose different from the historical understanding given to similar 
statutes."456 Third, because the statute served both remedial and pu-
nitive purposes, the court analyzed section 16-205.1 to determine whether 
. "the non-punitive purposes alone fairly justif[ied] the sanction im-
posed. "457 The court held that despite the section's possible punitive 
451. Section 16-205.1(b)(l)(i)(l) mandates a 45 day suspension of the driver's license 
for a first-time offender whose blood alcohol content tests above 0.10. Section 
16-205.1 (f) provides that the driver may request an administrative hearing at 
which the suspension of the license can be reduced or modified under certain 
circumstances. 
452. See Jones, 340 Md. at 265-66, 666 A.2d at 143. 
453. See Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); 
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435 (1989). 
454. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment "protects against three 
distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punish-
ments for the same offense." Jones, 340 Md. at 242,666 A.2d at 131 (quoting 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 440). 
455. Jones, 340 Md. at 250, 666 A.2d at 135. 
456. Id. 
457. Id. 
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purposes, its remedial purpose of keeping drunk drivers off the roads 
"amply" justified its driver's license suspension provision.4s8 
Regarding the Maryland double jeopardy protection claim, the 
court noted that "'[t]he rule against double jeopardy in Maryland is 
not established by the Constitution of the State but derives from the 
common law."'4s9 Thus, even if section 16-205.1 violates Maryland's 
common law double jeopardy doctrine, the statute prevails over com-
mon law.460 
Gabriel A. Terrasa 
C. Re-polling the jury after a juror gives an ambiguous answer to 
the polling question is not sufficient or appropriate to cure the 
ambiguity. Bishop v. Statft61 
1. Facts 
Paul Renard Bishop was tried on charges of robbery and con-
spiracy to commit robbery. After the foreman of the jury announced 
a guilty verdict on both counts, Bishop's counsel requested that the 
jury be polled. Each juror was asked whether the foreman's verdict 
was that juror's verdict. The third juror polled responded "uhh, 
reluctantly, yes." Bishop's counsel, at bench conference, requested 
the court to send the jury back and to further question the "reluc-
tant" juror. The court instead re-polled the entire jury; this time all 
jurors answered affirmatively, and the verdict was enrolled. 
Bishop appealed to the court of special appeals, claiming that: 
(1) the response "uhh, reluctantly, yes" to the jury poll wasambig-
uous; (2) under Lattisaw v. State462 the trial court was required to 
solve the ambiguity by non-coercive means; and (3) re-polling the 
jury after a juror showed reluctance to the verdict was coercive. The 
court of special appeals affirmed the conviction holding that the 
determination of whether the juror's response was ambiguous was 
within the discretion of the trial judge. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari and reversed the conviction. 
458. See id. at 265, 666 A.2d at 142. 
459. [d. at 266, 666 A.2d at 142 (quoting Ford v. State, 237 Md. 266, 269, 205 
A2d 809 (1965». 
460. See id. 
461. 341 Md. 288, 670 A.2d 452 (1996). 
462. 329 Md. 339, 619 A.2d 548 (1993). In Lattisaw, a juror responded "yes, with 
reluctance" to the jury-poll question. See id. The juror was visibly upset, and 
the trial court recognized that there was reluctance in her demeanor. See id. 
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2. Analysis 
The court of appeals held that, while the determination of 
whether a juror's response is ambiguous would ordinarily lie within 
the trial judge's discretion, it was clear under the circumstances of 
the case that the "reluctant" juror's response was ambiguous.463 The 
court noted that the purpose of polling the jury is to determine 
whether "the verdict is being given with 'free and unqualified' 
assent," and that the reluctant juror's response in this case did not 
fulfill that purpose.464 
Addressing the question of the appropriateness of re-polling the 
jurY,465 the court noted that Lattisaw offered two alternatives for 
clearing ambiguity in a juror's response: "'The safest course'" is to 
send the jury out for further deliberations, instructing them to return 
an unanimous verdict.466 "Alternatively," the court may attempt to 
clarify the ambiguity by questioning the juror in a non-coercive 
manner.467 The court concluded that re-polling the jury did not resolve 
the ambiguity of the juror's response and may have coerced the juror 
into giving an affirmative answer.468 
Gabriel A. Terrasa 
D. State police may deny application to purchase a handgun on 
the basis that possession of handgun by applicant would violate 
federal law. Department of Public Safety v. Berg469 
1. Facts 
Randolph Berg submitted an application to purchase a handgun 
from a gun dealer in Maryland. After conducting a background 
463. See Bishop, 341 Md. at 293, 670 A.2d at 455. 
464. [d. 
465. Judge Chasanow, joined by Judge Raker, dissented, noting that if the "reluc-
tant" juror response was ambiguous, the trial judge took appropriate steps to 
cure the ambiguity by re-polling the jury. See id. at 296-97, 670 A.2d at 457 
(Chasanow, J., dissenting). The dissenters interpreted Lattisaw's two alterna-
tives for clarifying a juror's response as suggested means and not as exclusive 
options. See id. at 295-96, 670 A.2d at 456 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). The 
dissenters also noted that the trial judge has the benefit of observing "the 
manner of answering and demeanor" of the "reluctant" juror, and as such, 
the trial judge is in a better position to determine whether the juror is uncertain 
about the verdict or merely unhappy about rendering the decision. See id. at 
296, 670 A.2d at 456 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). 
466. [d. at 293-94, 670 A.2d at 455 (quoting Lattisaw, 329 Md. at 347, 619 A.2d 
at 552). 
467. [d. (quoting Lattisaw, 329 Md. at 347, 619 A.2d at 552). 
468. See id. at 294, 670 A.2d at 456. 
469. 342 Md. 126, 674 A.2d 513 (1996). 
84 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
investigation, the Department Public Safety and Correctional Services 
(State Police) denied Berg's application. The denial was based on 
Berg's prior conviction for possession of cocaine in violation of state 
law and on the federal Gun Control Act of 1968. 470 Berg appealed 
the denial of the application to the Circuit Court of Maryland for 
Carroll County, claiming that the State Police could only apply the 
federal law if it was officially adopted by the state and if the guns 
were involved in interstate commerce. The circuit court reversed the 
State Police's decision, holding that the State Police should have 
considered whether Berg was entitled to an exemption from the 
statutory prohibition.471 The State Police appealed to the court of 
special appeals. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari 
prior to intermediate appellate review and reversed. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals held that the State Police were empowered 
to apply federal law in denying Berg's application for a handgun.472 
The court noted that through Clause 2 of Article VI of the United 
States Constitution, underscored by Article 2 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights, "an Act of Congress 'is as valid a command 
within the borders of [Maryland] as one of its own statutes."'473 The 
court concluded that state and local law enforcement officials are 
empowered to enforce federal law.474 
Addressing Berg's contention that the State Police could only 
enforce the federal law if the guns were involved in interstate com-
merce, the court noted that federal courts have consistently held the 
statute to apply even with a minimal nexus to interstate commerce.47S 
The court held that, because the handgun Berg intended to purchase 
470. The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921, prohibits the sale of a handgun 
to a person convicted of a crime punishable with imprisonment over a year. 
[d. § 922(b). The statute also prohibits a person convicted of such crime to 
possess or receive a handgun. See id. § 922(g). In Maryland, the crime of 
possession of cocaine carries a maximum sentence of four years imprisonment. 
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287 (1996). 
471. Section 925(c) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 provides that "[a] person who 
is prohibited from possessing ... or receiving firearms . . . may make appli-
cation to the Secretary [of Treasury] for relief from the disabilities imposed 
by Federal laws." Berg, 342 Md. at 134, 674 A.2d at 516 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 925(c) (1968». ' 
472. See id. at 139, 674 A.2d at 519. 
473. [d. at 136, 674 A.2d at 519 (quoting Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 174 
(2d Cir. 1928». 
474. See id. at 138-39, 674 A.2d at 518-19. 
475. See id. at 141-42, 674 A.2d at 520. 
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was manufactured outside of Maryland, the requisite connection to 
interstate commerce existed .476 
The court of appeals also held that the circuit court erred in 
directing the State Police to determine whether Berg was entitled to 
an exemption from the federal statute. 477 The court noted that the 
Gun Control Act of 1968 specifically delegated that function to the 
Secretary of the Treasury or his designee.478 The court concluded that 
the State Police had no jurisdiction to grant relief from the federal 
prohibition. 479 
Gabriel A. Terrasa 
V. EVIDENCE LAW 
A. Maryland's statute authorizing admission of DNA evidence 
eliminates the need to perform Frye-Reed hearings. Armstead v. 
State480 
1. Facts 
Petitioner, Michael Armstead (Armstead), was charged with 
rape, sexual assault, and other offenses arising out of the 1991 
robbery and rape of a Howard County woman. At trial, the State 
presented evidence of a DNA analysis on blood and semen samples 
taken from the victim which linked Armstead to the crime. 
Armstead sought, by motion in limine, to exclude the DNA 
evidence on statutory and constitutional grounds. The trial court re-
jected both statutory and constitutional arguments and ruled that the 
DNA evidence was admissible. Armstead was subsequently convicted. 
2. Analysis 
Armstead's primary arguments were that: (1) Section 10-915 of 
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland permits introduction of DNA evidence, but still requires 
an "inverse Frye-Reed hearing," a preliminary hearing to rebut the 
476. See id. at 142, 674 A.2d at 521. 
477. See id. at 140-41, 674 A.2d at 519. 
478. See id. 
479. See id. at 140-41, 674 A.2d at 519-20. 
480. 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996). 
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admissibility of DNA evidence;,sl and (2) despite the existence of 
section 10-915, the trial court must still perform a balancing test to 
determine if the probative value of the DNA evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial value. 482 
The court rejected Armstead's arguments,483 stating that the 
legislature's intent in passing section 10-915 was to remove the 
requirement of a hearing, not merely to shift the burden to the 
defendant to show that DNA evidence was unreliable. 484 Additionally, 
the. court of appeals concluded that any discretion allowed to the 
trial court centered on a determination of the relevance of this 
evidence rather than its reliability.485 As such, the trial court was not 
required to conduct any inquiry into the reliability of DNA evi-
dence. 486 
Doug/as I. Wood 
481. See id. at 55, 673 A.2d at 230. The Frye-Reed test requires that, absent a 
statute allowing admissibility, evidence relating to a scientific technique, such 
as DNA analysis, must meet the standard of '''general acceptance' in the 
relevant scientific community." [d. at 54, 673 A.2d at 228-29; see also Reed 
v. State, 283 Md. 374,381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978) (discussing Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923». 
482. See id. at 61-62, 673 A.2d at 232-33. 
483. Armstead asserted that rather than doing away with the Frye-Reed test, section 
10-915 merely shifts the burden from the prosecution to' show that DNA 
evidence is reliable to the defendant to show that DNA evidence is unreliable. 
See id. at 60-61, 673 A.2d at 232. Armstead's second argument was that despite 
the existence of section 10-915 authorizing admission of DNA evidence, the 
trial court retained discretion to balance the probative value of such evidence 
against its prejudicial effect. See id. at 61, 673 A.2d at 232. 
484. See id. at 60-61, 673 A.2d at 232. The court of appeals noted that whert the 
DNA legislation was initially proposed, the Senate Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee's Report stated that the purpose of the bill was to eliminate the need 
for hearings into the reliability of DNA evidence. See id. at 57-58, 673 A.2d 
at 230. The court also noted that the preamble to the statute shows the 
Legislature's position that DNA evidence is sufficiently reliable to eliminate 
the Frye-Reed inquiry. See id. at 59-61, 673 A.2d at 231-32. As such, the 
legislative history shows an intent to remove the need for hearings completely. 
485. See id. at 62, 673 A.2d at 233. The court of appeals stated that although the 
statute has eliminated the trial court's role in determining the reliability of 
DNA evidence for purposes of admission, the trial judge still retains discretion 
to evaluate the relevancy of such evidence. See id. at 62, 673 A.2d at 233. In 
addition, the trial court may exclude DNA evidence as unreliable if the manner 
in which a particular DNA test was performed would render that test unreliable. 
See id. at 63, 673 A.2d at 233. For example, a trial judge could refuse to 
admit certain DNA evidence which was obtained through erroneous laboratory 
procedures, rendering the test unreliable. See id. 
486. See id. at 62, 673 A.2d at 232. 
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B. Decision to compel disclosure of financial records by expert 
witnesses lies within sound discretion of trial judge. Araiza v. 
Roskowinski-Droneburft87 
1. Facts 
87 
Heather Jean Roskowinski-Droneburg (Plaintiff) filed an action 
in Maryland Health Claims Arbitration (HCA) after suffering com-
plications arising from a 1989 laparoscopy procedure. After the claim 
was filed, Gerardo Araiza, M.D., Gerrit J. Schipper, M.D., and 
their professional corporation, Drs. Araiza and Schipper, P.A. (De-
fendants), sent a notice of deposition to Marshall Klavan, M.D., a . 
Pennsylvania resident whom the Plaintiff intended to call as an 
expert witness. The notice requested that Klavan bring with him to 
the deposition all documents and records listing the number of hours 
billed, the compensation earned as a medical expert, and all records 
and documents indicating the identity of cases, parties, and attorneys 
with which he was involved as a medical expert over the past five 
years. 
At the deposition, Klavan testified as to the estimated amount 
of his annual income derived from forensics over the past ten years, 
as well as the proportion of his work it represented. Klavan did not 
produce his tax returns, however, and stated that he would not 
produce them even if ordered to do so by the court. Klavan also 
stated that he did not possess any 1099 tax forms, and that he did 
not maintain a record of billings for medical legal evaluations and 
testimony. Klavan confirmed that he had testified in all 118 of the 
cases named on a list obtained from the Defendants' insurer. 
The parties subsequently waived arbitration, and suit was filed 
against the Defendants in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Frederick 
County. On October 11, 1994, less than two weeks before trial, the 
Defendants obtained two subpoenas duces tecum directed at Klavan. 
One was taken to the Pennsylvania court which had jurisdiction over 
the venue of Klavan's medical office. That court issued an order for 
service of the subpoena on Klavan, who was personally served on 
October 21. The subpoena required Klavan to bring all documents 
and records indicating the amount of hours billed and compensation 
earned through involvement in medical legal cases; copies of all 
1099s; a list of medical cases indicating the identity of the cases, 
parties, and the attorney who retained him; and a list of all lapa-
roscopy cases he had performed during the past five years. 
On the day of the trial, both parties filed motions in limine in 
open court. The Defendants' motion asked the court to order Dr. 
487. 341 Md. 314, 670 A.2d 466 (1996). 
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Klavan to either comply with the subpoena or be barred from 
testifying. The Plaintiff's motion requested that the court relieve 
Klavan from complying with the subpoena pursuant to Maryland 
Rule 2-51O(e), which allows the court to protect individuals from 
unduly burdensome or oppressive demands. The trial judge granted 
the Plaintiff's motion, finding that the request was "extremely bur-
densome" given that the Defendants had over two years to take 
action after Klavan's refusal to comply with the original request, but 
waited until three days before trial to serve the subpoena duces 
tecum. The court also noted that all information requested in the 
subpoena, with the exception of the tax forms, had been substantially 
obtained at deposition. The jury trial proceeded, resulting in a verdict 
partially in favor of the Plaintiffs and partially in favor of the 
Defendants. 
The Defendants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. Before the intermediate court could consider the case, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to address Defen-
dants' argument that medical experts be required to disclose, as a 
matter of course and without a discovery request, financial infor-
mation for impeachment purposes. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether disclosure 
of financial information by an expert witness for the purpose of 
impeachment was compulsory without a formal discovery request. 488 
Instead, the court held that the trial judge had appropriately exercised 
his discretion in deciding whether to compel disclosure by the expert 
witness. 489 
The court of appeals noted that there appeared to be substantial 
legislative resistance to an automatic disclosure requirement. The 
Defendants' based their argument for automatic disclosure on the 
policy behind Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which require automatic disClosure by a party of a list of cases 
and depositions in which an expert witness retained by that party 
had testified. 490 The Araiza court 'noted, however, that the federal 
488. See id. at 315, 670 A.2d at 467-68. 
489. See id. at 322, 670 A.2d at 469-70. The Araiza court noted that the judge 
must consider "upon principles of reason and equity" whether compliance 
with a request for production should be honored. [d. at 322, 670 A.2d at 470 
(quoting Arney v. Long, 9 East. 473 (1808». 
490. See id. at 323, 670 A.2d at 470. The Araiza court stated that the Defendants' 
contention "carries well beyond the philosophy's limits in the federal rule." 
[d. 
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rule does not require automatic disclosure of financial records.491 The 
court also noted that a proposal for automatic disclosure of non-
financial records in civil cases had been proposed by the Maryland 
Rules Committee, but received such strong opposition that it was 
later withdrawn. 492 The court concluded that in light of purposeful 
legislative inaction it would be inappropriate to impose an automatic 
disclosure requirement by judicial decree.493 
Douglas I. Wood 
C. Posthumous permanent impairment ratings are admissible in 
worker's compensation claims. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ralph494 
1. Facts 
Calvin Ralph, was employed by the defendant, Sears, Roebuck 
and Company, Inc. (referred to collectively with its insurer, Allstate 
Insurance Company, as Sears) as an appliance repairman. In February 
1991, while making a service call, he slipped, fell, and injured his 
back. Sears thereafter paid Ralph temporary total disability benefits 
until his unrelated death from cancer in November 1991. 
Ralph visited Dr. Shah (Shah) on March 1, 1991, complaining 
of lower back pain radiating to both hips. Shah performed an x-
ray which revealed spinal column and nerve degeneration and disease 
in Ralph's lower back. Ralph visited Shah five more times in April 
and May of 1991. Shah referred Ralph for a neurological examina-
tion, which established that a myelogram and CT scan were necessary 
to determine the extent of Ralph's nerve disease and to develop an 
appropriate plan of treatment. 
After Ralph's visit on June 21, 1991, Shah made notes that 
Ralph was "totally disabled" and incapable of gainful employment. 
Shah then wrote a letter to Sears stating that Ralph was not ready 
for a work-hardening program and should not return to work, even 
491. See id. 
492. See id. The new proposed Rule 2-403 generated an "outpouring of opposition 
from the legal and other communities" and was later proposed to be limited 
to tort cases involving motor vehicles. Subsequently, the proposed rule was 
abandoned in lieu of scheduling conference orders to determine the appropriate 
level and scope of discovery necessary for reaching an expedient settlement. 
See id. 
493. See id. 
494. 340 Md. 304, 666 A.2d 1239 (1995). 
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for a "lighter job schedule." Before resolution of this action, how-
ever, Ralph died of an unrelated illness. 
After her husband's death, Ralph's widow (Mrs. Ralph) contin-
ued the action to receive permanent disability benefits. Four months 
after Ralph's death, Shah wrote a letter of medical rating to Mrs. 
Ralph's counsel stating that Ralph had 500/0 disability of his lumbar 
spine, 40% total body disability, and 100% disability to retvrn to 
work. A hearing was held in March of 1993 before the Matyland 
Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission), during which 
the Commission determined that, based on the evidence submitted, 
Ralph had not reached the maximum medical level of improvement. 
At trial, both parties moved for summary judgment. The circuit 
court granted Sears's motion based on a finding that there was 
insufficient evidence submitted to determine the claim, apparently 
because the medical rating was issued posthumously. Mrs. Ralph 
moved to alter the judgment based on a letter from Shah which 
stated that as of June 21, 1991, Ralph had reached maximum medical 
improvement and, because of his work-related injuries, would never 
be able to return to employment. The circuit court denied the motion 
to alter. 
The decision was reversed on appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, and Sears petitioned the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland for certiorari. Certiorari was granted to determine whether 
under Maryland law a posthumous permanent impairment rating can 
be used to determine a Workers' Compensation Claim. 
2. Analysis 
Sears's position that a posthumous permanent impairment rating 
was insufficient to determine a Workers' Compensation Claim was 
based on the interplay of Maryland statutory and regulatory provi-
sions.49S The court of appeals stated, however, that the mere fact 
495. See id. at 308, 666 A.2d at 1241. The Labor and Employment Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland provides a cause of action to continue a Workers' 
Compensation claim for permanent disability after the claimant's death. MD. 
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 9-632, -640(b) (1991); see also Sears, 340 Md. 
at 308 n.l, 666 A.2d at 1241, n.l. Permanent impairments are to be evaluated 
by a physician and reported to the Commission in accordance with the 
regulations of the Commission. LAB. & EMPL. § 9-721(a); see also Sears, 340 
Md. at 310-11, 666 A.2d at 1242. 
The court of appeals stated that the gravamen of Sears's argument is that 
the permanent impairment evaluation required by Maryland law can only be 
furnished by a medical witness who issued a formal evaluation, in accordance 
with the American Medical Association Guidelines of the Third Edition for 
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that the medical disability rating was not issued until after the 
claimant's death does not render the evaluation inadmissible.496 
The court based its decision on a review of the relevant statutes 
and legislative history .4'J7 The court of appeals noted that the purpose 
of the enactment of the current and former workers' compensation 
statutes, requiring compliance with the Guides,498 was to reduce the 
costs of workers' compensation insurance, not to preclude coverage in 
cases where the disability rating was issued before a claimant's death.499 
The court also noted that the survival provisions of the Workers' 
Compensation Act had not been construed to require that an award 
of compensation be made prior to a claimant's death.soo Therefore, 
legislative history and statutory interpretation did not preclude com-
pensation when the claimant has died of unrelated causes.SOI 
Finally, the court of appeals noted that in states which do not 
require an award to be issued prior to the claimant's death, determi-
nation of the survivability of a claim is made on a case-by-case basis. SOl 
A "bright-line" rule, such as that advocated by Sears, precluding 
admission of an impairment evaluation issued after the claimant's death, 
is inconsistent with this line of reasoning. 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (the Guides), during the claimant's 
lifetime. See id. at 312, 666 A.2d at 1243; see also MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
EMPL. § 9-721 (1991). Because Dr. Shah's formal letter of evaluation in 
accordance with the Guides was not issued until after Ralph's death, under 
Sears's hypothesis it would be incompetent evidence. 
496. See Sears, 340 Md. at 312-13, 666 A.2d at 1243. 
497. See id. 
498. See id. at 313, 666 A.2d at 1243. The disability evaluation was given according 
to the Guides. See id. 
499. See id. at 312-14, 666 A.2d at 1243-44. 
500. See id. at 314-15, 666 A.2d at 1244. The court stated that a claim which was 
"payable" for purposes of a survival action under Section 9-640(b) of the 
Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland was a 
claim which was payable because a compensable injury resulting in permanent 
disability occurred, not merely payable because an award was made prior to 
the claimant's death. See id. at 308 n.l, 314-15, 666 A.2d at 1241 n.l, 1244. 
501. See id. at 315, 666 A.2d at 1244. The court implied that the physician must 
have gathered sufficient underlying information and data during the claimant's 
lifetime to issue an evaluation in accordance with the Guides. See id. at 312-
13, 666 A.2d at 1243. If the physician possesses such information, it follows 
that a re-evaluation would be redundant. 
502. See id. at 316, 666 A.2d at 1244-45. The evidence of the evaluation supporting 
an impairment rating in the cases cited in the text was evaluated on its own 
merits. See id. The mere fact that the impairment evaluation was not issued 
before death does not preclude its admission. See id. at 315-16, 666 A.2d at 
1244-45. Survival claims were upheld where the pre-death medical record of 
the claimant was found sufficient to support an award and have been denied 
where the record was insufficient to show that the claimant reached the 
maximum level of medical improvement. See id. at 316, 666 A.2d at 1245. 
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Thus, the Sears court found that posthumous permanent impair-
ment ratings were admissible as evidence in workers' compensation 
cases. 
Douglas I. Wood 
D. Statute allowing admissibility oj motor vehicle speed 
measwements by radar does not preclude admissibility oj laser speed 
measurements. Goldstein v. State S03 
1. Facts 
Petitioner Goldstein was issued a citation by a Howard County 
Police officer charging him with driving at a speed of 74 miles per 
hour in a SS mile per hour zone. Goldstein's speed was measured 
using an L TI 20-20 laser speed gun: a device that uses a laser beam 
to measure velocity. 
At trial in the district court, Goldstein was convicted of speeding. 
Goldstein appealed to the Circuit Court of Maryland for Howard 
County, where he fIled a motion to exclude the laser evidence. The 
court denied the motion to exclude, holding that the State had proven 
by a preponderance of evidence that the L TI 20-20 was "generally 
accepted in the relevant scientific community" and that the evidence 
was thus admissible. 
2. Analysis 
Goldstein contended that the state legislature had impliedly rejected 
laser evidence to prove the speed of a motor vehicle. S04 Goldstein argued 
that the statute allowing the admission of radar speed readings did not 
specifically mention laser readings,SOS and that the legislature had ac-
tually rejected proposals to amend the radar-measurement statute to 
allow laser speed measurements. S06 
In rejecting Goldstein's "legislative inaction" argument, the court 
of appeals stated that Maryland's general rule is that failure to adopt 
legislation or provisions of a proposal does not provide a sound basis 
for determining legislative intent, particularly where there may have 
503. 339 Md. 563, 664 A.2d 375 (1995). 
504. See id. at 567, 664 A.2d at 377; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 12-401 (Supp. 1996). 
505. See Goldstein, 339 Md. at 565, 664 A.2d at 376. 
506. See id. at 569 n.l, 664 A.2d at 377 n.l. 
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been several reasons for rejecting a particular proposal.S07 The court 
further asserted that the absence of a specific legislative mandate that 
laser readings be allowed does not preclude the court from determining 
their admissibility under common-law evidentiary principles. sos 
The Goldstein court also discounted the petitioner's argument that 
the LTI 20-20 laser gun had not been accepted as reliable as a new 
scientific technique.S09 Although the court of appeals stated that the 
trial court had properly found that the L TI 20-20 speed detection 
device satisfied the criteria for admissibility of a new scientific tech-
niques - the Frye-Reed testS10 - the court stated that the Frye-Reed 
test need only be applied to scientific techniques, not to specific 
adoptions of that technique.Sll 
Douglas l. Wood 
E. Prior convictions for the same offense or an offense similar to 
one charged are not automatically excluded, but are subject to 
balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice. Jackson v. 
State512 
1. Facts 
Appellant, Robert M. Jackson (Jackson), was charged with the 
theft of a computer from the campus of the University of Maryland 
507. See id. at 570, 664 A.2d at 378. The court noted that Maryland's position on 
legislative inaction, like that of the majority of jurisdictions which have 
considered the issue, is that the rejection of proposed legislation "is a rather 
weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent." Id. (quoting 
Automobile Trade Ass'n v. Insurance Comm'r, 292 Md. 15,24,437 A.2d 199, 
203 (1981». The court of appeals further noted that courts are generally 
reluctant to infer legislative intent when there is more than one possible reason 
a bill was defeated. See id. at 570, 664 A.2d at 378. 
508. See id. at 571, 664 A.2d at 378-79. The Goldstein court concluded that if a 
statute supersedes the common law only to the extent that the statutory language 
expressly so provides, then certainly the failure of a legislative body to take 
action cannot be construed to overrule common law. See id. 
509. See id. at 573-74, 664 A.2d at 380. 
510. The court of appeals adopted the Frye standard for admissibility of scientific 
evidence in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). See Goldstein, 
339 Md. at 574, 664 A.2d at 380. The standard requires that evidence of a 
scientific technique be "generally accepted within the relevant scientific com-
munity" in order to be admissible. Id. at 573, 664 A.2d at 380. 
511. See id. The court stated that the issue was the merit of the theory upon which 
a device operates, n~t the specific device itself. See id. at 574-75, 664 A.2d at 
380. However, courts will reject a specific application of a generally accepted 
technique when the application of the technique interferes with the theory. See 
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at Baltimore.S13 Before trial, Jackson fIled a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence of two prior theft charges brought against him. In the first 
case, Jackson received probation before judgment; in the second case, 
he was convicted in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Prince George's 
County of theft of $300 or more, theft under $300, and conspiracy to 
commit theft, all resulting from the same incident. Jackson's counsel 
argued that the finding of probation before judgment was inadmissible 
as impeachment evidence because it was not a criminal conviction, and 
that the prior theft conviction was unduly prejudicial because it was 
for the same crime as that with which Jackson was charged.sl4 The 
trial judge granted Jackson's motion concerning the probation before 
judgment determination, but denied the motion with respect to the 
prior conviction, ruling that its probative value, for the impeachment 
of Jackson, outweighed its prejudicial effect. 
At trial, Jackson testified on his own behalf and denied involve-
ment in any criminal activity. On cross-examination, the State offered 
evidence of the prior theft conviction. Jackson was convicted and 
sentenced to five years imprisonment. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals rejected Appellant's contention that the 
trial court erred in admitting the prior conviction.SIS Jackson con-
tended that the prior theft conviction was unduly prejudicial because 
it was for a similar crime, and was therefore automatically excluded 
by Maryland Rule 5-609. 516 In rejecting this argument, the court 
noted that there was an "increasing flexibility" in this Rule, and 
that the similarity between the prior conviction and the current 
criminal charge was only one of several factors to be considered 
when determining whether the prior conviction was admissible. Sl7 The 
id. at 576, 664 A.2d at 380. For example, a version of the "gunpowder residue 
test," a generally accepted method of detecting the presence of certain chemicals 
in gunpowder on a subject's skin, was rejected when filter paper used in the 
test contained the chemicals the test was meant to detect. [d. at 575, 664 A.2d 
at 380-81 (quoting State v. Smith, 362 N.E.2dI239, 1245 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1976». 
512. 340 Md. 705, 668 A.2d 8 (1995). 
513. See id. at 708-09, 668 A.2d at 10. Jackson was arrested and charged with one 
count of theft of $300 or more, in violation of Section 342 of Artilce 27 of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland. See id. at 709, 668 A.2d at 10. 
514. Defense counsel argued that the prior conviction for theft would lead the jury 
to the improper inference that because the Defendant had done it before he 
must be guilty in this case also. 
515. See Jackson, 340 Md. at 722, 668 A.2d at 16. 
516. See id. at 711, 668 A.2d at 11. 
517. See id. at 712-13, 668 A.2d at 11-12. The court of appeals noted that Rule 5-
609, which governs admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment of 
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court of appeals noted that only the "third prong" of this test, the 
balancing of the probative value versus unfair prejudice, was at 
issue.5lS 
The court of appeals rejected Jackson's contention that a prior 
conviction for the same or a similar crime as that with which a 
defendant was charged was not always inadmissible. 519 While recog-
nizing the danger that a jury might use prior convictions for the 
improper purpose of inferring present guilt,S20 the court emphasized 
that Rule 5-609 was adopted to avoid this type of unfair prejudice 
by requiring the trial judge to weight the probative value of the 
evidence against its prejudicial effect. 521 
In affirming the trial court's conviction, the court of appeals 
stated the trial court had properly balanced the factors, and that 
because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the conviction 
must be affirmed.S22 
Douglas I. Wood 
G. A witness's prior inconsistent written statement on a photo 
array identifying defendant, a witness's grand jury testimony, and 
a witness's recantation of identification are admissible as 
substantive evidence. Stewart v. Statt!23 
witnesses, includes a three-part test to be used in determining if a conviction 
is admissible for impeachment: First, the conviction must "fall within the 
eligible universe," which consists of (1) infamous crimes; and (2) other crimes 
relating to credibility of the witness. Second, if the conviction falls within one 
of these two categories, it must be established by the party seeking admission 
that the conviction occurred within the preceding 15 years. Third, the trial 
court must determine that the probative value of the conviction outweighs the 
possibility of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Id. 
518. See id. at 713, 668 A.2d at 12. Jackson conceded the first two. parts of the 
test were satisfied. See supra note 517. 
519. See id. at 718, 668 A.2d at 14. 
520. See id. at 715, 668 A.2d at 13. 
521. See id. Rule 5-609 was designed to determine when admission of past convictions 
is properly sought to aid in a determination of the defendant's credibility and 
when admission of prior convictions is sought for the improper purpose of 
merely creating an unfavorable impression that the defendant is a "bad person" 
in the eyes of the jury. See id. at 715-16, 668 A.2d at 13. The party seeking 
introduction of the prior conviction (in this case the State) has the burden of 
showing that the probative value of the c(;>nviction outweighs its prejudicial 
value. See id. at 718 n.8, 668 A.2d 14 n.8. 
The court of appeals noted that various courts consider different factors in 
determining the probative value versus prejudicial effect of past convictions. 
See id. at 717, 668 A.2d at 14. Some of these factors include: (1) impeachment 
value of the past crime; (2) defendant's circumstances at the time of the crime 
and his subsequent behavior; (3) similarity of past crime and charged offense; 
(4) the importance of defendant's testimony; (5) the importance of the defen-
dant's credibility. See id. (discussing United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 
929 (7th Cir. 1976). 
522. See id. at 719, 668 A.2d at 15. Such a finding is subject to an abuse of 
96 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
1. Facts 
Petitioner, Michael Stewart, was convicted of first degree murder 
and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence in 
connection with the shooting death of James Brandon. George Booth 
was a key witness to the crime. Booth identified Stewart in an array 
of photographs and signed a statement stating he was positive Stewart 
shot Brandon. Booth also testified before a grand jury that Stewart 
shot Brandon. As the trial approached, however, Booth became 
reluctant to testify and recanted his testimony. Booth's grand jury 
testimony, his written out-of-court statement, and his inconsistent 
testimony at trial were admitted into evidence. Stewart was convicted. 
On appeal, Stewart argued that the statements were inadmissible 
because the State's only objective in calling Booth was to have his 
out-of-court statements admitted into evidence. The court of special 
appeals affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed on certiorarLS24 
2. Analysis 
Traditionally, a witness's prior inconsistent statements, when 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, are hearsay and, 
thus, inadmissible as substantive evidence.S2S The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland set forth an exceptionS26 to this general rule, however, 
in Nance v. State.S27 The court held that the factual portion of a 
witness's out-of-court statement is admissible as substantive evidence 
when: (1) the statement is inconsistent with the witness's testimony 
at trial; (2) the prior statement is based on the declarant's own 
discretion standard. See id. 
In applying the "Mahone" test, the court stated that four of the five factors 
listed above favored admission of Jackson's past theft conviction: (1) because 
theft was a crime of "deceitfulness," its impeachment value favored admission; 
(2) the prior conviction was within three years of the current charge, and its 
close proximity in time weighed in favor of admission; (3) the similarity of the 
prior theft conviction to the offense charge weighed against admission; (4) in . 
balancing the defendant's right to testify against the State's right to impeach 
a witness by cross-examination and the centrality of the defendant's credibility 
to the case, because the appellants credibility was central to the case, the 
probative value of the evidence strongly outweighed its danger of unfair 
prejudice, thus favoring admission on these two issues. See id. at 720-21, 668 
A.2d at 16. 
523. 342 Md. 230, 674 A.2d 944 (1996). 
524. See id. 
525. See id. at 236, 674 A.2d 947. 
526. See id. at 237, 674 A.2d at 947. 
527. 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993). 
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knowledge; (3) the witness has written and signed the statement; and 
(4) the witness is subject to cross-examination.528 
Applying the requirements of admissibility set forth in Nance, 
the court found that Booth's out-of-court statements were properly 
admitted as substantive evidence of Stewart's guilt. 529 Both Booth's 
signed statement and his grand jury testimony were clearly inconsis-
tent with Booth's trial testimony.53o Before trial, Booth stated in 
writing and under oath that Stewart was the man who killed Bran-
don.S3l At trial, Booth denied knowing who killed Brandon.S32 
Nonetheless, Stewart argued that Booth's out-of-court statements 
should have been excluded because the State only called Booth to 
get his out-of-court statements into evidence. 533 Stewart contended 
that the State was barred from employing this tactic because its 
genuine motive was to circumvent the hearsay rule in order to present 
otherwise inadmissible evidence to the jury.534 The court indicated 
that this rationale only applies when the evidence is admitted to 
impeach the witness. m In this case, the prior inconsistent statements 
were admitted not for impeachment purposes, but as substantive 
evidence.536 
Furthermore, Stewart asserted that Booth's recanting testimony 
had to surprise the State in order for the State to admit the incon-
sistent testimony as evidence. 537 The court disagreed and noted that 
the prerequisite that the State be surprised by a witness's inconsistent 
statement was constructed to prevent the jury from misusing im-
peachment evidence.S38 Since the out-of-court testimony was admitted 
as substantive evidence rather than impeachment evidence, this re-
quirement did not apply. 539 Thus, the court held the statements were 
properly admitted. 
Dan Curry 
528. See id. at 569, 629 A.2d at 643. These principles have since been codified in 
Maryland Rule 5-802.1. See Stewart, 342 Md. at 238, 674 A.2d at 948. 
529. See Steward, 342 Md. at 238, 674 A.2d at 948. 
530. See id. at 239, 674 A.2d at 949. 
531. See id. 
532. See id. 
533. See id. at 240, 674 A.2d at 949. 
534. See id. at 240-41, 674 A.2d at 949-50; see a/so Spence v. State., 321 Md. 526, 
530-31, 583 A.2d 715, 717 (1991) (holding that it is improper for the State to 
call a witness solely to introduce the witness's prior inconsistent statements 
regarding the defendant's guilt to impeach that witness). 
535. See Stewart, 342 Md. at 242,. 674 A.2d at 950. 
536. See id. 
537. See id. at 243, 674 A.2d at 951. 
538. See id. 
539. See id. 
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H. Witness with first-hand knowledge of events is not required to 
authenticate videotape; "silent witness" theory and business records 
exception to the hearsay rule may suffice to make videotape 
admissible. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services 
v. Collf40 
1. Facts 
Gregory Cole, a state prison employee was charged with using 
unnecessary force against a prisoner in a cell extraction. The incident 
was videotaped. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held the tape 
was admissible and sustained the charges. On appeal, the circuit 
court judge reversed the ALJ's ruling, and Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland affirmed the reversal. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land granted certiorari to consider whether the videotape was properly 
authenticated. 
2. Analysis 
Cole contended that only a witness with first-hand knowledge 
of the events depicted on the videotape could testify to its accuracy. 541 
Because the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services 
(Department) did not produce such a witness, Cole argued that the 
videotape was not properly authenticated.S42 The court disagreed and 
noted that this is not the sole method of authenticating a videotape.543 
The "silent witness" theory of admissibility is another method 
of authenticating videotape.s44 This method does not require the 
testimony of a witness with first-hand knowledge because the vide-
otape "speaks with its own probative effect." S45 The court compared 
the videotape with an X-ray which is admissible despite that fact 
that no one has first-hand knowledge that an X-ray is a correct and 
accurate representation of the inside of a body.546 
540. 342 Md. 12, 672 A.2d 1115 (1996). 
541. See id. at 20, 672 A.2d at 1119. 
542. See id. 
543. See id. 
544. See id. at 21, 672 A.2d at 1119. 
545. [d.; see also Sisk v. State, 236 Md. 589, 591-92, 204 A.2d 684, 685 (1964). A 
majority of jurisdictions utilize the "silent witness" theory of admissibility. 
See Cole, 342 Md. at 21,672 A.2d at 1119; see also, e.g., Fisher v. State, 643 
S.W.2d 571, 575-76 (Ark. App. 1982); Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 
1015-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The rationale behind the theory is that if there 
is an adequate foundation which assures the accuracy of the videotaping 
process, then the videotape should be admissible as a witness that "speaks for 
itself." 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 790, at 219-20 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
546. See Cole, 342 Md. at 22, 672 A.2d at 1120. 
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Additionally, the court held that the videotape could have been 
admitted because of the business records exception to hearsay. S47 
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-803(b)(6) establishes that records of 
regularly conducted business activity may be admitted into evidence. S48 
Warden Galley testified that it was common practice to videotape 
cell extractions, primarily for the protection of the inmate and the 
institution.s49 Therefore, the court concluded that the videotape qual-
ified as a part of the Department's ordinary business records and 
held that the videotape was authentic. sso 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
videotape was admissible evidence on two alternative grounds: (1) 
the "silent witness" theory; and (2) the business records exception 
to the hearsay rule. sst 
Dan Curry 
I. A decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is within the 
discretion oj the trial judge to be reversed only if it is based upon 
an error oj law or a serious mistake, or if the judge has abused 
his discretion. Franch v. AnkneySS2 
1. Facts 
During her employment in 1982, Lottie Ankney slipped and fell 
on an icy parking lot. After receiving an award from the Workers' 
Compensation Commission, Ankney negotiated a settlement with the 
owner of the parking lot. Consequently, the Commission terminated 
her payments on the grounds that the unauthorized settlement fore-
closed her right to future benefits. 
Ankney's attorney, William A. Franch, concurred with the Com-
mission's ruling, and thus advised Ankney that she would have little 
chance of prevailing on appeal. In January 1988, Ankney filed a 
malpractice action against Franch alleging negligence for advice given 
547. See id. at 28, 672 A.2d at 1123. The business record exception applies to items 
that are part of an organization's official record. See id.; see o/so, e.g., Queen 
v. Sate, 26 Md. App. 222, 229-31, 337 A.2d 199, 204 (1975) (illustrating that 
a photograph in a file would be included as part of a business record). In the 
instant case, the court considered the videotape, the envelope in which the tape 
was stored, and the chain of custody form to be part of the official record. 
See Cole, 342 Md. at 28-29, 672 A.2d at 1123. 
548. See Cole, 342 Md. at 29, 672 A.2d at 1123. 
549. See id. 
550. See id. at 30, 672 A.2d at 1124. 
551. See id. at 33, 672 A.2d at 1125. 
552. 341 Md. 350, 670 A.2d 951 (1996). 
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regarding the prospects of successfully appealing the Commission's 
unfavorable ruling. 
At trial, Ankney produced two expert witnesses that testified, 
contrary to Franch's advise, that an appeal of the Commission's 
ruling would have been successful. However, the trial judge granted 
Franch's motion to strike the experts' testimony on the grounds that 
the opinions were based on incorrect interpretations of Maryland 
law. The trial judge then ruled in favor of Franch, reasoning that 
Ankney failed to produce any admissible evidence establishing the 
relevant standard of care. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
held that the judge's striking of the testimony constituted an abuse 
of discretion and remanded the case. The Court of Appeals granted 
certiorari and reversed the decision of the intermediate court. SS) 
2. Analysis 
In Maryland, the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony 
is within the discretion of the trial judge. SS4 Thus, a trial judge's 
decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will be reversed only 
if it is based upon an error of law or some serious mistake, or if 
the judge has abused his discretion.S5S The court of special appeals 
found that the judge abused his discretion by striking the testimony 
of Ankey's experts, testimony which the judge considered "unduly 
prejudicial" to the defendant. 556 Ankney was left without the required 
expert testimony to prove the applicable standard of care.SS7 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland disagreed with the interme-
diate appellate court's analysis. Maryland's high court asserted that 
when an expert's testimony is based upon incorrect interpretations 
of law, the judge is not barred from striking the opinions simply 
because those opinions are necessary to a party's case.SS8 Here, 
because the experts' opinions were based on an incorrect interpreta-
tion of Maryland law, the trial judge properly excluded the testi-
mony.5S9 
553. See id. at 351, 670 A.2d at 954. 
554. See Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 576, 611 A.2d 581, 590 (1992). 
555. See id. 
556. See Ankney v. Franch, 103 Md. App. 83, 115, 652 A.2d 1138, 1153 (1995), 
rev'd, 341 Md. 350, 670 A.2d 951 (1996). 
557. See id. 
·558. See Franch, 341 Md. at 365, 670 A.2d at 958. 
559. See id. The experts' opinions that Franch's advice was negligent were based 
upon an unsound premise. Both experts believed that any prejudice the em-
ployer's insurance company may have suffered as a result of Ankney's unau-
thorized settlement was irrelevant to the insurance company's liability to pay 
benefits. In fact, the amount of prejudice was relevant because under Maryland 
law, the insurance company is entitled to an amount equal to any prejudice 
that it could demonstrate it suffered as a result of the unauthorized settlement. 
See id. at 364, 670 A.2d at 958. 
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Furthermore, the court noted that Ankney was on notice that 
the testimony was incorrect before commencement of the trial and 
proceeded, nonetheless, to offer the testimony.560 The court thus 
concluded that the trial judge's ruling could not have been "unduly 
prejudicial" to Ankney. 561 
Dan Curry 
VI. FAMILY LAW 
A. Shares of stock were "deferred compensation" encompassed 
within the meaning of Section 8-205(a) of the Family Law Article 
of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and ownership of the shares 
may be transferred upon divorce at the discretion of the court. 
Klingenberg v. Klingenberg562 
1. Facts 
Barry and Carolyn Klingenberg were married on August 10, 
1968. The couple separated and Mrs. Klingenberg filed for divorce 
on June 21, 1993. In the course of allocating property during the 
divorce proceedings, a question arose regarding the characterization 
of shares of stock Mr. Klingenberg received from his employer. The 
issue on appeal was whether the shares of stock qualified as "deferred 
compensation" under Section 8-205(a) of the Family Law Article of 
the Maryland Annotated Code 8-205(a).563 
2. Analysis 
Mrs. Klingenberg argued that her husband's stock plan was 
"deferred compensation" within the meaning of section 8-205(a).564 
She further maintained that, as deferred compensation, the proceeds 
from the stock could be transferred to her when Mr. Klingenberg 
sold the stock. 565 The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that 
the stock plan was "deferred compensation" within the meaning of 
section 8-205(a).566 
560. See id. at 365, 670 A.2d at 958. 
561. See id. 
562. 342 Md. 315, 675 A.2d 551 (1996). 
563. See id. at 318, 675 A.2d at 552. 
564. See id. at 324, 675 A.2d at 555. 
565. See id. 
566. See id. 
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Generally, deferred compensation refers to money received at a 
later date, for work done at an earlier date. 561 It is taxed when it is 
received rather than when it is earned.568 A deferred compensation 
plan is frequently used as an incentive plan given to executives of 
companies. 569 In the instant case, Mr. Klingenberg was allowed to 
invest in the stock plan as long as he remained employed with the 
company.510 The plan was an incentive designed to maximize the 
benefits given to high-level executives, such as Mr. Klingenberg, if 
they stayed with the company until retirement. 511 Thus, the court 
concluded that Mr. Klingenberg's stock plan was deferred compen-
sation in the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.S12 The court 
noted, however, that section 8-205(a) gives the circuit court discretion 
to transfer the stock as deferred compensation or as "stock" pursuant 
to the reconciliation agreement. The court of appeals thus remanded 
the case to the circuit court to determine the form of distribution. 
Dan Curry 
B. Evidence of history of domestic abuse is admissible at a 
protective order hearing regardless of whether the allegations were 
sufficiently pleaded in the original petition for protection. Coburn 
v. Coburn573 
1. Facts 
On March 3, 1995, Marcia Coburn filed a petition in district 
court for protection from domestic violence against her estranged 
husband, William E. Coburn, Jr. The petition alleged that on Feb-
ruary 25, 1995, Mr. Coburn slapped, punched, and threatened Ms. 
Coburn. Ms. Coburn also noted on the petition that Mr. Coburn 
had abused and threatened her on several prior occasions. The district 
court granted the petition in favor of Ms. Coburn. On appeal to the 
circuit court, a de novo protective order hearing was held. At this 
hearing, the court allowed, over the objection of Mr. Coburn, new 
allegations of prior instances of abuse in addition to those presented 
567. See id. at 328, 675 A.2d at 557; see also Greensboro Pathology Assocs. v. 
United States, 698 F.2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (defining deferred compensation 
as compensation received in the future for work done in the past). 
568. See Klingenberg, 342 Md. at 328, 675 A.2d at 557. 
569. See id. 
570. See id. at 329, 675 A.2d at 557. 
571. See id. 
572. See id. 
573. 342 Md. 244, 674 A.2d 951 (1996). 
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at the original hearing in district court. The circuit court granted the 
protective order and Mr. Coburn petitioned the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland for a writ of certiorari. The court of appeals granted 
certiorari to address the question of whether a judge presiding over 
a protective order hearing may admit evidence of prior incidents of 
domestic abuse. S74 
2. Analysis 
The court began its analysis by inquiring into the Maryland 
legislature's intent in drafting the domestic violence statute.57S The 
court noted that the statute was designed to '''aid victims of domestic 
abuse by providing an immediate and effective' remedy."s76 Its 
primary purpose is to afford protection and prevent any future 
harm.S77 Furthermore, section 4-504(b)(1)(ii) requires that the petition 
for temporary relief include any previous acts of abuse perpetrated 
by the respondent against the victim. S78 Moreover, remedial statutes 
are generally liberally construed in order "to 'suppress the evil and 
advance the remedy."'s79 Accordingly, the court held that the legis-
lature intended for incidents of past abuse to be admissible at both 
the temporary and final protective order hearings. S80 
Aside from the issue of legislative intent, the court disagreed 
with Mr. Coburn on three other independent and separate grounds. s81 
First, rejecting Mr. Coburn argument that the prior incidents of 
abuse were irrelevant to the hearing on the February incident, S82 the 
court noted that the remedy for one act of abuse would not equal 
the remedy for several abusive acts.S83 
Second, the court disagreed with Mr. Coburn's assertion that 
evidence of prior abuse was inadmissible under Maryland Rule of 
Evidence 5-404(b) which prohibits "admission of evidence of prior 
574. The court noted that the instant case was moot because the protective order 
at issue expired on September 26, 1995. See id. at 250, 674 A.2d at 954. 
However, the court decided to address the merits because the case presented 
unresolved issues in a matter of important public concern. See id. 
575. See id. at 250, 674 A.2d at 954; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-
501 to -516 (1991). 
576. Coburn, 342 Md. at 252, 674 A.2d at 955 (quoting Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 
620, 623, 537 A.2d 224, 225 (1988». 
577. See id. at 260, 674 A.2d at 958. 
578. See id. at 257, 674 A.2d at 957. 
579. [d. at 256, 674 A.2d at 957. (quoting Harrison v. John F. Pilli & Sons, Inc., 
321 Md. 336, 341, 582 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1990». 
580. See id. at 257, 674 A.2d at 957. 
581. See id. at 257-61, 674 A.2d at 957-59. 
582. See id. at 257, 674 A.2d at 957-58. 
583. See id. at 258, 674 A.2d at 958. 
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bad acts to prove that the person acted in conformity with those 
acts. "584 The court held that rule 5-404(b) did not apply to the instant 
case because the evidence was not admitted to prove that Mr. Coburn 
acted in conformity with his prior acts. S8S Rather, it was admitted to 
illustrate the probability that future abuse would occur, and thus, 
show Ms. Coburn's need for protection.s86 
Finally, Mr. Coburn argued that he was denied due process 
because he had no notice that the alleged incidents of past abuse 
were going to be admitted at the hearing. S87 The court replied that 
Mr. Coburn was put on notice when Ms. Coburn filed the ex parte 
petition for protection.s88 In addition, a petitioner's failure to list 
every single incident of abuse will not preclude a petitioner from 
introducing evidence of prior abuse unless there is an obvious prej-
udice to the respondent. S89 No such prejudice existed here, hence the 
evidence was held admissible.s90 
Dan Curry 
C. Failure of the circuit court judge to make a determination 
regarding a claim for counsel fees under sections 11-110 and 12-103 
of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland 
does not alone deprive a divorce judgment of finality. Blake v. 
Blake591 
1. Facts 
Clifton Avon Blake and Luvenilde Margott Blake were married 
on November 8, 1976, and they separated in January 1987. In 1990 
both parties filed for divorce. Ms. Blake's complaint, in addition to 
seeking an absolute divorce and other remedies, sought counsel fees 
pursuant to Sections 11-110 and 12-103 of the Family Law Article 
of the Annotated Code of Maryland. On July 30, 1993, the/circuit 
court judge filed his opinion and the order was docketed on August 
9, 1993. Ms. Blake filed a thirty day' motion to revise the judgment, 
pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-535, which does not stop the running 
of the thirty day appeal period. On April 12, 1994, the circuit court 
584. [d. at 259-60, 674 A.2d at 959. 
585. See id. at 260, 674 A.2d at 959. 
586. See id. 
587. See id. at 260-61, 674 A.2d at 959. 
588. See id. at 261, 674 A.2d at 959. 
589. See id. at 261, 674 A.2d at 959-60. 
590. See id. at 261-62, 674 A.2d at 960. 
591. 341 Md. 326, 670 A.2d 472 (1996). 
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denied Ms. Blake's motion to revise the judgment. Ms. Blake filed 
a notice of appeal on May 11, 1994, claiming that the circuit court 
erred in ruling that personal injury proceeds, which Mr. Blake 
received during their marriage, were not marital property. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari on its own motion, prior 
to consideration of the case by the court of special appeals. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals used this appeal to sua sponte raise the 
issue of whether unresolved counsel fees may prevent an otherwise 
final judgment from being final.s92 Despite the fact that neither party 
raised the counsel fee issue on appeal, the court considered the 
central issue to be "whether a claim for counsel fees under §§ 11-
110 and 12-103 [of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland] should be treated as part of the claim for relief on the 
merits, so that the August 9, 1993 judgment in the Blakes' divorce 
action was not ... final."s93 If the judgment of August 9, 1993 was 
final, then the notice of appeal filed by Ms. Blake on May 11, 1994 
would have been untimely because her motion to revise the judgment 
did not stop the running of the thirty day appeal period. 
The court of appeals surveyed the jurisprudence of other states 
on this question and noted that in the majority of jurisdictions an 
appeal on the merits does not usurp jurisdiction from the judgment-
rendering court on the issue of an award of counsel fees. s94 The 
court affirmed the trial court judgment without addressing the merits 
of the appeal, holding that although a statute may require counsel 
fees to be a part of a judgment on the merits, the rule that best 
serves courts and litigants is that a judgment is final, regardless of 
whether attorneys fees have been adjudicated.s9s Ms. Blake's notice 
of appeal was thus untimely. 
Dan Curry 
D. A father's incarceration constitutes a temporary material 
change of circumstances justifying modification of child support 
obligation; prisoner is not voluntarily impoverished absent a 
showing that the crime was committed with the intent of going to 
prison or otherwise becoming impoverished. Wills v. JoneSS96 
592. See id. at 339, 670 A.2d at 479 (Chasanow, J., concurring). 
593. [d. at 336, 670 A.2d at 477. 
594. See id. at 336, 670 A.2d at 477-78 (citing Newman v. Riley, 314 Md. 364, 379-
80 n.12, 550 A.2d 959, 967 n. 12 (1988». 
595. See id. at 338, 670 A.2d at 478. 
596. 340 Md. 480, 667 A.2d 331 (1995). 
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1.· Facts 
Randy Jones and Natasha Wills are the parents of Rhondell 
Durell Jones who was born in 1982. In 1992, Jones was incarcerated 
and began serving a mandatory ten year sentence. At that time, 
Jones was required to pay Wills fifty dollars per week in child 
support. During his incarceration, Jones's income dropped to twenty 
dollars per month. The circuit court granted Jones's motion to stay 
child support payments, finding that Jones had not committed the 
crime with the intent of impoverishing himself and thus avoiding the 
chid support payments.S97 
2. Analysis 
The first issue the court considered was whether there was a 
material change of circumstance sufficient to modify Jones's obli-
gation to pay child support. S98 Under section 12-104(a) of the Family 
Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, the court has the 
authority to modify the child support award if the circumstances 
have materially changed from the time of the original support or-
der.s99 Essentially, the test is whether the parent's income has 
changed. 600 The court found that Jones's income had decreased due 
to his incarceration.601 
The second issue the court addressed was whether Jones volun-
tarily impoverished himself when he committed a crime which carried 
a punishment of incarceration. 602 In Maryland, the parent's intent is 
crucial in determining whether a parent has voluntarily impoverished 
himself or herself.603 
Wills argued that Jones intended to impoverish himself when he 
made a conscious choice to commit a crime. 604 Wills asserted that 
because Jones's criminal behavior was in his control, incarceration 
was a foreseeable consequence, and therefore, his impoverishment 
was voluntary.6Os The court disagreed with Wills's logic and deter-
mined that the word "voluntary" evokes the· element of intent.606 
597. See id. at 480, 667 A.2d at 331. 
598. See id. at 488-89, 667 A.2d at 334-35. 
599. See id. at 487, 667 A.2d at 334. 
600. See id. at 489, 667 A.2d at 335. 
601. See id. at 485, 667 A.2d at 333. 
602. See id. at 489, 667 A.2d at 335. 
603. See id.; see, e.g., Goldberger v. Goldberger, 96 Md. App. 313, 327,624 A.2d 
1328, 1335 (1993) (indicating that voluntary impoverishment occurs when a 
parent freely and consciously renders himself or herself without adequate 
resources). 
604. See Wills, 340 Md. at 491, 667 A.2d at 336. 
605. See id. 
606. See id. at 494-95, 667 A.2d at 338. 
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Jones's intent was to commit a crime, not to cast himself into 
poverty.6(Y7 Accordingly, the court held that only a prisoner who 
commits a crime with the intent of becoming incarcerated and im-
poverished may be considered "voluntarily impoverished."608 
Dan Curry 
E. The mere establishment of common residence with an 
unrelated man was insufficient to establish "cohabitation" and 
therefore, did not violate requirements of a separation agreement. 
Gordon v. Gordon6lY) 
1. Facts 
Joel Spencer Gordon brought this action against his former wife, 
Sara Jenkins Gordon to terminate his alimony obligation. Their 
separation agreement read, in part, as follows: "Husband shall pay 
to Wife as alimony the sum of six thousand dollars per month .... 
Payments shall . . . terminate in the event the Wife resides with any 
unrelated man without the benefit of marriage for a period continuing 
for beyond sixty ... days. "610 
In 1993, Mr. Gordon suspected that Ms. Gordon was living with 
another man in violation of their separation agreement. A private 
investigator confirmed that Ms. Gordon shared a common residence 
with another man for a period longer than sixty days. Mr. Gordon 
filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Montgomery 
County to terminate alimony payments to Ms. Gordon. The court 
referred the case to a domestic relations master who concluded that 
Ms. Gordon had violated the separation agreement because she had 
resided with an unrelated male for more than sixty days. The master 
recommended that the court confirm Mr. Gordon's termination of 
support payments to Ms. Gordon. The court adopted the recommen-
dations. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari on its 
own motion prior to intermediate appellate review. 
2. Analysis 
Section 8-101 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland explicitly authorizes a husband and wife to enter into 
607. See id. at 497, 667 A.2d at 339. 
608. See id. 
609. 342 Md. 294, 675 A.2d 540 (1996). 
610. [d. at 296-97, 675 A.2d at 541-42. 
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separation agreements.611 The agreements typically make prOVISIons 
for support which will terminate if the spouse receiving support 
enters into a cohabitation arrangement with another person.612 How-
ever, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had not previously set forth 
the factors characterizing a cohabitation arrangement.613 
The court began its analysis by looking at the ordinary meaning 
of the term. 614 "Cohabitation," the court concluded, connotes an 
arrangement whereby a man and women live together and jointly 
assume "the duties and obligations associated with marriage. "615 With 
this definition in mind, the court formulated a list of factors to 
guide trial courts when considering whether a relationship qualifies 
as cohabitation: (1) establishment of a common residence; (2) long-
term intimate or romantic involvement; (3) shared assets or common 
bank accounts; (4) joint contribution to household expenses; and (5) 
recognition of the relationship by the community. 616 
Next, the court interpreted the phrase' 'resides with any unrelated 
man without the benefit of marriage for a period continuing for 
beyond sixty ... consecutive days" as synonymous with cohabit a-
tion.617 Essentially, this phrase was intended to exclude living situa-
tions with roommates or boarders. 618 
Accordingly, the court reversed the domestic relations master 
ruling.619 The master's ruling was based only upon the sixty-day time 
requirement instead of the factors which determine cohabitation.620 
The court noted that while the number of consecutive days living 
together is important, the nature of the relationship is key to deter-
mining whether it constitutes cohabitation.621 
Dan Curry 
VII. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A. An attorney who is disbarred for failure to disclose material 
information that would disqualify him from being admitted to the 
bar under Rule 14, may later be readmitted if he passes the 
comprehensive examination. In re Keeharf22 
611. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-101 (1991). 
612. See Gordon, 342 Md. at 301, 675 A.2d at 544. 
613. See id. at 305, 675 A.2d at 545. 
614. See id. at 308, 675 A.2d at 547. 
615. [d. 
616. See id. at 308-09, 675 A.2d at 547-48. 
617. [d. at 311, 675 A.2d at 549. 
618. See id. 
619. See id. at 312-13, 675 A.2d at 549. 
620. See id. at 312-13, 675 A.2d at 549-50. 
621. See id. at 313, 675 A.2d at 550. 
622. 342 Md. 121,674 A.2d 510 (1996). 
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1. Facts 
Petitioner, Michael Patrick Keehan, deliberately failed to disclose 
a material fact requested on the Maryland bar application. Although 
he had been admitted to the Pennsylvania bar and maintained a law 
office with a partner in Pennsylvania, his residence and place of full-
time employment, working as a claims adjuster, were in Maryland. 
He submitted an application to the Maryland bar for admission 
pursuant to Rule 14, which if accepted would require him to take 
only a limited three hour exam.623 On his application he did not 
mention his full-time employment as a claims adjuster. Based on the 
information given in his application, he was admitted to the Maryland 
bar in November 1981. When it was discovered he had failed to 
disclose all relevant information, he was disbarred on November 20, 
1987 in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore County. The 
petitioner filed for readmission to the Maryland bar. 
2. Analysis 
A lawyer is subject to disciplinary action if he deliberately fails 
to disclose a material fact that was requested on his application for 
"admission to the bar .624 Keehan deliberately failed to disclose his 
employment as a claims adjuster so that he would be admitted to 
the bar under Rule 14. 625 Had he been honest on the application, he 
would not have been admitted to the bar under Rule 14.626 
In order for a person to be readmitted to the bar, four criteria 
must be examined: (1) the nature and the circumstances of the 
petitioner's original conduct; (2) the petitioner's subsequent conduct; 
(3) the petitioner's present character; and (4) petitioner's present 
qualifications and competence to practice law. 627 The court was 
convinced that the petitioner had satisfied the first three aforemen-
623. Maryland Rule 14 permits a person who has been admitted to the bar in 
another state to apply to be a member of the Maryland bar without taking 
the full two day exam. MD. R. 14. However, for at least five of the seven 
years prior to his application, he must have been regularly engaged as a 
practitioner of law. A practitioner of law is defined as a member of the bar 
of another state who has regularly engaged in the practice of law as his 
principal means of earning his livelihood. See In re Keehan, 342 Md. 121, 123, 
674 A.2d 510, 511 (1996). The rule was devised under the premise that a lawyer 
who has regularly engaged in the practice of law has sufficient legal knowledge. 
See Id. at 124, 674 A.2d at 512. 
624. See In re Patrick, 342 Md. 121, 123, 674 A.2d 510, 511 (1996) (quoting MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101(A) (1980». 
625. See Keehan, 342 Md. at 123, 674 A.2d at 511. 
626. See id. 
627. See id. at 125, 674 A.2d at 512 (citing In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 199-
200, 316 A.2d 246, 248 (1974». 
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tioned criteria; however, petitioner had not satisfied his present 
qualifications and competence to practice law.628 Therefore, the court 
concluded that Keehan could be admitted to the bar if he successfully 
passes the comprehensive Maryland bar exam. 629 
Laura L. Chester 
B. Failure to keep client funds in escrow, using client funds for 
improper purposes, and engaging in dishonest conduct by obliging 
a client's request not to disburse funds in order for the client's son 
to receive more financial assistance for college warrants an 
indefinite suspension from the practice of law for at least one year. 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Glenn 630 
1. Facts 
The Attorney Grievance Commission filed a petition for disci-
plinary action against John Wheeler Glenn alleging violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. On at least two different occasions, 
the funds that Glenn held for clients in escrow accounts were less 
than what was owed to the clients, and money had to be added to 
the escrow account from Glenn's private funds before checks could 
be issued to the clients. Glenn claimed that he was not aware of this 
problem because his bookkeepers were in charge of maintaining 
balances. 631 On at least one occasion, Glenn was told by a bookkeeper 
that his accounts were "in a jumble" but he took no measures to 
resolve the problem. Judge Clifton J. Gordy of the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City made findings of fact and concluded that Glenn 
had violated the following: (1) Maryland Rule of Professional Con-
duct 1.1S(a) because he did not keep his own property separate from 
client funds;632 (2) Maryland Rule BU 9 because he used funds 
628. Sre ide 
629. Sre ide at 126, 674 A.2d at 512-13. He must also pay all costs of the review 
proceeding and will be subject to character updates. See ide 
630. 341 Md. 448, 671 A.2d 463 (1996). 
631. See ide at 452, 671 A.2d at 465. The court found that because Respondent 
was the only person able to sign the checks from the escrow accounts, he 
should have been aware that the clients' funds were being withdrawn. See ide 
at 466, 671 A.2d at 472. There was a manual detailing the procedures that a 
bookkeeper should follow to ensure that sufficient funds were in the escrow 
account, but the bookkeepers testified that they told Glenn they did not 
understand the instructions. See ide at 487, 671 A.2d at 482. 
632. See ide at 457, 671 A.2d at 467. "A lawyer shall hold property of clients or 
third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation 
separate from the lawyer's own property .... " Id. (citing MD. R. PROF. 
CONDUCT 10.5(a». 
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required to be in trust for an unauthorized purpose;633 (3) Rule S.3(b) 
and (c) for allowing bookkeepers to engage in conduct that was 
incompatible with his legal obligations;634 and (4) Section 10-306 of 
the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland for using trust money for a purpose other than 
that for which it was entrusted to the lawyer.63s Judge Gordy also 
found that Glenn violated Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c) by 
withholding a client's settlement in order for his client's child to 
receive greater financial assistance for his college tuition. 636 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals makes an independent review of the record 
to determine whether attorney misconduct has occurred.637 Here, the 
court agreed with Judge Gordy that all violations occurred with the 
exception of the Section 10-306 of the Business Occupations and 
Professions Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 638 The court 
determined that "in order to trigger disciplinary proceedings under 
the Maryland Rules ... [section] 10-307 [of the Business Occupations 
and Professions Article] requires that the attorney's violation of 
633. [d. at 457,671 A.2d at 467. "An attorney ... may not borrow or pledge any 
foods . . . to be deposited in an attorney trust account . . . or use any funds 
for an unauthorized purpose." [d. at 459, 667 A.2d at 468 (quoting MD. R. 
BU 9). 
634. See id. at 457, 671 A.2d at 467. "[W]ith respect to a nonlawyer employed or 
retained by or associated with a lawyer: (b) a lawyer having direct supervisory 
authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer 
.... " [d. at 462, 671 A.2d at 470 (quoting MD. R. 5.3(b». 
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that 
would be a violation of the rules of professional conduct if engaged 
in by a lawyer if: (1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the 
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a 
partner in the law firm which the person is employed, or has direct 
supervisory authority over that person, and knows of the conduct at 
the time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails 
to take reasonable remedial action. 
[d. at 466, 671 A.2d at 471-72 (quoting MD. R. 5.3(c». 
635. See id. at 457, 671 A.2d at 467. "A lawyer may not use trust money for any 
purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the 
lawyer." [d. at 482, 671 A.2d at 479 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & 
PROF. § 10-306 (1995». 
636. See id. at 457, 671 A.2d at 467. "It is unprofessional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepre-
sentation." [d. at 460, 671 A.2d at 469 (quoting MD. R. PROF. CONDUCT 
8.4(c». 
637. See id. at 470, 671 A.2d at 473-74. 
638. See id. at 482-83, 671 A.2d at 479-80. 
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section 10-306 be willful. "639 The court held that Judge Gordy erred 
in finding that Glenn willfully misused escrow funds in violation of 
section 10-306 simply because there was "absence of evidence that 
the escrow deficit was caused by an appropriate reimbursement or 
legal fee."64O Therefore, the court held that Glenn did not violate 
section 10-306. 
After determining that misconduct occurred, the court determines 
the appropriate sanction to "protect the public and the integrity of 
the legal profession." 641 Although Glenn had been an upstanding 
member of the bar and been involved in numerous beneficial activ-
ities, the court found that he knowingly misappropriated funds and 
"breached his legal duty to the legal profession and to the public. "642 
Thus, he was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and 
not able to apply for reinstatement for at least one year. 643 
Laura L. Chester 
C. Willful failure to file tax returns and to pay taxes in a timely 
fashion is conduct that is inherently prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and thus warrants suspension from the 
practice of law. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Breschi644 
1. Facts 
George Armando Breschi failed to file his federal income taxes 
for the years 1989 and 1990. During 1989 and 1990, Breschi was 
counsel in a demanding case which occupied most of his time. In 
the beginning of 1991, Respondent experienced several traumatic 
occurrences involving family members and the death of his partner 
in legal practice. Respondent pleaded guilty to willfully failing to file 
an income tax return in 1989. 645 Judge Byrnes of the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore County determined that Breschi's failure to file a tax 
return for 1989 constituted "engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice" in violation of Maryland Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.4(d). Bar counsel took exception to Judge 
Byrnes's conclusion of law that the disciplinary charges were based 
only on Breschi's failure to file his 1989 tax return and not his 
639. Id. at 482, 671 A.2d at 479. 
640. Id. at 482, 671 A.2d at 480. 
641. Id. at 483, 671 A.2d at 480. 
642. Id. at 484, 671 A.2d at 481. 
643. See id. at 491, 671 A.2d at 484. 
644. 340 Md. 590, 667 A.2d 659 (1994). 
645. See I.R.C. § 7203 (1988). 
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failure· to file his 1990 tax return because the criminal prosecution 
did not include this charge. Counsel argued that the charges also 
included Breschi's failure to file a 1990 tax return. 
2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland makes the ultimate decision 
as to whether professional rules have been violated646 by independently 
reviewing the record to determine that the hearing judge's fi~dings 
of fact were based upon clear and convincing evidence.647 Once this 
is determined, the court of appeals then determines the appropriate 
sanction. 648 The court held that absence of prosecution for the year 
1990 does not mean that a Rule had not been violated, nor does late 
payment of all monies due.649 Although Breschi was not prosecuted 
for his failure to file his 1990 tax returns and pay his taxes in a 
timely fashion, it is still "conduct that is prejudicial t(> the admin-
istration of justice. "650 
Next, the court determined the appropriate sanction for Breschi. 
The main purpose of disciplining an attorney is not to punish the 
attorney, but to protect the public from an unscrupulous practitioner 
and "maintain public trust in the legal profession by demonstrating 
intolerance for unprofessional conduct. ''651 The court may consider 
initigating factors and give a lesser sanction for compelling extenuating 
circumstances. 652 Although Breschi experienced extremely difficult cir-
cumstances and was very remorseful, his first failure to file his taxes 
was the result of a trial and not his subsequent tragic events. Further-
more, he paid his personal expenses before his taxes.653 The court 
balanced the initigating circumstances against the respondent's voluntary 
and intentional violation of a known legal obligation and imposed a 
sanction of a six month suspension from the practice of law.6S4 
Laura L. Chester 
646. See Breschi, 340 Md. at 599, 667 A.2d at 663 (citing Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1982». 
647. See id. at 599, 667 A.2d at 664 (citing MD. R. BVIO(d». 
648. See id. (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Boyd, 333 Md. 298, 303, 635 
A.2d 382, 384 (1994». 
649. See id. 
650. [d. 
651. [d. at 601, 667 A.2d at 665 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Myers, 333 
Md. 440,446-47,635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994». 
652. See id. (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 587, 664 
A.2d 854, 858 (1995». 
653. See id. at 602, 667 A.2d at 665. From 1989 through 1991, Respondent made 
payments on three cars and paid his children's private schools' tuition. See id. 
654. See id. at 604, 667 A.2d at 666-67. 
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D. Disbarment in Maryland is an appropriate sanction for an 
attorney convicted in the District of Columbia of unlawful 
solicitation of money from an indigent client when the attorney 
was appointed as counsel under the Criminal Justice Act. Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Willcher6ss 
1. Facts 
In the District of Columbia, in 1982, Arthur L. Willcher was 
appointed to represent an indigent client pursuant to the Criminal 
Justice Act. At two different times, Willcher unlawfully demanded 
money from his client and his client's parents.6S6 Willcher was con-
victed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for "unlaw-
ful solicitation of money from an indigent whom he had been 
appointed to represent under the criminal justice act. "6S7 Willcher 
had already been indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in 
Maryland on February 11, 1980 by an order of the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland.6s8 
2~ Analysis 
The only issue on appeal was whether disbarment was an ap-
propriate sanction for the unlawful acts Willcher committed in Wash-
ington D.C., which occurred after his suspension in Maryland.6s9 
When Maryland and the District of Columbia have addressed the 
same issues of misconduct, Maryland frequently imposes the same 
sanction. 660 When cases of similar misconduct arise in Maryland and 
another jurisdiction, Maryland considers the unique facts and cir-
cumstances of the case, as well as the sanction imposed by the other 
jurisdiction, with the goal of consistency.661 
The respondent's conviction was based upon fraud, deceit, and 
dishonesty.662 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has consistently 
655. 340 Md. 217, 665 A.2d 1059 (1995). 
656. See id. at 220, 665 A.2d at 1060. The practice of soliciting money from indigent 
clients is unlawful when one is appointed as counsel under the Criminal Justice 
Act. See id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2606(b) (1981». 
657. Willcher, 340 Md. at 220, 665 A.2d at 1060. The conviction was affirmed on 
appeal. See In re Willcher, 408 A.2d 67 (D.C. App. 1979). 
658. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Willcher, 287 Md. 74,411 A.2d 83 (1980). 
Willcher's crimes did not involve fraud or dishonesty. See id. at 79, 411 A.2d 
at 85. 
659. See Willcher, 340 Md. at 221, 665 A.2d at 1061. 
660. See id. 
661. See id. at 222, 665 A.2d at 1061 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. 
Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987». 
662. See id. 
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held that absent compelling circumstances, crimes involving fraud, 
deceit and dishonesty will" warrant disbarment.663 Because there was 
no evidence of compelling reasons not to disbar the petitioner, the 
court held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction. 664 
Laura L. Chester 
E. Indefinite suspension of attorney for misappropriation of client 
funds caused by alcoholism was appropriate under prior Maryland 
law; however, in the future, when an attorney faces disbarment, 
alcoholism will no longer be a mitigating factor absent truly 
compelling circumstances. Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Kenney66S 
1. Facts 
The Attorney Grievance Commission filed a petition for disci-
plinary action against Respondent Samuel F. Kenney alleging viola-
tions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland referred the case to the Honorable Dana M. Levitz of 
the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore County "to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law."666 Judge Levitz found that 
Respondent violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
when Kenney misappropriated at least two different clients' funds. 
Judge Levitz also found that Kenney commingled clients' funds with 
his law practice and personal funds.667 Judge Levitz concluded that 
"the Respondent's alcoholism, was to a substantial extent, 'the 
663. See id. (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 292, 614 
A.2d 102, 110 (1992». 
664. See id. at 223, 665 A.2d at 1061-62. 
665. 339 Md. 578, 664 A.2d 854 (1995). 
666. [d. at 579, 664 A.2d at 854. 
667. The Respondent was found to have violated the following Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Rule 1.1 - Competence; Rule 1.3 - Diligence; Rule 1.4 - Com-
munication; Rule 1.15 - Safekeeping Property; and Rule 8.4 - Misconduct. 
It was also concluded that Respondent violated Section 10-306 of the Business 
Occupations and Professions Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland for 
using money for a purpose other than that for which the money was entrusted 
to him. In addition it was concluded that the Respondent did not comply with 
the Tax-General Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland because he failed 
to withhold income taxes from his employees' wages. See id. at 582, 664 A.2d 
at 855-56. Kenney was convicted of theft in a separate proceeding for with-
drawing $38,800.00 from a client's account for his personal use. See id. at 
582, 664 A.2d at 856. 
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responsible, the precipitating, the root cause' of the Respondent's 
misappropriation of trust and client funds. ''668 The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland adopted Judge Levitz's findings of facts and conclusions 
of law and suspended Kenney indefinitely from the practice of law. 
2. Analysis 
An attorney who misappropriates a client's funds will generally 
be disbarred absent compelling extenuating circumstances.669 The 
court acknowledged that alcoholism had been considered to be a 
mitigating factor warranting a sanction less severe than disbarment 
when an attorney had misappropriated funds provided that "the 
alcoholism, to a substantial extent, was the responsible, the precipi-
tating, the root cause of the misappropriation."67o Because Judge 
Levitz specifically concluded this causal connection between the al-
coholism and the misconduct, the Respondent was indefinitely sus-
pended from the practice of law rather than disbarred.671 The court 
of appeals warned, however, that it will no longer consider alcoholism 
as a mitigating factor when determining sanctions for professional 
misconduct, absent truly compelling circumstances. 672 
Laura L. Chester 
F. After an attorney has been suspended from the practice of law 
for a stated period, he may be readmitted to the bar only if he has 
complied with all the terms of the suspension, which includes not 
engaging in the practice of law. Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
James673 
1. Facts 
Petitioner Richard Allen James was suspended from the Mary-
land Bar for one year.674 During his year suspension, James claimed 
668. Id. at 586, 664 A.2d at 858. 
669. See id. at 587, 664 A.2d at 858 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 
323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991». When facing disbarment a 
compelling circumstance will be found only as the result of intensely strained 
circumstances. See id. at 588, 664 A.2d at 859 (quoting Bar Ass'n of Baltimore 
City v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 527, 340 A.2d 712, 713 (1975». 
670. Id. at 588-89, 664 A.2d at 859 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. White, 
328 Md. 412, 418, 614 A.2d 955, 959 (1992». 
671. See id. at 595, 664 A.2d at 862. 
672. See id. at 591, 664 A.2d at 860. 
673. 340 Md. 318, 666 A.2d 1246 (1995). 
674. See id. at 320, 666 A.2d at 1246. 
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that he arranged for Eugene M. Brennan to come to his office and 
take over his practice while he merely continued to work there as a 
paralegal or as a law clerk for Brennan. However, James's actions 
were inconsistent with his claims. The building directory continued 
to list James's name as the only attorney working from the office, 
and two different phone directories continued to list James as an 
attorney. Brennan did not enter into separate fee agreements with 
James's former clients, nor was there any evidence James was com-
pensated for any work he did for Brennan. Although Brennan entered 
his appearance in James's cases pending in court, James did not 
strike his appearance. Further, James signed Brennan's name on 
papers to be filed with the court and, at least on one occasion, 
signed a motion in his own name. Lastly, James held negotiations 
on a client's behalf with an insurance representative. Due to these 
facts, Judge McKee of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County 
found that James continued to practice law during his period of 
suspension. 
2. Analysis 
An attorney who has been suspended from the bar may only be 
readmitted if he files a verified statement saying that he has fully 
complied with all the terms of the suspension, and the Bar Counsel 
informs the court that the attorney has satisfactorily complied with 
the terms of the suspension.67s An attorney may not practice law 
during his suspension. 676 
Ultimately, the court of appeals determines whether a person 
has engaged in the practice of law.677 The factors the court considers 
when determining whether a person has engaged in the practice of 
law include "[u]tilizing legal education, training, and experience [to 
apply] the special analysis of the profession to a client's problem. "678 
Due to the acts in which James continued to engage, the court held 
that Judge McKee was not clearly erroneous in finding that James 
continued to practice law.679 Consequently, James was ordered to 
serve a one year suspension. 680 
Laura L. Chester 
675. See id. at 320, 666 A.2d at 1248 (quoting MD. R. BV13a.2). 
676. See id. at 320, 666 A.2d at 1247 (quoting MD. R. BV13a.2). 
677. See id at 323, 666 A.2d at 1248 (citing Public Servo Comm'n v. Hahn Transp., 
Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583, 253 A.2d 845, 852 (1969». 
678. Id. (quoting Kenney v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, Inc., 316 Md. 646, 
662, 561 A.2d 200, 208 (1989». 
679. See id. at 333, 666 Md. at 1253. 
680. See id. 
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VIII. PROPERTY LAW 
A. The vendor's failure to provide a disclosure or disclaimer 
statement to the purchaser does not make a contract of sale void 
thereby immunizing the vendor from the purchaser's suit for 
specific performance. Romm v. Fla)(>8.1 
1. Facts 
On February 19, 1994, Lawrence and Elaine Flax (the Flaxes) 
entered into a contract. to sell their home to Barry and Marcy Romm 
(the Romms). The Flaxes did not provide, and the Romms did not 
request, a disclosure statement before signing the contract. On March 
4, 1994, the Flaxes informed the Romms that the contract was void 
due to their own failure to provide a disclosure or disclaimer state-
ment. The Romms filed a compliant for specific performance on 
March 17, 1994.682 
2. Analysis 
Section 10-702 of the Real Property Article of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland provides that if a written residential property 
disclosure statement is "delivered by the Seller later than three (3) 
days after the Seller enters into a contract witb the Purchaser, the 
contract is void.''683 The Court of Appeals of Maryland was called 
upon to define the term void, when the seller claims that his failure 
to provide the disclosure statement renders the contract of sale void, 
although the contract is otherwise valid. 684 The court declined to 
allow the statute to be interpreted so as to allow the seller to create, 
in essence, an option contract, exercisable by the seller only, every 
time a disclosure statement is not given.68s 
The court stated that to read the term "void" literally is incon-
sistent with the legislative intent to grant rescission rights to the 
681. 340 Md. 690, 668 A.2d 1 (1995). 
682. A suit praying for specific performance is an equitable proceeding, granted by 
the court's discretion only when there is not an adequate remedy at law. See 
GEORGE W. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 4479 (1963). However, when a 
contract for the sale of real estate is entered into, specific performance is 
granted as a matter of right because real estate is considered unique, making 
all other remedies inadequate. See id. 
683. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702 (1995). 
684. See Romm, 340 Md. at 693, 668 A.2d at 2. 
685. See id. at 695, 668 A.2d at 3. 
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purchaser only when a disclosure statement is not provided.686 Ad-
ditionally, the court referred to prior decisions in which it refused 
to interpret "null and void" provisions of contracts literally where 
to do so would allow one party to frustrate enforcement of a contract 
by preventing a condition precedent.687 
The holding prohibits a seller from having a three day period 
in which they would have unilateral control over whether the contract 
of sale would be fully executed, when the seller fails to provide a 
disclosure statement. The term "void" in Section 1O-702(g)(1) of the 
Real Property Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland means a 
contract of sale is "voidable at the option of the purchaser" when 
the purchaser fails to provide the required disclosure statement.688 
Christopher 1. Marchand 
B. Failure to foreclose an equity of redemption constitutes an 
encumbrance created by the purchaser, thereby violating a special 
covenant against encumbrances given to a purchaser. Magraw v. 
DilloWS9 
1. Facts 
James S. Magraw owned an undivided 5/6 interest in 5.09 acres 
located in Cecil County. The owner of the remaining 116 was Helen 
Squires, who died intestate in 1947. In 1983, in an attempt to acquire 
the 116 interest, Magraw allowed his property tax payments to fall 
into arrears until a tax sale proceeding was instituted. Magraw and 
his wife bought the property at the tax sale and then attempted to 
foreclose the equity of redemption. Due to an inaccurate search of 
the record's of the Orphan's Court, however, they failed to properly 
notify the heirs of Squires. Consequently, the attempt to foreclose 
the equity of redemption on the 116 interest was ineffective and 
"[t]he right of redemption in the tax sale exist[ed] in perpetuity until 
such time as that right of redemption [was] foreclosed by proper 
legal proceedings." 690 
In 1988, the Magraws sold the property to Robert M. Dillow. 
The deeds contained a special covenant against encumbrances. Dillow 
686. Sre id. 
687. Sre id. at 696, 668 A.2d at 4 (citing Brewer v. Sowers, 118 Md. 681, 86 A. 
228 (1912». 
688. [d. at 697, 668 A.2d at 4. 
689. 341 Md. 492, 671 A.2d 485 (1996). 
690. [d. at 507, 671 A.2d at 492 (citing Brashears v. Collison, 207 Md. 339, 351-
54, 115 A.2d 289, 295-96 (1955». 
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proceeded to improve the property. When he applied for a loan, 
however, he was told that he did not have good and marketable title 
due to the deficient attempt to foreclose the equity of redemption 
belonging to the heirs of Squire. 
Dillow brought suit in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Cecil 
County claiming that the Magraws: breached the special warranty 
contained in the deeds; breached the covenant against encumbrances; 
breached express and implied covenants of merchantable title; and 
that they were negligent in their handling of the foreclosure sale. 
The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim 
and Dillow appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
The court of special appeals reversed with respect to the breach of 
the special covenant against encumbrances and remanded to the 
circuit court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari. 
The court of appeals affirmed the court of special appeals and 
remanded to the circuit court. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals focused on the issue of whether the property 
was actually encumbered, and if so, whether the Magraws created 
the encumbrance and thereby violated the special covenant against 
encumbrances.691 
The court weighed six factors to determine if the equity of 
redemption constituted an encumbrance: 692 
(1) A right or interest in land; (2) subsisting in a third party; 
(3) diminishing the value of the property purchased; (4) but 
not so much that the grantee received no title at all; (5) but 
must have preexisted the contract of sale and be breached, 
if at all, at the time of conveyance; and (6) the subject 
property must be in the hands of the covenantee and not a 
remote purchaser. 693 
The court found all six factors to be present in the case at bar. 694 
Additionally, the court held that the Magraws created the encum-
brance because they created the defect in the foreclosure proceed-
ing.69s 
The court held that the unforeclosed equity of redemption con-
stituted an encumbrance and that the Magraws created the encum-
691. See id. at 504, 671 A.2d at 490-91. 
692. See id. at 509, 671 A.2d at 493. 
693. [d. 
694. See id. at 510-11, 671 A.2d at 494. 
695. See id. at 512, 671 A.2d at 495. 
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brance because they created the defect in the foreclosure proceedings.696 
By creating the encumbrance through their own actions, the Magraws 
violated the special covenant against encumbrances that they conveyed 
to Dillow. 697 The court remanded the case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings.698 
Christopher J. Marchand 
C. A sheriff's failure to execute a warrant of restitution because 
the tenant has vacated the premises or is no longer in default does 
not constitute grounds for refund of the required fee under Section 
7-402(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland. Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam 
v. Aluisl'99 
1. Facts 
The law firm of Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam (the Firm) 
advanced on behalf of its client the fees collected by the Prince 
George's County sheriff in connection with summary ejectment pro-
ceedings. The Firm paid the five-dollar required fee for the service 
of summary ejectment papers, which were served by the sheriff. 700 
Additionally, the Firm paid the thirty-dollar fee for the execution of 
the warrant after judgment had been entered granting a warrant of 
restitution. 701 The Firm argued that this provision required the sheriff 
to refund the thirty-dollar fee charged for execution of the warrant 
of restitution because it was never executed.702 
2. Analysis 
The court first looked at Section 7-402(d) of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland to 
696. See id. at 511, 671 A.2d at 494. 
697. See id. A special covenant against encumbrances does not run with the land, 
however, it is enforceable between the coventor and the coventee and, therefore, 
it was enforceable between Magraw and Dillon. See id. 
698. See id. at 512, 671 A.2d at 495. 
699. 341 Md. 115, 668 A.2d 929 (1995). 
700. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 7-402(a)(l) (1995) (prescribing five-
dollar fee for service of summary ejectment papers). 
701. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 7-402(a)(3) (1995) (prescribing 
thirty-dollar fee for execution of warrant of restitution). 
702. The opinion seemed to indicate that the tenant vacated the premises. See Aluisi, 
341 Md. at 124, 668 A.2d at 934. 
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determine the plain meaning of the language and the purpose of the 
statute. 703 Section 7-402(d) provides that "[i]f the sheriff is unable to 
serve a paper, the fee shall be refunded to the party requesting the 
service.' '704 A warrant of restitution is not a document to be served 
upon the tenant, but commands the sheriff to remove the tenant and 
all of his belongings and to put the landlord in possession of the 
premises. 70S According to the plain meaning of section 7-402(d), the 
warrant is not a paper to be served, and thus, falls outside of the 
scope for a refund under section 7-402(d).706 Additionally, the purpose 
of the warrant, which is to eject the tenant and put the landlord in 
possession, can be fulfilled even when the sheriff does not execute 
the warrant. 707 The court stated that the mere issuance of the warrant 
"coupled with the sheriff's availability and duty to execute it" may 
be enough to prompt the tenant to vacate the premises, fulfilling the 
goal of the warrant.7OS Therefore, the court held that the thirty-dollar 
fee paid for a warrant of restitution is not refundable under section 
7-402(d) when the sheriff does not have to eject a tenant from the 
premises because the tenant has vacated before the sheriff executes 
the warrant. 709 
Christopher J. Marchand 
D. The status of a confessed judgment is not affected when the 
state court "opens" the judgment for a hearing on the merits 
without affirmatively stating that the judgment lien is preserved. 
Schlossberg v. Citizens Bank710 
1. Facts 
On March 22, 1991, Citizens Bank of Maryland (Citizens Bank) 
obtained confessed judgments against G. David Broyles and Emily 
E. Broyles (The Broyleses), based on the Broyleses' guarantees of 
certain corporate debts. Citizens Bank recorded the judgments in the 
Circuit Court of Maryland for Worcester County, thereby obtaining 
a lien on the Broyleses' condominium in Ocean City. Subsequently, 
703. See id. at 119, 668 A.2d at 931-32. 
704. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 7-402(d) (1995). 
705. See Aluisi, 341 Md. at 123, 668 A.2d at 934; see also MD. CODE ANN., REAL 
PROP. § 8-401(d)(I) (1995). 
706. See Aluisi, 341 Md. at 123, 668 A.2d at 933. 
707. See id. at 127, 668 A.2d at 935-36. 
708. [d. 
709. See id. at 127-28, 668 A.2d at 936. 
710. 341 Md. 650, 672 A.2d 625 (1996). 
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the clerk of courts for Prince George's County served the Broyleses 
with notice of the entry of judgment by confession. 7lI In the Circuit 
Court of Maryland for Prince George's County, the Broyleses moved 
to vacate the confessed jUdgment.712 On November 12, 1992, pursuant 
to the Broyleses' motion, the circuit court opened the confessed 
judgments for a hearing on the merits without affirmatively stating 
that the judgment lien would be preserved. 713 However, prior to' the 
opening of the confessed judgment, the Broyleses filed for chapter 
seven bankruptcy. Citizens Bank sought to proceed with its confessed 
judgment in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Prince George's 
County, in order to execute upon its judgment lien in Worcester 
County, and asked the.bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic 
stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code.714 The Broyleses argued that 
the stay should not be lifted because the lien was no longer enforce-
able due to the fact that the judgment had been opened. Citizens 
Bank argued that the stay should be granted to allow them to enforce 
the judgment and that the opening of the confessed judgment had 
no effect on the lien.71S The bankruptcy court ordered the stay lifted 
and the Broyles ~ppealed to the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland which affirmed the ruling. The Broyleses then 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit certified, inter alia, the fol-
lowing question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland: "Pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 2-611(d), what is the effect on the lien status of a 
confessed judgment when the state court 'opens' the judgment for a 
hearing on the merits without affirmatively stating that the judgment 
lien is preserved?" 716 
711. See id. at 655, 672 A.2d at 627 (noting that, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-
. 621(b), recording a judgment in a county constitutes a lien on a defendant's 
interest in land located in that county). 
712. The motion was first denied by the circuit court. On appeal to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, the court reversed and remanded the case to the 
circuit court to open the confessed judgment for a hearing on the merits. See 
id. 
713. See id. at 653-54, 672 A.2d at 626. The defendant may move to open, modify, 
or vacate the confessed judgment. See MD. R. 2-611(b) (1995). The court may 
order the confessed judgment opened, modified, or vacated. See MD. R. 2-
611(d) (1995). 
714. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). 
715. "The automatic stay imposed by II U.S.C. § 362 (1994) bars creditors from 
enforcing judgments against debtors who have filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion. . .. [However] a creditor may file a motion seeking relief from the 
automatic stay to allow the creditor to enforce the judgment." Schlossberg, 
341 Md. at 654, 672 A.2d at 627. 
716. [d. at 654-55, 672 A.2d at 627. 
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2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that under Maryland 
Rule 2-611 the court can open, modify, or vacate the confessed 
judgment and that each option "has a different effect on the status 
of the judgment. "717 The court held that when a confessed judgment 
is opened the judgment is not destroyed; rather, the judgment is set 
aside to be examined, even if the judgment is not expressly preserved 
by the court.71S Conversely, the court stated that when a confessed 
judgment is vacated the lien is destroyed. 719 However, in the case at 
bar, the confessed judgment was not vacated. It was opened only 
for a hearing on the merits and the court's answer to the certified 
question was that "a judgment lien remains valid when a court 
'opens' a confessed judgment for a hearing on the merits ... and 
the priority of the lien is not affected by the opening. Further, [the 
court held] . . . no affirmative language is necessary to preserve the 
lien when a confessed judgment is opened." 720 
Christopher J. Marchand 
E. Unpaid subcontractors did not state a claim for unjust 
enrichment or a claim to set aside foreclosure sale on fraud 
grounds when the developer/mortgagor never fully paid the general 
contractor and subsequently the bank foreclosed and partially 
financed the purchase the property, thereby extinguishing the 
subcontractors mechanics' liens. Bennett Heating & Air 
Conditioning Inc. v. NationsBank721 
1. Facts 
In a construction contract, the developer did not fully pay the 
general contractor for work done, and the general contractor, in 
turn, did not pay the subcontractors (Bennett) for the work they did. 
Subsequently, the developer defaulted on the mortgage and Nations 
Bank, the mortgagee, foreclosed. The mechanics' liens that were 
established before the foreclosure sale were extinguished due to lack 
of any surplus over the senior mortgage debt. Bennett argued that 
since the developer "did not pay [the general contractor] in full ... 
717. [d. at 657, 672 A.2d at 628. 
718. See id. at 659, 672 A.2d at 629. 
719. See id. The court did not address what happens when the confessed judgment 
is modified. 
720. [d. at 660, 672 A.2d at 630. 
721. 342 Md. 169, 674 A.2d 534 (1996). 
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it is unjust for the [developer] and its successors or alter egos in title 
to retain the benefits without having paid their value. "722 Addition-
ally, Bennett argued that the foreclosure sale was "a sham" and 
should be set aside because "[a] subsidiary of the Bank bought in 
at the sale and assigned its rights as purchaser to a new entity which 
acquired the Property by utilizing . . . funds borrowed from the 
Bank on the security of a new mortgage on the Property. "723 
2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that since the subcon-
tractor was not a party to the original developer-general contractor 
agreement, they do not have a claim for unjust enrichment against 
the developer.724 The court stated that the· proper action in this 
situation is one usirig garnishment or subrogation to enforce Bennett's 
claim against the general contractor and against any funds retained 
by the original landowner. 72S Additionally, the court held that the 
foreclosure sale could not be set aside. It is legal for the secured 
party to buy in at the foreclosure sale,726 even if the public sale was 
intended by the mortgagee to wipe out junior liens.727 "[TJhe motives 
of the mortgagee or of his assigns in acquiring and in foreclosing a 
mortgage cannot set up as a defense to a foreclosure .... "728 The 
complaint must allege improper conduct by the mortgagee to set 
aside a foreclosure sale.729 Thus, the court held that Bennett's com-
plaint failed to state a claim upon which restitution could be granted. 
Christopher J. Marchand 
722. Id. at 180, 674 A.2d at 539. 
723. Id. at 175, 674 A.2d at 537. 
724. See id. at 182, 674 A.2d at 540. 
725. See id. at 184, 674 A.2d at 541 (quoting 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 698 
(1993». 
726. See id. at 186, 674 A.2d at 542 (citing MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-
105(e) (1996». 
727. See id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-108 (1996». 
728. Id. at 187, 674 A.2d at 543 (quoting Southern Md. Oil, Inc. v. Kaminetz, 260 
Md. 443, 453, 272 A.2d 641, 646 (1971». The court's concern with these 
parties is that there was not an intent to suppress bidding at the sale. See id. 
at 191, 674 A.2d at 541. 
729. See id. 
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F. When deciding whether an appeal to the circuit court is to be 
heard de novo or on the record in a rent escrow case, the court 
must determine the amount in controversy by the amount in 
escrow when an appeal is not based on a right to, or obligation 
jor, continued possession by the tenant. Ro v. Heredia730 
1. Facts 
On August 24, 1993, Duk Hee Ro entered into a one year lease 
with Raymond Heredia, Sean Murphy, and William Hines (the 
Tenants).731 The Tenants paid the rent through November, but be-
cause the property was in disrepair, the Tenants deposited the two 
following months rent, totalling $1700, in an escrow account pursuant 
to Section 8-211 of the Real Property Article of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland. The district court found that Ro was entitled· to the 
$1700 in the escrow. However, on appeal, the circuit court conducted 
a de novo hearing and reversed the district court. The circuit court 
entered judgment in favor of the Tenants in the amount of $4,476.67; 
$2,776.67 for rent paid from August through November plus the 
$1,700.00 in the escrow account. Ro appealed to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, arguing that the appeal should have been dismissed 
because the amount in controversy exceeded $2500 which would have 
required the appeal to be heard on the record. Thus, the appellants 
were required to order a transcript and they did not.732 
2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with the circuit court 
and held that the appeal was properly heard de novo because the 
amount in controversy, in a rent escrow case which is not based 
upon the right to possession, is determined by the amount in escrow. 
The court applied the "Purvis test," which states that the amount 
in controversy should be determined by "look[ing] to the demand in 
the pleading setting forth the plaintiff's claim, including any amend-
ments in the trial court. "733 However, the court of appeals held that 
the circuit court erred in entering judgment in the amount exceeding 
730. 341 Md. 302, 670 A.2d 459 (1996). 
731. See id. at 304, 670 A.2d at 460. 
732. If an appeal is heard on the record a transcript must be filed with the circuit 
court. See MD. R. 7-113(b). Generally, if an appeal is heard de novo it proceeds 
in accordance with the rules governing cases instituted in the circuit court 
which does not require a transcript to be filed. See MD. R. 7-112(3). 
733. Heredia, 341 Md. at 308, 670 A.2d at 462 (quoting Purvis v. Forrest Street 
Apartments, 286 Md. 398, 402, 408 A.2d 388, 390 (1979». 
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that which was in escrow. The circuit court erred when it granted 
the Tenant's motion to amend the complaint to include the security 
deposit claim which was not claimed at trial. 734 The court of appeals 
explained that a tenant should not be permitted to "exclude existing 
claims from the computation of the amount in controversy at the 
time of appeal, in order to proceed de novo in the circuit court, and 
then add those previously existing claims to the controversy once the 
matter is in the circuit court. '1735 
Christopher J. Marchand 
G. Maryland forfeiture statute mandates that a complaint 
application to institute a forfeiture action must contain an executed 
show cause order and be submitted within 90 days after the final 
disposition of the criminal proceeding. Prince George's County v. 
Vieira736 
1. Facts 
Prince George's County Police seized $7850 from Anthony Wilfred 
Vieira when they arrested him for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Eighty-nine days after sentencing, Prince George's County filed a 
Complaint for Forfeiture of Currency, however, a show cause order 
was not filed until 104 days after the final disposition of the criminal 
case. Vieira argued that the requirement of Section 297(d)(2)(i) of 
Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, that an executed 
show cause order be filed within ninety days following final dispo-
sition of a criminal proceeding, was not fulfilled by Prince George's 
County. Therefore, Vieira concluded, his due process rights were 
violated, and the forfeiture action should be dismissed. Prince George's 
County argued that section 297(d)(2)(i) only requires a proposed show 
cause order to be filed within ninety days, not an executed show 
cause order. 
2. Analysis 
In order to institute a proceeding for forfeiture of money, under 
Maryland's forfeiture statute, an application must be by complaint, 
affidavit, and show cause order.737 The function of a show cause 
734. Sa? id. at 304, 670 A.2d at 460. 
735. Id. at 310, 670 A.2d at 463. 
736. 340 Md. 651, 667 A.2d 898 (1995). 
737. See id. at 657, 667 A.2d at 901 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 297(d)(2)(i) 
(1996». 
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order is to notify a person that a forfeiture action has been instituted 
and that failure to answer the complaint may result in forfeiting 
property.738 The Court of Appeals of Maryland stated, on the other 
hand, that a proposed show cause order does not properly notify 
the defendant; therefore, the legislature intended an executed show 
cause order and not a proposed one be filed along with the com-
plaint. 739 Additionally, the language of the statute mandates that the 
a complaint application be made within ninety days of the final 
disposition of the criminal proceeding and if one is not submitted 
within the time constraints the defendant's property must be returned 
upon defendant's petition. 740 
The court held that because a proposed show cause order and 
not an executed order was filed within ninety days of the final 
disposition of Vieira's criminal proceeding, Vieira's petition for return 
of currency should have been granted.741 
Christopher J. Marchand 
H. An action in trover, not an action in replevin or detinue, is 
the proper action when goods have been converted and not 
returned by a tort-feasor. Wallander v. Barnes742 
1. Facts 
Thomas R. Wallander purchased a Mercedes Benz from Domino 
Motors for $15,500. Chesapeake Industrial Leasing Company, Inc. 
(Chesapeake) financed the purchase under an agreement to lease the 
Mercedes to Wallander for three years with an option to purchase. 
Domino Motors held the Mercedes Benz on consignment from Barnes 
Used Cars (Barnes). Domino Motors never fully paid Barnes for the 
. car, and Barnes had the car repossessed. Two months later Wallander 
sued to recover the car in an action of replevin in the District Court 
of Maryland in Montgomery County. Barnes subsequently transferred 
the title to the car to a dealer in North Carolina. The district court 
ruled that the proceedings no longer were to issue a writ of replevin, 
but that the proceeding was in detinue and entered a judgment for 
738. See id. at 662, 667 A.2d at 903. 
739. See id. 
740. Section 297(d)(2) mandates that "all proceedings relating to money or currency 
. . . shall be instituted within 90 days from the date of final disposition of 
criminal proceedings that arise out of Article 27, §§ 276 through 302, inclusive." 
Id. at 657, 667 A.2d at 901. 
741. See id. at 666-67, 667 A.2d at 546. 
742. 341 Md. 553, 671 A.2d 962 (1996). 
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Wallander in the amount of $3752.25. Wallander appealed asserting 
that he had the right to recover direct and consequential damages in 
a replevin action. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the 
district court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland disagreed with 
both lower courts and Wallander. It held that the since Wallander 
did not seek return of the car and only sought damages, the action 
was in trover. The court of appeals vacated the judgment below and 
remanded to the district court. 
2. Analysis 
An action in replevin is proper when the object of the suit is to 
recover possession of goods and chatte}.743 Here, however, Wallander 
requested the market value of the Mercedes Benz and consequential 
damages. 744 Additionally, the court held that the action was not in 
detinue because the trial judge did not specify the value of the 
property in the judgment.74s The court stated that, "[w]here goods 
have been converted and not returned by the tortfeasor, an action 
in trover lies."746 The court also granted certiorari to determine the 
proper measure of compensatory damages under the circumstances. 
The court stated that Maryland follows the general rule that when 
goods have been converted compensation should be the fair market 
value at the time of the conversion with interest.747 The fact that 
Wallander was leasing the car did not affect his right to sue for full 
value. 748 However, because the action is no longer in replevin, "the 
damages are subject to the monetary jurisdictional limitation of the 
District Court which, for the subject action, is $10,000. "749 
Christopher J. Marchand 
743. See id. at 561, 671 A.2d at 966 (citing 2 JOHN PRENTISS POE, PLEADING AND 
PRACTICE 417 (1925». 
744. See id. at 573, 672 A.2d at 971. 
745. See id. 
746. Id. at 573, 671 A.2d at 971-72 (citing 1 POE, supra note 743, at 44). 
747. See id. at 573-74, 671 A.2d at 972 (citations omitted). 
748. See id. at 575, 671 A.2d at 973 (stating that the lease explicitly places the risk 
of loss on Wallander therefore he had the right to sue for full value of the 
car). 
749. Id. at 578, 671 A.2d at 974. The action became one in tort after being 
converted and, at the time of this action, the monetary limitation was $10,000. 
It has since been changed to $20,000. See id. at 553, 671 A.2d at 965 (citing 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-401(1) (Supp. 1996». 
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IX. STATE LAW, CODE AND REGULATION 
A. Collective bargaining agreement between the county executive 
and a union containing an arbitration provision and a prohibition 
on reduction in jorce does not constitute an impermissible 
delegation oj the County's budget and appropriation junctions. 
Fraternal Order oj Police, Inc. v. Baltimore County750 
1. Facts 
On January 25, 1991, Baltimore County (County) and the Fra-
ternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 4 (Union) entered into a new 
collective bargaining agreement effective for the 1992 fiscal year. The 
Union agreed to a freeze on cost-of-living adjustments for 1992 in 
return for a clause prohibiting a reduction in force by furlough or 
lay-off during that year. The County appropriated funds pursuant 
to the agreement. In January 1992, however, facing a revenue short-
fall, the County enacted a furlough plan for all county employees, 
including the police officers covered by the agreement. The Union 
filed a grievance which was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator 
found that the County had breached the collective bargaining agree-
ment and ordered that all employees covered by the agreement be 
compensated for wages and benefits lost as a result of the furloughs. 
The Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore County vacated 
the award, holding that the county executive had no authority to 
contract away the County's power to regulate compensation of county 
employees.m The Union appealed the circuit court's decision to the 
court of special appeals. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari prior to intermediate appellate review on their own motion 
and reversed. 
2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the arbitrator's 
award holding that the agreement to arbitrate and the provision 
prohibiting a reduction in force did not constitute an impermissible 
delegation of the County's budget and appropriation functions.m 
The court noted that the county executive and the county council 
750. 340 Md. 157, 665 A.2d 1029 (1995). 
751. The court viewed the reduction-in-force prohibition in the collective bargaining 
agreement as "affecting" compensation. See ide at 163, 665 A.2d at 1032. 
752. See ide at 170-72, 665 A.2d at 1035-36. 
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fully exercised their budget and appropriation functions prior to the 
dispute and arbitration.753 Had the council budgeted and appropriated 
less funds pursuant to a furlough plan, the court continued, "the 
budget provisions, and not the collective bargaining agreement's 
terms, would [have] prevail[ed]."7s4 The court concluded that because 
the arbitrator only ordered the County to pay the police officers the 
wages and benefits that had already been appropriated, the arbitra-
tor's award did not constitute an usurpation of the county executive 
and county council legislative discretion.m 
Gabriel A. Terrasa 
B. Contracting the final stages of the manufacturing process does 
not preclude a company from benefiting from the manufacturing 
equipment tax exemption. Comptroller of Treasury v. Disclosure, 
Inc. 7s6 
1. Facts 
Disclosure, Inc. (Disclosure) is a company in the business of 
compiling and selling financial information obtained from various 
public sources. Disclosure makes the information available to its 
customers in a variety of media, including CD-ROM.7S7 In its CD-
ROM production process, Disclosure contracts an outside supplier to 
perform the last stage of the manufacturing process: the physical 
creation of the CD-ROMs.7s8 
The Sales and Use Tax Division of the Comptroller of the 
Treasury (Comptroller) attempted to levy an assessment against Dis-
closure for failure to pay taxes on the purchase of computer equip-
ment used in its CD-ROM production process. Disclosure appealed 
the assessment to the Maryland Tax Court, claiming that the equip-
ment was exempt from taxation as manufacturing equipment used to 
753. See id. at 171, 665 A.2d at 1035-36. 
754. Id 
755. See id. at 170-71, 665 A.2d at 1035-36. 
756. 340 Md. 675, 667 A.2d 910 (1995). 
757. Compact Disk - Read Only Memory. 
758. The production of the CD-ROMs is a multi-step process consisting of: (1) 
optical-scanning the public documents; (2) verifying of the scanned information; 
(3) "stapling" or collating the electronic documents; (4) formatting the elec-
tronic pages into CD-ROM form and encoding them in a magnetic tape; (5) 
creating a "master" CD; and (6) replicating CD-ROMs from the original 
master. Disclosure contracted 3M to perform stages (5)-(6) of the production 
process. See Disclosure, 340 Md. at 679-80, 667 A.2d at 912. 
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produce "tangible personal property for resale." 759 The tax court 
held that most of the equipment was exempt from taxation. The 
Comptroller appealed to the circuit court claiming that Disclosure's 
activities must be separated from the activities performed by the 
outside supplier and that, when so separated, Disclosure's activities 
only yield an intermediate product which is not "tangible personal 
property for resale." The circuit court affirmed the tax court and 
the Comptroller noted an appeal to the court of special appeals. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari on its own motion 
prior to review by the court of special appeals and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals held that work performed by an outside 
contractor cannot be considered in determining whether a company's 
activities are substantial enough to be considered "manufacturing. "760 
The court noted, however, that once it is determined that a company's 
activities constitute "manufacturing" within the meaning of the Tax-
General Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, the fact that 
the company contracts out the last stages of the process resulting in 
the final product for sale does not preclude the compariy from 
benefiting from the manufacturing equipment tax exemption.761 
Gabriel A. Terrasa 
c. Where a candidate for the House of Delegates took 
appropriate steps to evidence domicile in a specific area, that 
candidate fulfilled constitutional residency requirements. Roberts v. 
Lakin762 . 
1. Facts 
Steven S. Lakin and Anthony Roberts were candidates in the 
1994 primary election for the Republican nomination for the delegate 
759. The manufacturing equipment tax exemption is currently found in Section 11-
210(b) of the Tax-General Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. MD. 
CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 11-21O(b) (1994); see also id. § 11-101(d) (defining 
"production activity" as "assembling, manufacturing, processing or refining 
tangible personal property for resale"). 
760. See Disclosure, 340 Md. at 684-85, 667 A.2d at 914-15. An activity can be 
described as "manufacturing" when "a product has gone through a substantial 
transformation in form and uses from its original state." [d. at 684, 667 A.2d 
at 914 (citing Perdue Foods v. State Dep't of Assessment & Taxation, 264 
Md. 228, 237, 286 A.2d 165 (1972». 
761. See id. at 685-87, 667 A.2d at 915-16. 
762. 340 Md. 147, 665 A.2d 1024 (1995). 
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in District 14A. Lakin believed that Roberts had not satisfied the 
residency requirements to run for office. Consequently, Lakin sought 
an order to ban Roberts from the election in the Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Montgomery County. The court determined that Rob-
erts had not met the residency requirements and issued a writ of 
mandamus ordering his name to be stricken from the election ballots. 
Roberts appealed to the court of special appeals, but before the court 
could hear the appeal' the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a 
writ of certiorari. The court of appeals ordered a stay of the judgment 
directing that Roberts be included on the election ballot. 
2. Analysis 
According to Maryland's Constitution, a person is eligible to be 
a delegate if he has resided in the district for six months prior to 
the date of the election. 763 Thus, Roberts must have resided in District 
14A since last May 8, 1994 to have been eligible for the November 
8, 1994 election. 
Before the critical date of May 8, 1994, Roberts availed himself 
to District 14A.764 He began living at his girlfriend's house, in District 
14A, in January 1993. 765 However, Roberts' lease on his apartment, 
outside the district, lasted into mid-I994.766 He continued to use his 
apartment as a business address, and for its pool and racquetball 
court.767 He changed his voter registration to District 14A.768 In August 
1994, Roberts moved into his own apartment in the district. 769 
. The Court of Appeals of Maryland previously held that "re-
sided" in Article III, section 9, means "domiciled."770 The controlling 
factor in determining a person's domicile is his intent. 771 In the 
present case, the court again considered voter registration the strong-
est evidence of domicile.772 Thus, the court held that Roberts was 
763. See id.; see also MD. CONST. art. III, § 9. 
764. See id. at 151-52, 665 A.2d at 1026. 
765. See id. at 151, 665 A.2d at 1026. 
766. See id. at 152, 665 A.2d at 1026. 
767. See id. 
768. See id. at 151, 665 A.2d at 1026. 
769. See id. at 152, 665 A.2d at 1026. 
770. See id. at 153, 665 A.2d at 1027; see also Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 
496-97, 325 A.2d 392, 396 (1947). 
771. Roberts, 340 Md. at 153-54, 665 A.2d at 1027 (citing Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 
Md. 101, 116-17, 371 A.2d 1094, 1102-03 (1973». 
772. See id. at 155, 665 A.2d at 1027 (citing Bainum, 272 Md. at 498, 325 A.2d at 
397). 
134 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
domiciled in the district prior to May 8, 1994 and therefore, he 
satisfied the residency requirements for the election.773 
Dan Curry 
D. A Governor's Early Retirement System benefits were properly 
suspended during his tenure as governor. Board oj Trustees oj the 
Maryland State Retirement and Pension Systems v. Hughes774 
1. Facts 
Governor Harry Hughes retired from twenty-two years of state 
service in 1977. He began receiving a pension under the Governor's 
Early Retirement System (ERS) and pursuant to Maryland law. 775 
Section 11(12) of Article 73B of the Annotated Code of Maryland 
provides: "Should such beneficiary be appointed or elected to any 
office, the salary or compensation of which is paid by the State, his 
retirement allowance shall cease .... "776 Subsequently, Hughes was 
elected and began serving as governor of Maryland in 1979. Once 
he began to receive a state salary, the Board suspended his retirement 
allowance in accordance with section 11(12). Hughes appealed the 
Board's decision to the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore 
City. The circuit court remanded the case to the Maryland State 
Retirement Agency to establish more evidence. Hughes filed a motion 
to alter, amend, and revise judgment and requested the circuit court. 
rule in his favor based upon the record, agency practice, and legis-
lative history. The motion was denied and the Agency appealed to 
the court of special appeals. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
issue certiorari prior to intermediate appellate review to determine 
whether Hughes was entitled to receive both his ERS benefits and 
salary while he served as governor. 
2. Analysis 
Hughes contended that he was entitled to retirement benefits 
and a salary simultaneously because his gubernatorial pension was 
covered under a separate retirement system than the ERS.777 Hughes 
argued that section 11(12) would apply to him only if he were both 
773. See id. at 155-56, 665 A.2d at 1028. 
774. 340 Md. 1, 664 A.2d 1250 (1995). 
775. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 11(12) (1988). 
776. Hughes, 340 Md. at 4, 664 A.2d at 1251. 
777. See id. at 5, 664 A.2d at 1252. 
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a beneficiary and a member of the ERS.778 Once he assumed the 
office of governor, Hughes became a member of the Gubernatorial 
Retirement Plan (GRP).779 Therefore, he asserted that he was no 
longer a member of the ERS and thus, not subject to section 11(12).780 
The court disagreed. The plain language of section 11(12) indi-
cates that "membership" is irrelevant. 781 The inquiry turns on whether 
Hughes was a "beneficiary" of the ERS.782 Furthermore, the court 
concluded that the GRP is not separate from the ERS.783 Rather, it 
is a system that is under the ERS.784 
In addition, Hughes asserted that the provisions of the ERS do 
not apply to governors because governors are not considered "em-
ployees" under the ERS definition in Section 1(3) of Article 73B of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland. 785 The court disagreed with this 
proposition as well.786 Section 1(3) includes as an employee "any 
appointed or elected employee of the State." 787 Thus, the court held 
that Governor Hughes was not entitled to simultaneously receive a 
salary and retirement compensation from the State during his tenure 
as governor.788 
Dan Curry 
E. Insurance Commissioner has authority to decide the 
constitutionality of insurance code provisions; the statutes deemed 
unconstitutional by the Commissioner, however, were inapplicable 
to the controversy before the court. Insurance Commissioner v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society'89 
1. Facts 
The Insurance Commissioner determined that statutes authoriz-
ing differentials based on gender, even though actuarially justified, 
violated the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The life insurer, 
Equitable, the Human Relations Commission, and the National Or-
778. See id. at 9, 664 A.2d at 1253-54. 
779. See id. at 9, 664 A.2d at 1254. 
780. See id. 
781. See id. 
782. See id. 
783. See id. at 10, 664 A.2d at 1254. 
784. See id. 
785. See id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 1(3) (1988). 
786. See Hughes, 340 Md. at 10-11, 664 A.2d at 1254-55. 
787. [d. at 11, 664 A.2d at 1254-55. 
788. See id. at 17-18, 664 A.2d at 1257. 
789. 339 Md. 596, 664 A.2d 862 (1995). 
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ganization of Women sought judicial review of the Commissioner's 
determination in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari to 
review the commissioner's determination. 
2. Analysis 
Portions of Article 48A of the Annotated Code of Maryland 
authorize differentials for certain insurance rates and underwriting 
based on gender if the differentials are actuarially justified.790 The 
Insurance Commissioner held that the statutes were unenforceable 
because of Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights -
Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment. 791 Upon review of the Insur-
ance Commissioner's and the circuit court's decisions, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held the statutes did not apply to the contro-
versy at bar.792 Consequently, the court did not reach the constitu-
tional issues. 793 
The court reviewed the constitutional authority vested in the 
Insurance Commissioner .794 As an administrative official, the court 
concluded, the Insurance Commissioner had jurisdiction to rule on 
the constitutionality of insurance statutes. 795 Moreover, the court 
noted that the Commissioner, like any other elected or appointed 
state official, had taken an oath to uphold the Maryland Constitu-
tion.796 
The court then addressed to the statutory sections at issue, which 
included sections 223, 226 and 234A of Article 48A of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland. 797 Section 223(b)(2) is applicable only to health 
insurance, as opposed to life insurance which was at issue here. 798 
Section 226(c)(2) relates to property and casualty insurance. 799 More-
790. See id. at 600-01, 664 A.2d at 865; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 
223 (b)(2) , 226(c)(2), 234A(b) (1988). 
791. See Equitable Life, 339 Md. at 601, 664 A.2d at 865. 
792. See id. at 625, 664 A.2d at 877. 
793. See id. 
794. See id. at 615-24, 664 A.2d at 872-76. 
795. See id. at 624, 664 A.2d at 876. 
796. See id. at 617,664 A.2d at 873. 
797. See id. at 625-34, 664 A.2d at 877-82. 
798. See id. at 627, 664 A.2d at 878. Section 223(b)(2) states in full: "Notwithstand-
ing any other provisions in this section, an insurer may not make or permit 
any differential in ratings premium payments or dividends for any reason based 
on the sex of an applicant or policyholder unless there is actuarial justification 
for the differential." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 223(b)(2) (1988). 
799. See Equitable Life, 339 Md. at 626-27, 664 A.2d at 871-78. Section 226(c)(2) 
states in full: "Notwithstanding any other provisions in this section, an insurer 
may not make or permit any differential in ratings premium payments or 
dividends for any reason based on the sex or physical handicap or disability 
of an applicant or policyholder unless there is actuarial justification for the 
differential." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 226(c)(2) (1988). 
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over, subsection (e) of section 226 states that the section does not 
apply to life insurance. 800 Finally, section 234A(b) applies to under-
writing whereas the controversy in the instant case involved rate 
setting, to which section 234 does not apply.801 Because the statutes 
were inapplicable, the court vacated the Insurance Commissioner's 
order and the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case to the 
Insurance Commissioner for further deliberations. 802 
Dan Curry 
F. Informing a jury of collateral aspects of a health care 
arbitration panel's decision generally undermines the statutory 
presumption of correctness,· however, such information is 
appropriate to cure a counsel's prejudicial statement. Carrion v. 
Linzey 803 
1. Facts 
Robert P. Linzey filed a dental malpractice claim against Dr. 
Timothy J. Carrion, Dr. Donald B. Lurie and their employer, Donald 
B. Lurie, D.D.S., P.A. In accordance with the Section 3-2A-Ol of 
the Health Claims Arbitration Act, an arbitration panel heard the 
case and awarded Linzey $167,600. Carrion appealed to the Circuit 
Court of Maryland for Baltimore City and requested a jury trial. 
The trial judge told the jury both of the arbitration panel's compo-
sition (one health care professional, one lawyer, and one lay person) 
and that its decision was not unanimous (the health care professional 
dissented). The jury found Carrion not liable to Linzey for his 
injuries.804 Linzey appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland,80s which found that the jury instruction weakened the 
800. See Equitable Life, 339 Md. at 626, 664 A.2d at 877. 
801. See id. at 626, 664 A.2d at 877. Section 234A(b) states in full: 
No insurer shall require the existence of special conditions, facts, or 
situations as a condition to its acceptance or renewal of, a particular 
insurance risk or class of risks in an arbitrary, capricious, unfair, or 
discriminatory manner based in whole or part upon race, creed, color, 
sex, religion, national origin, place of residency, or blindness or other 
physical handicap or disability. Actuarial justification may be consid-
ered with respect to sex. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234A(b) (1988). 
802. See Equitable Life, 339 Md. at 635, 664 A.2d at 882. 
803. 342 Md. 266, 675 A.2d 527 (1996). 
804. See id. at 272-73, 675 A.2d at 529-30. Dr. Carrion performed oral surgery on 
Linzey to correct an "open bite" and reposition the lower jaw. See id. at 270, 
675 A.2d at 528-29. The lower jaw did not properly heal. See id. 
805. See Linzey v. Carrion, 103 Md. App. 116, 652 A.2d 1154 (1995). 
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statutory presumption of correctness. The court of special appeals 
reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for a new 
trial. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari and 
reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals. 
2. Analysis 
a. Presumption oj Correctness 
Under Rule 5-301 of the Maryland Rules of Evidence a pre-
sumption "satisfies the burden of production on the fact presumed 
and, in absence of rebutting evidence, may satisfy the burden of 
persuasion. "806 The Health Claims Arbitration Act allows for the 
decisions of arbitration panels to be admissible because of their 
presumption of correctness. S07 Therefore, when a party rejects the 
arbitration panel's award, that award is admissible as evidence at 
trial and is given a presumption of correctness;sos 
b. Instant Case 
The controversy in the instant case was over the trial judge's 
instruction to the jury on the membership of the arbitration panel.809 
The trial judge told the jury that the panel consisted of one lay 
person, one lawyer, and one health care professional.8l0 Furthermore, 
the judge told the jury that the panel found in favor of Linzey by 
a two-to-one vote. SII 
The court of appeals held that under most circumstances such 
information would be grounds for reversible error because it gives 
too much case-specific information to a jury.812 A jury could infer 
too much from the instruction and consequently, abdicate its role of 
fact-finder and defer to the panel's decision. 813 However, the instruc-
tion was necessary in this case because of a violation of a motion in 
limine.S14 A motion in limine was granted to prohibit the attorneys 
806. Carrion, 342 Md. at 279, 675 A.2d at 533 (quoting Alan D. Hornstein, The 
New Maryland Rules 0/ Evidence: Survey, Analysis and Critique, 54 MD. L. 
REv. 1032, 1049 (1995». 
807. See id. at 280, 675 A.2d at 534. 
808. See id. 
809. See id. at 290, 675 A.2d at 538. 
810. See id. 
811. See id. 
812. See id. at 291, 675 A.2d at 539. 
813. See id. at 284, 675 A.2d at 536. 
814. See id. at 292-93, 675 A.2d at 540. 
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from mentioning the panel's membership. m Linzey's attorney vio-
lated the motion by mentioning that a question from the panel was 
asked by "Dr. Oppenheim.''816 Therefore, the court held that the 
trial judge's instruction was necessary to cure the attorney's preju-
dicial statement. 817 
Dan Curry 
G. The Police Department's decision to add a new charge against 
an officer after the officer rejects the Department's initial offer of 
punishment is not a violation of the Law Enforcement Officers' 
Bill of Rights (LEOBR). Blondell v. Baltimore City Police 
Department818 
1. Facts 
In December 1990, Captain Charles Blondell of the Baltimore 
City Police Department was charged with filing a meritless complaint 
of sexual harassment against one of his subordinates. The Investi-
gation Department and Blondell's commanding officer recommended 
a severe letter of reprimand as punishment. The punishment also 
included a three-day loss of vacation. Blondell declined the offer of 
punishment and asserted his right to a hearing under LEOBR. In 
preparation for the hearing, Blondell made false statements to the 
review board. Consequently, the department added a false statements 
charge. 
Before the hearing, Blondell filed a complaint in the Circuit 
Court of Maryland for Baltimore City against the police department. 
He charged that the addition of the false statement charge, after he 
rejected a "summary punishment" offer, was a violation of sections 
727(d)(3).819 He requested permanent injunctive relief to prevent the 
police department from proceeding with the hearing. The police 
department argued that its initial offer did not constitute summary 
punishment and that the hearing should proceed with no punishment 
restrictions. The circuit court denied Blondell's request and on appeal 
S15. Sa! id. 
S16. Sa! id. at 270, 675 A.2d at 529. Linzey's counsel did not directly state that 
Dr. Oppenheim was a member of the panel or that he was a dentist. See id. 
S17. See id. at 293, 675 A.2d at 540. 
SIS. 341 Md. 6S0, 672 A.2d 639 (1996). 
S19. See id. at 6SS, 672 A.2d at 643. Section 727(d)(3) restricts the punishment that 
can be imposed by the board to nothing more severe than those which the 
summary judgment imposed. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 727-734D (1991). 
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the court of special appeals affirmed the decision. The court of 
appeals granted certiorari and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
The court noted that purpose of the LEOBR is to provide police 
officers accused of misconduct with procedural safeguards.820 For 
example, section 727(d)(3) provides that an officer who refuses sum-
mary punishment will have a hearing board recommend a punishment 
not more severe than the rejected punishment. 821 Accordingly, Blon-
dell asserted that the additional charge and penalty violated the 
"summary punishment" provision. The court first considered whether 
the offer to Blondell was for "summary punishment," and then 
addressed whether adding a charge was a violation of the LEOBR.822 
The court ruled that the initial offer of punishment to Blondell 
was not "summary punishment. "823 Thus, section 727(d)(3) did not 
apply.824 Summary punishment is only available for minor offenses 
and the department may not offer summary punishment if an offense 
is not minor. 825 'The court held that the fabrication of a sexual 
harassment charge was not a minor offense.826 Therefore, summary 
punishment was not available to Blondell. 827 
Even assuming for argument's sake that this was a summary 
punishment, the police department added the second charge before 
the police chief chose the hearing board mechanism under which to 
proceed.828 The court stated that the police chief has discretion in 
choosing which hearing board "mechanism" under which to pro-
ceed. 829 The chief may choose to proceed via section 727(d)(1) which, 
contrary to section 727(d)(3), does not impose any limitation on the 
penalty.830 Because the police chief had not yet selected a hearing 
820. See Blondell, 341 Md. at 691, 672 A.2d at 645. 
821. See id. at 689, 672 A.2d at 644. 
822. See id. at 687-701, 672 A.2d at 643-50. 
823. See id. at 698, 672 A.2d at 648-49. 
824. See id. 
825. See id. at 698, 672 A.2d at 648. 
826. See id. Although the LEOBR does not define minor offenses, the court noted 
some examples: lateness, personal appearance infractions, and minor omissions 
of assigned duties. See id. at 699 n.15, 672 A.2d at 649 n.15. 
827. See id. Additionally, the court held that the punishment exceeded the maximum 
penalty available for summary punishment, further supporting the assertion 
that the initial offer was not summary punishment. See id. 
828. See id. at 701, 672 A.2d at 650. 
829. See id. 
830. See id. at 690, 672 A.2d at 644. Essentially, section 727(d)(1) requires a hearing 
board of three or more members and no punishment restrictions. See id. 
Section 727(d)(3) allows for a one-member or more board that may not 
authorize sanctions more severe than those which the summary punishment 
imposed. See id. 
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board mechanism by which to proceed when Blondell instituted the 
action, section 727(d)(3) was not violated. 831 The police department 
had not taken any action that could limit the hearing board's 
permissible penalty.832 Consequently, the court found that the police 
procedures did not violate the LEOBR.833 
Dan Curry 
H. A contractor is not entitled to attorney's fees, when it 
prevails, in an action for mandamus relief from wrongful rescission 
of a competitive bid project. Hess Construction Co. v. Board of 
Education oj Prince George's County834 
1. Facts 
In 1993, the Board of Education of Prince George's County 
(Board) requested bids for construction of an elementary school. The 
contract was awarded to the lowest bidder, Hess Construction Com-
pany (Hess). Subsequently, the Board revoked the offer and Hess 
instituted an action for a writ of mandamus and attorney's fees. The 
circuit court granted the writ but declined to award attorney fees. 
Hess, however, insisted that attorney's fees can be granted under 
Maryland Rule BE 44. Hess asserted that "damages" in Rule BE 44 
included attorney's fees and based its position on the equitable nature 
of an action for mandamus relief and because Rule BE 44 explicitly 
provides for damages. Hess appealed to the court of special appeals, 
which affirmed the circuit court. The court of appeals granted 
certiorari and affirmed. 
2. Analysis 
The court stated that Maryland follows the American Rule that 
a prevailing party may not ordinarily recover attorney's fees. 835 The 
831. See id. at 701, 672 A.2d at 650. 
832. See id. 
833. See id. at 702, 672 A.2d at 650. 
834. 341 Md. 155, 669 A.2d 1352 (1996). 
835. See id. at 159, 669 A.2d at 1354 (citing Collier v. Maryland Individual Practice 
Ass'n, 327 Md. I, 11, 607 A.2d 537, 542 (1992». Exceptions to the American 
Rule include: (1) where a statute or contract allows for the fees; (2) where a 
defendant's wrongful conduct forces plaintiff to a sue a third party, plaintiff 
may recover fees from defendant; (3) where a criminal defendant prevails in a 
malicious prosecution action, the fees from the criminal suit may be awarded 
as damages in the civil suit. See id. at 160, 669 A.2d at 1354. 
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court disagreed with Hess's contention that Rule BE 44 contains an 
exception to the American rule, and based its conclusion on several 
grounds. 836 First, historically, attorney's fees were not recoverable in 
a mandamus action merely because the party against whom the fees 
are sought is the unsuccessful litigant.837 Second, substantive law, not 
equitable principals, governs damages claims under the Maryland 
Rules. 838 The court stated "[t]he American Rule applies to actions 
'in equity' as well as to actions 'at law,"'839 and the American Rule, 
as a matter of substantive law, does not award attorney's fees as 
damages.84O Accordingly, the court held that simply mentioning 
"damages" in Rule BE 44 is not enough to qualify as an exception 
to the American Rule.841 
Dan Curry 
I. Attorney's fees and costs imposed on an employer and insurer 
for bringing a frivolous proceeding do not constitute compensation 
for the purpose of tolling a statute of limitations to modify a 
workers' compensation award. Stevens v. Rite-Aid Corp.842 
1. Facts 
The claimant Viola M. Stevens injured herself in March 1981 
while on the job for Rite-Aid Corporation (Rite-Aid). She received 
payments of either temporary or permanent partial disability benefits 
for several years thereafter. In October 1991, she sought to reopen 
her case before the Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) in 
order to receive additional compensation. Approximately six years 
had passed since her last compensation payment. However, due to 
appeals taken by Rite-Aid, attorney's fees were awarded to Stevens's 
counsel, the last fee being awarded on October 4, 1988. The reopening 
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, section 9-736 of the 
Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 
states that the WCC may not modify any award unless the modifi-
cation was applied for within five years of the last compensation 
payment. The question before the court was whether attorney's fees 
836. See id. at 164-71, 669 A.2d at 1356-59. 
837. See id. at 164,669 A.2d at 1356 (quoting Hess Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 
102 Md. App. 736, 750, 651 A.2d 446, 453 (1995». 
838. See id. at 165-66, 669 A.2d at 1357. 
839. [d. at 166, 669 A.2d at 1357. 
840. See id. at 165, 669 A.2d at 1357. 
841. See id. 
842. 340 Md. 555, 667 A.2d 642 (1995). 
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and costs, which had been charged to the employer and insurer as 
sanctions for frivolous proceedings, constituted compensation as de-
scribed in section 9-736. Stevens argued that the attorney's fees and 
costs awarded constituted compensation. Consequently, having been 
awarded the last payment of fees and costs in 1988, claimant's 1991 
application for modification would have been within the five-year 
time limit. Rite-Aid argued that the fees and costs were not compen-
sation, therefore, section 9-736 would bar the claimant from addi-
tional compensation since she had not applied for benefits within 
five years after the last compensation payment. The circuit court 
held that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations because 
attorney's fees and costs imposed for bringing frivolous proceedings 
was not compensation under section 9-736. 
2. Analysis 
The court of appeals granted certiorari to consider the meaning 
of the word "compensation" within section 9-736 of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 843 The court stated that compensation is money 
payable to the covered employee or the employee's dependents. 844 In 
Chanticleer Skyline Room, Inc. v. Greer84S the court posed three 
questions to determine the meaning of "compensation": (1) Is the 
payment a money allowance?; (2) Is the payment provided for in the 
title?; (3) Is it payable directly to the employee?846 
In the instant case, the payments were money and section 9-734 
of the title provides for payments of fees and costs as a result of 
frivolous proceedings. 847 The court held, however, that the payments 
were not payable to the employee-claimant.848 The Chanticleer model 
deems fees "payable to the employee" if the claimant owes the fees 
to the attorney. 849 Since the fees and costs represented a sanction 
against Rite-Aid for its frivolous proceedings, they purposely did not 
reduce the claimant's award.8so The fees were paid directly by Rite-
Aid to claimant's counsel. 8S1 Thus, the fees and costs were not 
"payable to the employee" and therefore, were not compensation.8S2 
843. See id. at 565, 667 A.2d at 647. 
844. See id. 
845. 271 Md. 693, 319 A.2d 802 (1974). 
846. See· Stevens, 340 Md. at 565-66, 667 A.2d at 647. 
847. See id. at 566, 667 A.2d at 648. 
848. See id. at 567, 667 A.2d at 648. 
849. See id. In Chanticleer, the court held that attorney's fees were compensation 
because the wee approved the fees, and the fees were a lien against the 
compensation award. See id. 
850. See id. 
851. See id. 
852. See id. 
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Accordingly, the court affirmed the circuit court and denied Stevens 
additional compensation because five years had elapsed since her last 
compensation payment.8S3 
Dan Curry 
J. A defendant suffers "injury," which starts the running of the 
lBO-day period for provision of notice under the Maryland Tort 
Claims Act (MTCA) for third-party claims against the state, when 
the defendant is served with the plaintifi's complaint. Haupt v. 
State8S4 
1. Facts 
Sandra Lee Haupt was involved in an accident with Margaret 
Lynn Keehan, the plaintiff, on August 1, 1989. Three years later, 
Keehan filed suit alleging that Haupt's negligence caused the accident. 
Haupt filed an answer and a third-party complaint against Anne 
Arundel County (the County) alleging that trees and brush on the 
County's property obstructed her view. However, the State of Mar-
yland (the State), not the County, owned the property in question. 
The action against the County was dismissed, and on March 5, 1993, 
Haupt filed a third-party complaint against the State.8SS The State 
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Haupt failed to give the State 
notice within 180 days of the accident. The State construed the injury 
as the injury to the plaintiff, or those injuries resulting from the 
accident. Haupt construed the injury requirement in the statute to 
mean as the time when final judgment is awarded against her. The 
circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss, adopting the 
State's position. The court of appeals issued a writ of certiorari on 
its own motion. 
2. Analysis 
The question for the court to decide was whether the injury 
referred to in the statute is that arising out of the car accident, or 
the injury to the defendant when the defendant is served with suit 
papers.8S6 The court noted that the State's assertion that the injury 
853. See id. at 568, 667 A.2d at 649. 
854. 340 Md. 462, 667 A.2d 179 (1995). 
855. Maryland requires written notice to the state "within 180 days after the injury 
to the person or property that is the basis of the claim." MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE GOV'T § 12-106(b)(1) (1993). 
856. Haupt, 340 Md. at 472, 667 A.2d at 184. 
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requirement is the injury resulting from the accident is illogical and 
contrary to common sense when the notice provision is considered 
in. light of third-party claims.8s7 
The statute has a different meaning in the contex.t of a third-
party claim.8s8 Since the purpose of the third-party complaint is to 
protect the defendant from the plaintiff's demands, the term "injury" 
carries a different meaning than it has in the first party claim.8S9 
Consequently, the running of the 180-day notice provision begins 
when the defendant is served with the plaintiff's complaint.860 This 
is the first point in time that the defendant is exposed to liability. 861 
Likewise, since the defendant has been put on notice, once it has 
been served with a complaint, the defendant is now in a position to 
notify the State in accordance with section 12-106(b).862 
Nevertheless, Haupt, the third-party plaintiff in this case was 
unable to benefit from the court's broad reading of the statute. 863 
Keehan served Haupt with the complaint on August 30, 1992.864 
Therefore, Haupt had until February 26, 1993 to provide the State 
with written notice of the action.86s She failed to do so and the court 
dismissed her action against the State because it was untimely. 866 
Dan Curry 
X. TORT LAW 
A. In actions for civil conspiracy to commit a tort and for aiding 
and abetting the commission of a tort, the plaintiff must allege 
that the underlying tort has been committed. Alleco, Inc. v. Harry 
& Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Inc.867 
1. Facts 
Lawrence I. Weisman served as attorney for Alleco, Inc. (Alleco) 
from September 1986 to July 1988. During that time, Weisman shared 
857. See id. at 472-74, 667 A.2d at 184-85. 
858. See id. at 474, 667 A.2d at 185. 
859. See id. at 475, 667 A.2d at 185. 
860. See id. at 476, 667 A.2d at 186. 
861. See id. 
862. See id. 
863. See id. at 479, 667 A.2d at 187. 
864. See id. 
865. See id. 
866. See id. 
867. 340 Md. 176, 665 A.2d 1038 (1995). 
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confidential information regarding Alleco's intent to sell a subsidiary 
with various personal business associates. Based on this information, 
Weisman and his associates coordinated substantial purchases of 
Alleco's debentures and stock and eventually attempted to force the 
corporation to pay par value for the securities. 
Alleco filed suit against Weisman's associateg868 alleging liability 
under four counts: (1) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; 
(2) civil conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty; (3) aiding and abetting 
fraud; and (4) civil conspiracy to commit fraud. The circuit court 
dismissed counts one and three holding that Maryland had not 
recognized "aiding and abetting" the commission of a tort as an 
independent tort. The court also dismissed counts two and four 
holding that Alleco did not sufficiently allege that any of the defen-
dants had committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari. The court of appeals affirmed as to 
counts two and four and affirmed, on different grounds, as to counts 
one and three. 
2. Analysis 
Addressing the civil conspiracy counts, the court first noted that 
'''conspiracy' is not a separate tort capable of independently sustain-
ing an award of damages in the absence of other tortious injury to 
the plaintiff." 869 The court maintained that to prevail in a civil 
conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must first establish that the underlying 
tort was committed.870 The court thus held that counts two and four 
were appropriately dismissed because the plaintiffs did not adequately 
allege that Weisman had committed the underlying torts - breach 
of fiduciary duty 871 and fraud.872 
With regards to counts one and three, the court held that the 
circuit court and the court of special appeals erred in holding that 
Maryland did not recognize liability for aiding and abetting the 
commission of a tort.873 The court noted, however, that, as with the 
868. Weisman died prior to the commencement of the action, and his estate was 
not made a party to the litigation. See id. at 179, 665 A.2d at 1040. 
869. [d. at 189, 665 A.2d at 1045 (quoting Alexander v. Evander, 336 Md. 635, 
645 n.8, 650 A.2d 260, 265 n.8 (1994». 
870. See id. at 189-91, 665 A.2d at 1044-45. 
871. The court specifically reserved the question of whether Maryland law recognizes 
a tort of breach of fiduciary duty. The court assumed for the purpose of 
discussion that it did, and thus, applied the elements of the tort as set forth 
in Section 874 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id. at 191-92, 665 
A.2d at 1045-46. 
872. See id. at 196, 199, 665 A.2d at 1048, 1049. 
873. See id. at 199, 665 A.2d at 1049. 
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civil conspiracy counts, "civil aider and abettor liability ... requires 
that there exist underlying tortious activity in order for the alleged 
aider and abettor to be held liable. "874 The court thus held that 
because the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the underlying 
torts had been committed, their claims for aiding and abetting were 
properly dismissed. 87s 
Gabriel A. Terrasa 
B. When police officer performs arrest pursuant to a facially 
valid arrest warrant, false imprisonment does not lie against 
arresting officer or third party instigating the arrest. Montgomery 
Ward v. Wilson876 
1. Facts 
Several customers of the Montgomery Ward store at Temple 
Hills complained of unauthorized credit card charges made against 
their credit cards at that store. Montgomery Ward's loss prevention 
manager, Jeffrey Bresnahan, investigated the charges. During the 
investigation, two employees told Bresnahan that a co-worker, Frances 
Wilson, had made credit purchases charging them to an account 
number she had written on a piece of paper. Bresnahan verified 
through personnel records that Wilson had been working at the time 
the unauthorized charges were made. Bresnahan interviewed Wilson, 
who denied the allegations. Bresnahan did not examine the charge 
slips to ascertain whether the authorizing signature resembled Wil-
son's handwriting. Bresnahan filed charges against Wilson. Prince 
George's County Police arrested Wilson at Montgomery Ward, where 
she was handcuffed and taken away in front of her peers and 
customers. The charges against Wilson were eventually dismissed 
because witnesses failed to appear for trial. 
Wilson filed a complaint against Montgomery Ward and Bres-
nahan claiming false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Wilson claimed that 
Bresnahan had not sufficiently investigated the allegations against 
her before bringing criminal charges. A jury found the defendants 
liable on both torts and awarded Wilson compensatory and punitive 
damages. The defendants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland, claiming that, as a matter of law, Bresnahan had 
874. [d. at 201, 665 A.2d at 1050. 
875. See id. at 200-01, 665 A.2d at 1050. 
876. 339 Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
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probable cause to file the charges against Wilson, and thus, the 
evidence did not support a verdict against them for false imprison-
ment and malicious prosecution. The defendants also claimed that 
the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that punitive damages 
could be awarded on either tort on the basis of implied malice. The 
court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
2. Analysis 
a. Probable Cause 
The court noted that the trial judge gave the jury too much 
authority to decide whether there had been probable cause.877 Rather 
than allowing the jury to apply a legally correct definition of probable. 
cause to the facts of the case, the trial judge should have "explain[ed] 
to the jury whether or not probable cause exist[ed] under the various 
factual scenarios which [might have been] generated by the evi-
dence." 878 The court held, however, that because the defendants did 
not object to the jury instruction on probable cause, and in light of 
the conflicting testimony regarding Wilson's actions, the verdict 
would not be overturned on the ground that there was insufficient 
evidence of lack of probable cause.879 
b. Malicious Prosecution 
Turning to the tort of malicious prosecution, the court addressed 
the defendants' contention that the plaintiff had not proven the 
element of malice. 880 The court asserted that in malicious prosecution 
cases, the jury is allowed to infer malice from lack of probable 
cause.881 The court explained, however, that malice in this context 
means "wrongful or improper motive in initiating legal proceedings 
877. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 716, 664 A.2d at 923. 
878. Id (citing Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297 (1984». 
879. See id. at 716-17, 664 A.2d at 923-24. 
880. The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are: 
(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant 
against the plaintiff, (b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the 
accused, (c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (d) 
'malice,' or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than 
that of bringing an offender to justice. 
Id. at 714, 664 A.2d at 922 (quoting Durante v. Braun, 263 Md. 685, 688, 
284 A.2d 241, 243 (1971»). 
881. See id. at 717-18, 664 A.2d at 924. 
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against the plaintiff," and that an inference of "negligence in insti-
tuting unjustified criminal proceedings . . . cannot satisfy the malice 
element. "882 The court held that while the trial judge's instruction 
on malice might have "invited" the jury to infer malice from 
negligence, the defendants failed to object to the trial court's instruc-
tion, and thus affirmed the award of compensatory damages under 
the malicious prosecution count.883 
c. False Imprisonment 
Addressing the false imprisonment count, the court held that 
when a police officer performs an arrest pursuant to a facially valid 
arrest warrant, the tort of false imprisonment does not lie against 
the arresting officer or the third party instigating the arrest. 884 Over-
ruling numerous court of special appeals's decisions, the court noted 
that once an arrest warrant is issued and the proceedings against the 
plaintiff have commenced, the tort of malicious prosecution provides 
the appropriate remedy for any damage done.88s 
d. Punitive Damages 
The court held that to recover punitive damages in an action 
for either false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, "a plaintiff 
must establish by clear and convincing evidence the defendant's 
wrongful or improper motive for instigating the prosecution."886 
Furthermore, the court noted that although the jury may infer malice 
from lack of probable cause when awarding compensatory damages 
in a malicious prosecution case, the inference cannot be made in an 
award of punitive damages.887 
Gabriel A. Terrasa 
C. Manufacturers and distributor-installers of asbestos-containing 
products may be liable to bystander workers harmed by asbestos 
dust. ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin 888 
1. Facts 
An April 1990 order of the Circuit Court of Maryland for 
Baltimore City consolidated 8555 actions involving claims for per-
882. [d. at 718-19, 664 A.2d at 924-25. 
883. See id. at 719-20, 664 A.2d at 925. 
884. See id. at 720-21, 664 A.2d at 925. 
885. See id. at 723, 664 A.2d at 927. 
886. [d. at 730-35, 664 A.2d at 930-33. 
887. See id. at 735-36, 664 A.2d at 933. 
888. 340 Md. 334, 667 A.2d 116 (1995). 
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sonal injuries or wrongful death allegedly resulting from exposure to 
asbestos. By agreements of counsel, six representative plaintiffs were 
selected, three by plaintiffs' counsel and three by defendants' counsel, 
for the consolidated actions known as Abate I. All issues between 
the six representative plaintiffs and six nonsettling trial defendants 
were decided at the Abate I trial. 
For the three representative plaintiffs selected by defendants' 
counsel, the court found each had not contracted an asbestos-related 
disease, and judgments in favor of the six trial defendants were 
entered as to these plaintiffs. For the three Abate I plaintiffs, selected 
by plaintiffs' counsel, the jury found that: (1) the plaintiffs were 
foreseeable bystanders;889 (2) the plaintiffs had contracted an asbestos-
related disease; and (3) the amount of time the plaintiffs had been 
exposed to defendants' products was a substantial contributing factor 
in causing the asbestos-related disease and/or death. Three defen-
dants, ACandS, Inc. (ACandS), a manufacturer, and Pittsburgh 
Corning Corporation (PCC) and Porter Hayden Company (PH), 
both distributor-installers were found liable for compensatory dam-
ages. Additionally, PCC and PH were found liable for punitive 
damages. All three defendants appealed. 
The common issues of defendants' negligence and strict liability 
as to specific products were decided by the Abate I court in favor 
of plaintiffs. Defendants appealed, questioning the legality of apply-
ing these findings to the cases of the 8,549 plaintiffs not tried in 
Abate I. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted a writ of certiorari 
on their own motion prior to consideration by the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. 
2. Analysis 
ACandS, PCC, and PH challenged the constitutionality of the 
consolidation on the grounds that it produced proceedings so complex 
and overwhelming that it was beyond the capacity of the jury to 
resolve fairly. 890 The court of appeals reviewed decisions nationwide 
affirming the legality of consolidation actions in other asbestos cases 
and concluded that the Abate I proceedings fit well within acceptable 
parameters of numbers of parties litigated, number of work site 
889. A bystander was defined as an individual who did not directly handle an 
asbestos-containing product, but was near enough to an asbestos-containing 
product's fibers to come in contact with those fibers. Bystanders were distin-
guished from users, who were those who came in contact with asbestos fibers 
by directly handling an asbestos-ontaining product. [d. at 358, 667 A.2d at 
127. 
890. See id. at 397-98, 667 A.2d at 147. 
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situations introduced into evidence, and types of workers affected.891 
The court held that findings on common issues of these defendants' 
negligence and strict liability as to all products submitted were thus 
binding on cases against these defendants by the 8549 plaintiffs 
pending mini-trials.892 
The court also addressed the appropriateness of the punitive 
damage awards. 893 The court reversed the lower court's judgment, 
holding that actual malice, not merely implied malice, was required 
to support an award of punitive damages in this non-intentional tort 
action.894 The court held there was insufficient evidence to prove that 
the defendants acted in bad faith towards any class action plaintiff.895 
Addressing the specific claims of the three bystander plaintiffs 
awarded compensatory damages, the court held that the majority 
rule: the "frequency, regularity and proximity" test,896 was the law 
in Maryland, and was appropriately applied by the trial court in 
awarding compensatory damages to these plaintiffs. /fn The court, 
however, reversed the judgment in favor of one plaintiff, finding 
that there was insufficient evidence of proximity of the plaintiff to 
the asbestos-containing product.898 
Thus, the court of appeals upheld compensatory damages as to 
two of the plaintiffs, but denied the awards of punitive damages. 
Lucy Moran 
D. Maryland's exception to the economic loss rule applies only 
when a defective product creates imminent, serious, and 
unreasonable risk of death or personal injury. MorTis v. Osmose 
Wood Preservin!!99 
1. Facts 
Homeowners (Morris) brought a class action suit 900 against man-
ufacturers of fire retardant treated plywood (FRT Plywood) used in 
891. See id. at 397-403, 667 A.2d at 146-49. 
892. See id. at 404, 667 A.2d at 150. 
893. See id. at 358-92, 667 A.2d at 127-44. 
894. See id. at 358-61, 667 A.2d at 127-29. 
895. See id. at 362-92, 667 A.2d at 129-44. 
896. See id. at 349, 667 A.2d at 123 (questioning Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. 
Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992». The analysis of the frequency, 
regularity, and proximity test takes into account physical characteristics of the 
workplaces and the relationship between activities of the direct users of the 
product and the bystander plaintiff. It is within this context that the frequency 
of product use, proximity of plaintiff to use, and regularity of exposure are 
assessed. 
897. See id. at 349, 667 A.2d at 349-50. 
898. See id. at 356-58, 667 A.2d at 126-27. 
899. 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1995). 
900. The plaintiffs' amended complaint contained five counts: strict liability, neg-
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the construction of roofs. Morris alleged that FRT Plywood was 
defective in design because it was unduly susceptible to thermal 
degradation and deterioration. Morris further alleged that the FR T 
Plywood's defect affected the structural integrity of their homes, 
creating unreasonable risk of death or personal injury from the roofs 
collapsing. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and Morris 
appealed. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
dismissal of the breach of implied warranty count, 901 and affirmed 
the other dismissals. 
Plaintiffs appealed and defendants cross-appealed. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's initial ruling902 dis-
missing all claims. 903 
2. Analysis 
Under Maryland's economic loss rule, purely economic losses in 
product liability claims cannot be recovered in tort actions.904 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that an exception to the 
900. The plaintiffs' amended complaint contained five counts: strict liability, neg-
ligence, breach of implied warranties, negligent misrepresentation, and viola-
tions of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. See Osmose, 340 Md. at 528, 
667 A.2d at 629 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAW II §§ 13-101 to -411 
(1990 & Supp. 1996». 
901. The intermediate appellate court pointed out that the apparent error in the 
circuit court's ruling was that the warranty claims were not filed within the 
applicable limitations periods, and determined that Osmose was a "seller" 
under the vce, thus potentially liable. These claims were remanded for trial. 
See Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 99 Md. App. 646, 664, 639 A.2d 
147, 156 (1994). 
902. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Eldridge criticized the majority's decision to 
affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs' tort claims. The dissenter noted that the 
rationale underlying Maryland's exception to the economic loss rule is that 
correction of dangerous conditions should be encouraged, and that one should 
not have to wait for serious physical injury to recover costs of remedying or 
repairing defects. See Osmose, 340 Md. at 549, 667 A.2d at 634 (Eldridge, J., 
dissenting). Judge Eldridge concluded that the majority's analysis, which con-
sisted of drawing a negative inference from the absence of an injury, was 
inappropriate. See id. at 549-52, 667 A.2d at 639-41 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
903. For the tort claims, the economic loss rule barred recovery. See id. at 531-36, 
667 A.2d at 631-33. With respect to the other claims, the court stated that the 
UCC warranty claims were not cognizable under Maryland's version of the 
UCC, primarily because no dates of "sale" between manufacturer and con-
sumer could be ascertained from the record. See id. at 540-44, 667 A.2d at 
635-37. The court affirmed the dismissal of the count under the Maryland 
Consumer Protection Act, because the connection was too remote between the 
alleged deceptive trade practices of the manufacturers and the sale of the 
homes to the consumers. See id. 
904. See id. at 531, 667 A.2d at 631 (citing U.S. Gypsum v. Baltimore, 336 Md. 
145, 156, 647 A.2d 405 (1994». 
1996] Annual Review 0/ Maryland Law 153 
economic loss rule exists only when the negligent conduct creates an 
unreasonable risk of death or serious personal injury.9Os The court 
concluded that the alleged defects in the FRT Plywood did not 
present a substantial risk.906 It reiterated the court of special appeals's 
holding that mere possibilities are legally insufficient to allege the 
existence of a clear danger of death or serious personal injury.907 
The majority explained that to determine the degree of risk 
required to apply the exception to the economic loss rule, the 
reviewing court must assess the seriousness of the possible harm with 
the probability of the damage occurring.9Os In the instant case, these 
factors viewed together pointed to absence of clear, serious, and 
unreasonable risk of death or personal injury. 909 
Lucy Moran 
905. See id. at 532, 667 A.2d at 631 (citing Council of Co-owners v. Whiting-
Turner, 308 Md. 18, 32-35, 517 A.2d 336 (1986». 
906. See id. at 536,667 A.2d at 633. 
907. See id. 
908. See id. at 533-35, 667 A.2d at 631-33. 
909. See id. at 535-36, 667 A.2d at 633. 

